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Abstract
The Internet of Things (IoT) is being hailed as the next wave revolutionizing our
society. Smart homes, enterprises, and cities are increasingly being equipped with a
plethora of IoTs, ranging from smart-lights to smoke alarms and security cameras.
While IoT networks have the potential to benefit society and our lives, they create
privacy and security challenges not seen with traditional IT networks. The un-
precedented scale and heterogeneity of IoT devices make today’s security measures
inapplicable to IoT networks. Due to the lack of tools for real-time visibility into
IoT network activity, operators of such smart environments are not often aware of
their IoT assets, let alone whether each IoT device is functioning properly safe from
cyber-attacks. This thesis is the culmination of our efforts to develop techniques to
profile the network behavioral pattern of IoTs, automate IoT identification and clas-
sification, deduce their operating context, and detect anomalous behavior indicative
of cyber-attacks.
We begin this thesis by surveying IoT market-segments, security risks, and stake-
holder roles, while reviewing current approaches to vulnerability assessments, intru-
sion detection, and behavioral monitoring. For our first contribution, we collect traf-
fic traces and characterize the network behavior of IoT devices via attributes such as
activity cycles and signaling patterns. We develop a robust machine learning-based
inference engine trained with these attributes and demonstrate real-time classifica-
tion of 28 off-the-shelf IoT devices in the lab with over 99% accuracy. Our second
contribution enhances the classification by reducing the cost of attribute extraction
(via flow-level telemetry at multiple timescales) while also identifying IoT device
states (bootup, user-interaction, and idle). Prototype implementation and evalua-
tion demonstrate the ability of our supervised machine learning method to detect
behavioral changes (including firmware updates) for five IoT devices. Our third
and final contribution develops a modularized unsupervised inference engine that
dynamically accommodates the addition of new IoT devices and/or updates to ex-
isting ones, without requiring system-wide retraining of the model. We demonstrate
via experiments that our model can automatically detect attacks (i.e., direct, spoof-
ing, and reflection) and firmware changes in ten IoT devices with over 94% accuracy.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Contents
1.1 Thesis Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2 Thesis Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
The number of devices connecting to the Internet is rapidly increasing, signalling
the beginning of the era of “Internet of Things” (IoT). IoT refers to the tens of billions
of low–cost devices autonomously communicating with each other and with remote
servers on the Internet. They include everyday objects such as lights, cameras,
motion sensors, door locks, thermostats, fitness trackers, power switches and house-
hold appliances. With shipments projected to reach nearly 20 billion by 2020 [1],
thousands of IoT devices are expected to find their way in homes, enterprises, cam-
puses, and cities of the near future, engendering “smart” environments benefiting
our society and our lives.
While the benefits of IoT devices are well understood, they have unfortunately
also become weapons of destruction in the hands of cyber-attackers. Recent in-
cidents show that the consequences of exploiting IoT vulnerabilities can be high:
an eavesdropper can illegitimately snoop into family activities, an attacker can take
control or shut down a power grid, and household devices can become launch-pads to
1
Chapter 1. Introduction
attack popular web-services. Securing IoT devices from attack remains a formidable
challenge. The large scale and heterogeneity in IoT devices, each with its own hard-
ware, firmware, and software, makes the security vulnerabilities diverse and attack
vectors complex. The reasons for such vulnerabilities can be manifold, for exam-
ple, devices do not have any host protection because of the resource constraints,
device integrators obtain device parts from various suppliers without conducting
any systematic security testing, and device manufacturers have low motivation to
embed security in consumer IoT devices, as they are dissuaded by low margins,
time-to-market pressure, and limited skills.
Network operators are not always fully aware of their IoT assets and they lack
tools that provide visibility into device operational behavior. Obtaining visibility in
a timely manner is paramount to network operators so as to ensure that devices are
in appropriate network security segments, and device behavioral changes indicative
of cyber-attacks are able to be detected, so they can be quarantined rapidly when a
breach is identified.
This thesis begins by surveying the security challenges in the IoT ecosystem
by categorizing connected devices based on market segments, assessing the risks
and challenges compared to traditional IT networks, and recognizing the major
stakeholders and their responsibilities. We also develop a systematical approach to
evaluate the security of smart home devices, validate it empirically in the lab using
many consumer IoT devices, and compare it against threats and solutions used in
traditional IT security.
The observations above emphasize the need to develop a deep understanding of
the behavior of network traffic to/from IoT devices. The objective in this thesis
is therefore to develop behavioral models of IoT devices, which allows for feature
extraction, automated classification, and anomaly detection using machine learning
algorithms. Equally important to this thesis is the empirical validation of the models
using data collected from IoT devices in the lab and in the wild. In this context,
the major contributions of this thesis are as follows:
2
Chapter 1. Introduction
1.1 Thesis Contributions
1. Our first contribution is to learn the unique traffic behavioral characteristics of
various IoT devices. We build an IoT experimental testbed instrumented with
28 consumer IoT devices and five non-IoT devices. The traffic characteristics
of each device are analyzed via attributes comprising activity patterns (e.g.,
distribution of flow volume, flow duration, traffic rate, and device sleep time)
and signalling patterns (e.g., server ports, domain names, cipher suites, DNS,
and NTP queries) extracted from the network traffic traces. These attributes
are used to develop an inference engine to classify the IoT device types using
machine learning techniques. The proposed approach is trained and validated
using the data collected over a six months period from our lab testbed, and
demonstrated to achieve over 99% accuracy.
2. Our second contribution is to develop techniques to extract flow-based at-
tributes at multiple timescales using a programmable telemetry architecture
and to minimize the cost of attribute extraction. We then develop an infer-
ence engine by using these extracted flow level attributes along with a multi-
stage supervised learning architecture to detect the behavioral changes of IoT
devices, distinguish IoT traffic from non-IoTs, classify individual types and
identify states (e.g., bootup, user-interaction, and idle) during its normal op-
erations. We then quantify the trade-off between performance and cost of our
solution, and demonstrate how our monitoring scheme can be used in real-time
operation for detecting behavioral changes (i.e., firmware upgrade or cyber-
attacks).
3. For our third contribution, we invent unsupervised, modularized machines to
achieve a per-device type classification. This allows us to dynamically ac-
commodate changes (e.g., firmware upgrade or addition of a new type) in
an IoT network without requiring a system-wide retraining. The machines
are sensitive to minor deviations in traffic characteristics, allowing us to iden-
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tify changes arising from low-rate cyber-attacks. We validate this by launching
multi-rate attacks including port scanning, ARP spoofing, smurf, fraggle, TCP
SYN flooding and UDP/TCP/ICMP reflections in our testbed. We have shown
that our machine is able detect attacks with a high true positive rate (TPR).
1.2 Thesis Organization
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 published in [2–4] surveys
the landscape of the IoT ecosystem and highlights related work and contributions
made in recent years. In Chapter 3, published in [5, 6], we characterize the IoT
traffic based on the network activity and signalling pattern, and classify the device
types using machine learning-based inference engines. Chapter 4 published in [7, 8]
presents a low-cost attribute extraction architecture using the software defined net-
working (SDN) paradigm and enhances the inference engine to recognize IoT devices
along with the device types and states. In Chapter 5, published in [9, 10], we en-
hance the inference to an unsupervised modular device classification architecture to
accommodate behavioral changes of the devices while also developing a methodology
to monitor the consistency of the classifier and validate the classification framework
using benign and attack traffic. Chapter 6 concludes the thesis with pointers to
direction for future work.
4
Chapter 2
Survey on IoT Ecosystems
Contents
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.2 IoT Market Segments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.2.1 Industrial IoT (IIoT) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.2.2 Consumer IoT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.2.3 Enterprise / Commercial IoT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.3 IoT Security Risks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.3.1 Threats in IoT Network Compare to IT Network . . . . 12
2.3.2 Drawbacks of Traditional Security Measures . . . . . . . 12
2.3.3 Types of Cyber Attacks on IoT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.4 Perspectives and Roles of Stakeholders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.4.1 Consumers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.4.2 Manufacturers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.4.3 Regulators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.4.4 Insurers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.5 Systematical Evaluation of Cybersecurity Threats . . . . . . . . 19
2.5.1 Security Test Suite . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.5.2 Security Posture of IoTs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.5.3 Security Rating of IoT Devices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.6 Existing IoT Security Solutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
5
Chapter 2. Survey on IoT Ecosystems
2.6.1 Signature-based Intrusion Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.6.2 Specification-based Intrusion Detection . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.6.3 Anomaly-based Instruction Detection . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.7 IoT Behavioral Monitoring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.7.1 IoT Traffic Characterization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.7.2 IoT Finger-Printing and Classification . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.8 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
The IoT ecosystem is in its early stages, and concerns about security and privacy
threats have been getting increasing attention. In this chapter, we summarize the
IoT ecosystem and challenges involved in protecting the device from cyber-attacks.
Our first contribution explores the IoT ecosystem in terms of the market segments,
risks, and challenges, as well as the expected responsibilities of major stakeholders in
securing the devices. The second contribution proposes a systematical approach to
evaluate the security of the devices by exploring aspects of confidentiality, integrity,
access control and the possibility to launch reflection attacks. Then we review
the existing IT security solutions and the challenges in adapting them to the IoT
domain. Finally, we study existing techniques for characterization, classification,
and anomaly detection in IoT network traffics. Parts of this chapter have been
published in [2], [3] and [4].
2.1 Introduction
The phrase “Internet of Things” introduced by Kevin Ashton in 1999, refers to the
Internet-connected cyber-physical systems which sense and control the physical en-
vironment without much human interventions unlike traditional general purpose
computers and smartphones [11]. Internet-connected devices have already started
to create a profound effect on us by offering the promise of unparalleled freedom and
flexibility, be it for fitness, health, efficiency, safety, or entertainment [12]. The num-
ber of IoT devices in use is exponentially growing – 20.4 billion Internet-connected
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devices will be instrumented across the globe by 2020 as per [13]. Australia’s largest
telco operator Telstra predicts that an average Australian household which had 13
Internet-connected devices in 2017 will reach 30 by 2020 [14].
2.2 IoT Market Segments
According to IDC’s forecast, spending on IoT technology is expected to surpass
US$ 1.2 trillion in 2022 with the compound annual growth of 13.6% [15]. It covers
a wide range of application domains such as smart home, wearables, automobiles,
industrial IoT, smart cities, smart agriculture, intelligent retail, energy management,
and health care. The IoT market can be folded into three main categories: 1)
Industrial IoT; 2) Consumer IoT; and 3) Enterprises / Commercial IoT. This section
provides a brief overview of these segments.
2.2.1 Industrial IoT (IIoT)
Industrial IoT (IIoT) brings the fourth industrial revolution (Industry 4.0) into
reality by facilitating remote monitoring and automation in value chains of the
manufacturing industries (e.g., transportation, oil-and-gas, mining, energy/utilities,
aviation, and logistics). IIoT includes interconnected industrial sensors, controllers,
and actuators to maximize the efficiency and reliability in mission-critical infras-
tructures of the industries. IIoT devices are specifically designed to tolerate rugged
environment and operate for the long-term. They are mainly instrumented in new
or legacy systems to perform relatively simple tasks like measuring the fuel levels or
monitoring the product quality with the assistance of sensors [16, 17].
Typically, IIoT devices are deployed in large scale Industrial Control Networks
(ICN) which are transparent as opposed to a corporate IT network. To maintain
interoperability and management through single management systems (e.g., ICS,
SCADA), industries tend to use homogeneous devices and similar protocols (e.g.,
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MQTT, DDS, CoAP) within a specific network. Also, industries mostly have an
in-house ability to maintain life cycles (e.g., updating firmware or patching vulner-
abilities) of the devices. Due to the transparency of ICNs and predictable behavior
of the IIoT devices, it is relatively easy to barricade IIoT using simple security
policies [18].
2.2.2 Consumer IoT
Consumer IoT refers to the connected gadgets built for personal use, ranging from
wearable health monitors, smart bulbs, smoke-alarms, and webcams to smart home
appliances such as fridges. These devices come in different form factors to perform
heterogeneous functionalities. Unlike IIoT, consumer IoT manufacturers prioritize
low cost, advanced functionalities, user convenience, and elegant interfaces over per-
formance, reliability, and long-term support of the devices. Typically, these devices
collect and deal with a lot of private and sensitive user information since they work
in an environment very close to users.
The consumer IoT devices are mostly connected to small scale networks similar
to a home network where they function independently. The devices from differ-
ent vendors offer different management portals or mobile apps to control the IoT
devices [19]. Fig 2.1 shows the main three communication models used by the de-
vices to exchange the data with users and the cloud-based services: 1) Direct access
model – the devices not only communicate directly with cloud services but also, can
be controlled directly through the management portals or smartphone Apps (e.g.,
LiFX bulb, HP Envy Printer); 2) External access model – the device directly com-
municates with the cloud services only. It doesn’t provide any direct interface or
API to control by users. However, users can get updates via connecting with the
cloud servers (e.g., Awair air quality monitor, Nest smoke sensor); and 3) Transit
model – this method is mostly used in low power devices which do not have the
8
Chapter 2. Survey on IoT Ecosystems
IoT
Internet
IoT
IoT
Internet
Internet
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 2.1: Communication model: (a) Direct, (b) External, (c) Transit
direct Internet connectivity. These devices communicate with smartphones using
low powered communication mediums such as Bluetooth or Near Field Communi-
cation (NFC). Then the smartphone relays the data to a vendor cloud server over
the Internet (e.g., Fitbit, Tile Bluetooth tracker) [20].
The interoperability of consumer IoTs is inherently limited since each manufac-
turer uses dissimilar protocols for authorization and communication. Still, consumer
IoTs use commonly accepted protocols (e.g., UPnP, Bonjour, REST, mDNS) to dis-
cover, control, and communicate with other devices. On the other hand, integration
platforms such as IFTTT, voice-activated assistances (e.g., Google Home, Ama-
zon Echo) and dedicated IoT hubs (e.g., Samsung SmartThings) enable somewhat
interoperability using local or cloud to cloud APIs.
The level of inbuilt security mechanisms of the consumer IoTs varies between
vendor to vendor. Also, consumer IoT platforms usually use third-party tools and
services, which adds another level of complexity in security. On the other hand, the
heterogeneous behavior of consumer IoT devices makes it difficult to protect using
simple security policies.
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2.2.3 Enterprise / Commercial IoT
Enterprise IoT (also referred to commercial IoT) can be found in large organiza-
tional networks such as smart buildings, retail spaces, and smart cities (e.g., smart
lighting, connected HVAC system). The characteristics of enterprise IoT overlaps
the behavior of industrial IoTs and consumer IoTs [21]. For instance, enterprise IoT,
like smart lighting system, offers a user-friendly interface to consumers, whereby
they optimize the power usage of the whole organization by controlling thousands
of light bulbs.
The enterprise IoT mostly support automation protocols, namely BACnet and
Modbus, to exchange data with other devices. Although typical enterprise IoTs are
managed by the private cloud services, they may update the information to the
public cloud APIs as well (e.g., a public transportation company which equipped
GPS trackers on their buses may update the location of buses to users through
common mapping services similar to Google map).
Industrial IoT is typically managed by a centralized controller in an industry;
nevertheless, a single organizational network may contain several independent en-
terprise IoT systems and be controlled by different departments. For example, a
smart city may have street lights which are monitored by councils and traffic signals
which are controlled by city police. Due to this complexity, the authentication and
access permissions are sophisticated compared to consumer or pure Industrial IoTs,
which may require support with hierarchical access control and directory services
(e.g., LDAP, Active Directory). Despite the fact that enterprise IoTs are commonly
connected behind relatively secured corporate networks, the involvement of large
people, departments, in the IoT ecosystem, may lead to insecure settings.
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2.3 IoT Security Risks
IoTs are being rapidly adopted as they give us the opportunity to enjoy incredible
experiences in our life. Nevertheless, they are susceptible to attack by those wishing
to harm us. Many Internet-connected devices have poor in-built security measures
that make them vulnerable, and these flaws have the potential to reveal private
data and information that may further hurt or alarm us. A typical smart home
with many IoT devices is under significant risk of cyberattack. This vulnerability
compromises data and threatens our safety. The frequency and severity of cyber-
attacks has been escalating in recent years. As each month brings new consumer
IoT devices to the market and millions of deployments in households worldwide, new
security and privacy attack vectors open up that can be exploited at a scale never
seen before.
Furthermore, search engines, such as Shodan [22] and Inseccam [23], are dis-
covering vulnerable IoT devices exposed to the Internet; openly available lists of
IoT default username-password combinations [24]; as well as the publicly available
botnet codes similar to Mirai [25, 26], which make it an effortless task to launch a
cyberattack.
The attacks on IoT devices have already started to show the impact on the econ-
omy of the companies as well as the privacy of users. One-fourth of the companies,
which are rapidly moving towards IoT, reported at least $34 million security-related
losses in only the last year [27]. Studies show that 91.5% of data generated by IoT de-
vices are exposed as plain text – readable by anybody snooping the transaction [28].
It includes private and sensitive information such as medical records [29].
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2.3.1 Threats in IoT Network Compare to IT Network
The attacks currently targeting the IoT devices are not completely brand new in
cyberspace. Although they have been encountered in traditional IT network over
the decades, they pose new dimensions of challenges in the IoT ecosystem [30].
First of all, the scale of IoT and the number of exposed endpoints create a massive
exploitable threat surface which has never been seen in the traditional networks.
The traditional IT networks are built upon a very limited number of platforms
(i.e., applications, operating systems, and device vendors) which are well grown and
constantly undergo security evaluations by experts. However, every year hundreds of
new IoT devices are introduced to the market by newly emerging startups – mostly
who do not have expertise in security. This makes the situation worse.
Almost 90% of IoT devices closely monitor and collect some form of personal
data like location, health, habits, interests, etc [31]. Also, they interact with the
physical environment without any intervention from human users. These factors,
as a result of the security breach, possibly create severe consequences as it results
in a loss of privacy or infrastructure damage, or worse it results in safety hazards
to users [32]. In 2015, security evaluators demonstrated this by hijacking a jeep
remotely [33]. Furthermore, the IoT behind the secured enterprise networks becomes
an easy infiltration point for attackers [34] and this can then jeopardize other devices
in the network. The compromised fish tank sensors used to hack a casino is a good
example of this scenario [35].
2.3.2 Drawbacks of Traditional Security Measures
The present IT ecosystem is mainly protected by host-based threat protection mech-
anisms (e.g., Anti-virus) and network perimeter defenses (e.g., firewalls and instruc-
tion detection systems (IDS)). Unlike the general-purpose computers or smartphones
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in the IT ecosystem, IoT devices come with a very limited computational power.
Therefore they cannot run in-built protection mechanisms like anti-virus software
as well as key certificate exchanges and state of the art encrypted algorithms during
communications. Moreover, IoTs do not have enough resources like storage, battery,
and computational power to support automatic firmware upgrading and security
patching mechanism [34] like our smartphones.
On the other hand, the scale and heterogeneity of the IoT ecosystem make it
difficult to protect using the existing network-level defense systems. For example,
the traditional networks can be protected for a certain degree by allowing well-known
protocols (i.e., port numbers) only through firewalls. However, the IoT ecosystem
makes it impossible because of the diverse amount of protocols and standards used
in the devices [36]. Meanwhile, the classical attack signature identification using
IDS is also not an easy task since the attack and response patterns vary between
devices. The detailed analysis of the existing IDS will be discussed in §2.6.
IoT devices are vulnerable to indirect attacks as well. For example, in a smart
home, door locks might be configured to unlock automatically while the smoke sensor
alarm is triggered. An attacker may exploit this cross-device communication to open
the door by compromising under secured smoke sensor [37]. This kind of attack can
be preventable only if security systems distinguish the context of devices in the
network [38].
2.3.3 Types of Cyber Attacks on IoT
Cyber attacks on IoT can be categorized into 4 different criteria: 1) attacks that
affect the confidentiality of the data communication of them; 2) attacks that affect
the integrity and authentication of connections they establish with other entities
(local or external); 3) attacks that affect the access control and availability to make
the connection with legitimate devices; and 4) attacks that use the IoT devices
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as reflectors to attack new devices. Following attacks recorded in recent history
can explain the severity of each types. In November 2015, hackers compromised
a Hello Barbie doll and gained access to user accounts and encrypted audios [39]
(Confidentiality violation). In 2016, a large scale attack used the Zigbee protocol in
the Phillips Hue lightbulb to spread a worm to control other lightbulbs [40] (integrity
violation). In 2017, a hacker with the name “Stackoverflowin” gained illegitimate
access to 150,000 printers by exploiting the Internet printing protocol (IPP), and
was able to send out rogue print jobs [41](access control violation). In the same
year, a university became a victim of DDoS attack from its campus lamp posts and
vending machines [42] and one of the largest distributed denial of service (DDoS)
attack to dates, recorded in 2016, used an army of compromised IoT devices to
bring down the Dyn DNS server. It affected many popular websites [43] (availability
violation)). Although we have not seen any mass scale reflection attacks using IoT
devices yet, the researches suggest that present IoT devices are highly capable to
reflect the attacks[44]. We develop a systematic approach to evaluate these 4 types
of vulnerabilities in §2.5. Later, in Chapter 5 we will validate the efficacy of our
anomaly detection engine by launching DDoS (Type 3) and Reflection attacks (Type
4) which are commonly used for IoT devices at scale.
2.4 Perspectives and Roles of Stakeholders
It is a well-known fact that there is no one-off solution to secure all IoT devices. It
requires a lot of responsibilities and actions to be taken by various entities related to
the IoT ecosystem [45]. This section identifies the main players of the IoT ecosystem
and discuss their role and responsibilities in the security domain.
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2.4.1 Consumers
Mostly IoT consumers do not scrutinize the security of devices during their pur-
chase. There are two main reasons for that: 1) they don’t seem to be aware of how
detailed and sensitive data are being collected by their devices nor are they aware
the consequences if that data get compromised; and 2) they don’t have the knowl-
edge to rate the safety of a device. Also, many IoT users do not follow good security
practices such as applying strong passwords – 10 out of 100 devices have never been
changed from their default username and passwords (e.g., <admin,admin>, <ad-
min,password>) [46]. They assume that device manufacturers or service providers
apply the software updates and patches until the lifetime of the device – actually,
this is a myth. Nevertheless, it is not reasonable to expect them to be tech-savvy
enough to patch the devices manually as well. Experts say, although consumers do
not have the capacity to understand the technical terms related to the security, they
can be indicated using a rating scheme similar to “energy efficiency star rating” in
electrical appliances [47].
2.4.2 Manufacturers
The peak demand for IoT leads the manufacturers to focus on rushing the device
to the market rather than prioritizing the security. Furthermore, manufacturers
hesitate to provide long term supports to devices, especially due to development
costs. They are more likely to release a new version with the improved functionalities
to get more profits than supporting the previous version. Even though some of the
manufacturers are aware that their devices support mass scale DDoS, they don’t
give close attention towards fixing the issues. The reason is those kinds of attacks
don’t impact the customers directly [48].
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2.4.3 Regulators
As security and privacy concern rises about the IoTs, there have been calls for gov-
ernment regulations in the IoT ecosystem. These regulations are expected to urge
manufacturers to build devices with minimum security standards. The main impli-
cation in this process is, according to the current settings, different domains of the
IoT may fall under the different departments’ regulations. For example, devices re-
lated to health and medical come under the rules and regulations of the Therapeutic
Goods Administration within the Department of Health. Meanwhile, services and
technologies such as telecommunications, broadcasting, radio communications, and
the Internet are regulated by the Australian Communications and Media Authority.
In the scenario of Medical grade IoT, it may require the attention of both depart-
ments [45]. On the other hand, some people believe strict government regulations
may create additional bureaucracy and stifle the innovation and agility in the IoT
development [49]. Several governments have already started to propose very basic
level legislations to handle this trade-off.
United States of America
The United States Congress introduced a bill “Internet of Things (IoT) Cybersecu-
rity Improvement Act of 2019” to set minimum standards to procure and use the IoTs
for government agencies. It requested the recommendations from the National In-
stitute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to propose minimum standards on IoT
development, identity management, patching, and configuration management [50].
However, this bill does not consider consumer or business use cases.
16
Chapter 2. Survey on IoT Ecosystems
UK
In 2019, the UK proposed a basic set of code of practice (CoP) to be followed on
IoT design and development [51]. It includes: 1) unique factory reset settings for
each device – cannot have universal default passwords for all devices; 2) a public
point of contact has to be provided by manufacturers to disclose the vulnerabilities;
3) requirement to explicitly state the minimum duration that a device will continue
to receive security updates or patches; and 4) a labeling system to determine the
level of security – similar to health star rating on foods or energy rating on electrical
appliances. Currently, the officials say the government is planning to impose the first
three practices as mandatory ‘Secure by Design’ rules and the labeling system as a
voluntary scheme to improve the knowledge of consumers about the basic security
standards of devices.
Japan
The National Institute of Information and Communications Technology (NICT) of
Japan has announced a scanning over the nationwide Internet-connected devices to
identify the vulnerabilities. This project has been estimated to continue until 2022.
During the experiment, agencies especially probe the devices using the list of default
usernames and passwords without the concern of citizens and businesses to identify
the IoTs with easily guessable credentials. The owners of the devices will be notified
if the scan finds any potential security issues. Although this search can help to
uncover a portion of vulnerable devices, fixing them might have implications. For
example, owners may not have enough knowledge to fix the vulnerabilities [52].
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Europe
‘ETSI TS 103 645’ is a new cybersecurity standard for consumer Internet of Things
devices released by the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI)
in February 2019 [53]. It proposes 13 best practices to support manufacturers: no
default passwords; keeping software updated; manage vulnerability reports; securely
store security-sensitive data; communicate securely; minimize attack surfaces; en-
sure software integrity; protect personal data; be resilient to outages; make use of
telemetry data; allow users to delete personal data; make installation and mainte-
nance easy; and validate input data. It claims that these standards allow flexibility
for innovation rather than being rigid rules.
Australia
Compared to other countries discussed earlier, Australia is still lagging in imposing
the legislation for the protection of IoT. In the past, the federal government has
proposed the idea of a rating logo for Internet-connected devices which is named as
“Cyber Kangaroo” [54] – assuring a basic level of quality for consumers.
However, it received criticism from the experts for various reasons. The resilience
to attack of the devices cannot be expressed by a static rating logo. The security
weaknesses of the devices may unveil over time, but the rating logo on the packaging
cannot reflect those changes. Also, the security rating may reflect different meaning
on different domains. For example, the consequences of an attack on a connected
car are different from the breach on connected Barbie dolls – these cannot be rated
by a single rating scheme. The security labels also make a false impression to users
that these devices are always secure. Thus, users tend to negate the best practices,
such as changing default passwords / updating the devices immediately after the
patch available [55].
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2.4.4 Insurers
In spite of the precautions taken to secure the IoT, there is the possibility to still be
affected by cyberattacks along the line. It may cause harm to users and affect the
reputation of the manufacturers. To mitigate the impact and avoid bankruptcy, they
may invest in cyber-insurance. The increasing premium for these manufacturers who
are more likely to be vulnerable will also force them to bring security to the top of
their priority list. It is claimed that the global market size of Cyber Insurance is
estimated to grow from US$2.9 billion in 2019 to US$16.7 billion by 2024 [56].
2.5 Systematical Evaluation of Cybersecurity Threats
Emerging research work [20, 37, 44, 57–60] has focused on understanding and identi-
fying potential security and privacy threats for IoT. However, there is little research
into a systematic way for identifying security flaws in existing and emerging IoT de-
vices. We believe our work is the first to develop a systematic methodology for pro-
filing the security posture of consumer IoT devices, which can lead to a security-star
rating that can inform consumers, regulators, and insurance bodies of the associated
risks.
With regards to this scenario, we develop a suite of security tests categorized
under four criteria: confidentiality of data sent/received by the IoT device; integrity
and authentication of connections the IoT device establishes with other (local or
external) entities; the access control and availability of the IoT device to connection
requests; and the capability of the IoT device to participate in reflection attacks.
Next, we apply our automated security test suite to 20 IoT devices available in
the market today, chosen to cover a range of applications including home security
(cameras and motion sensor), health (weighing scale, blood-pressure monitor and
air-quality sensors), energy management (light-bulbs and power-switch), and en-
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tertainment (photo frame, printer and speaker). Finally, using the outputs of our
automated test suite, we assign a color-coded security score to each of the devices
under each of the four criteria, thereby giving an intuitive visual representation of
the device’s security posture.
2.5.1 Security Test Suite
In this section, we develop a suite of security tests to categorize threats that ex-
ploit security/privacy vulnerabilities in IoT devices under four dimensions namely
confidentiality, integrity, access control and availability, and reflection.
Confidentiality
Confidentiality involves ensuring the exchanged data between endpoints cannot be
understood by unwanted snoopers. We evaluate the confidentiality of exchanged
data using three measures, whether it is plaintext, encoded, or encrypted. We assess
all communication channels of a given IoT device – between: device and cloud server;
device and user App; user App and cloud server. We therefore wrote a Python script
that performs ARP spoofing inside the home network to intercept all traffic to/from
the IoT device as well as the user’s smartphone.
Encryption protocol: We use this test to determine the security protocol being
used for a particular communication channel. The security protocol is obtained
by checking the protocol field of the packet capture on Wireshark to see if it is
identifiable.
Plaintext: After inspecting the protocol field, we analyze the data field (i.e.
payload) to check if it contains any human-readable text. This test determines
whether the data is in plaintext or not, but it does not differentiate between encoded
data and encrypted data as both are not human-readable.
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Entropy: Since the above tests cannot always evaluate the confidentiality of
data, we use the entropy test to verify whether a certain communication is encrypted,
encoded or in plaintext. Entropy can not only be used to determine whether data
is encrypted, but also to assess the strength of encryption. The better the level of
encryption the higher the entropy as it will contain more information.
We wrote a Python script that is fed raw data from captured packets to compute
the Shannon entropy of the data one byte at a time (i.e. a value between 0 and
8) – we look at the data in bytes. In order to have an accurate entropy value,
we use at least 100 KB worth of packets. Our entropy test verifies whether the
data is encrypted in conjunction with the encryption protocol test and confirms the
plaintext test. We note that the entropy test may fail to distinguish encrypted from
encoded communications specially when it is applied to traffic of compressed video
generated by cameras – video compression yields a high entropy value though it is
unencrypted.
Integrity
Integrity assessment ensures a given IoT device performs its intended functions with-
out any manipulation and no message to/from the device is modified without detec-
tion. We therefore test the following:
Replay attack: We feed captured packets sent from the user App to the IoT
device (using the technique mentioned in Confidentiality) into our Python script
which will then replay them to the IoT device. The attack is successful if the device
performs a certain function specified in the packet. Furthermore, if packets are
in plaintext (or encoded), we modify certain fields inside the packets and replay
them to check whether the device responds to tampered packets. Replay attacks
are launched on a third of IoT devices which use plaintext or encoded packets only.
We note that other devices which communicate encrypted traffic using TLS/SSL are
protected against replay attacks..
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DNS security: We also test whether the device attempts to connect to an ille-
gitimate server. Inspecting the DNS queries and responses, we assess whether devices
uses DNSSEC. We note that DNSSEC is only offered by authoritative servers, not
recursive resolvers. Authoritative servers contacted by IoT devices are managed by
their respective manufacturers. In order to determine whether a device validates
DNSSEC certificate records or not, we spoofed the response of DNS queries made
by that device. Accepting spoofed responses by the device and attempting to con-
nect to the illegitimate server indicate that the device does not validate DNSSEC
records.
If the device is vulnerable to DNS spoofing, we use a python script to perform
DNS spoofing redirecting traffic to a fake server. If the device attempts to con-
nect to this fake server, the system integrity is violated. In addition, if it sends
information to the fake server it indicates the device does not conduct any form of
authentication.
Access control and availability
We consider the access control and availability of an IoT device to identify how easily
an attacker can gain access/control to/of the device and determine whether it is sus-
ceptible to a denial of service (DoS) attack. We start our test by scanning for ports
that are open on the device using command nmap -sS -sU -p 0- 65535 [deviceIP].
We then attempt to gain access via Telnet, SSH and HTTP using a list of known
weak login credentials – these ports were exploited recently by the Mirai botnet that
resulted in one of the largest DDoS attacks from IoTs over the Internet [61].
Denial of Service: We assess the ease of launching a DoS attack using the
following experiment. We determine how much incoming traffic the IoT device can
handle before it completely loses its expected functionality. We flood the device with
ICMP ping requests as well as UDP packets, and determine the amount of data that
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is required to stop the operation of the IoT. We conduct these two tests using the
hping3 tool by issuing the command: hping3 -d 1000 -1 (1 for ICMP and 2
for UDP) -p (port) (deviceIP). We also use another python script to measure
the maximum number of concurrent TCP connections the device can handle before
it crashes – by flooding the device with TCP SYN packets to initiate connections to
the list of open ports on the device.
Reflection attacks
Following the public announcement of the large DDoS attack fueled by IoTs in
2016 [61] many manufacturers have consequently closed their remote access ports,
or strengthened their default login credentials. We have shown that IoT devices
can still be employed to launch DDoS attacks by exploiting various protocols using
source-spoofed traffic [44]. Evaluating the reflection capability of device protocols is
important since IoT devices are increasingly contributing to DDoS attacks to popular
services providers across the Internet [62–65]. We experiment the reflection attacks
on three standard protocols namely ICMP, SSDP and SNMP. We write a python
script that crafts malformed packets (with spoofed source IP address) and sends;
(a) ICMP messages, (b) SSDP broadcasts, and (c) SNMP requests to a given IoT
device. For the SNMP, we further check if the device supports the SNMP public
community string that can potentially generate a larger volume of responses. If
successful, we issue a getBulk SNMP request that sends multiple getNext requests
at once. Responding to each of these protocols reveals that the device can be used
to launch a reflection attack.
2.5.2 Security Posture of IoTs
We now validate our assessment methodology by applying it to 20 IoT devices that
have been recently introduced to the consumer market, ranging from cameras and
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Table 2.1: Posture of confidentiality
Device to Server Device to User-app User-App to Server
Devices Plaintext Protocol Entropy Plaintext Protocol Entropy Plaintext Protocol Entropy
Hue bulb No TLSv1.2 7.70 Yes None 5.48
Belkin switch Partially Unknown 7.74 Yes None 5.16
Samsung cam No Unknown 7.99 No Unknown 7.91
Belkin cam No Unknown 7.06 No SSL 7.95 No SSL 7.48
Awair air quality No SSL 7.89 No SSL 7.90
HP printer Yes None 5.38
LiFX bulb No Unknown 4.66 No SSL 7.64
Canary cam No TLSv1.2 7.96 No TLSv1.2 7.46
TPlink plug No Unknown 7.95 No Unknown 5.33 No SSL 7.63
Amazon Echo No TLSv1.2 7.98 No TLSv1.2 7.91
SmartThings No TLSv1.2 7.69 No TLSv1.2 7.80
Pixstar photo No TLSv1.2 7.87
TPlink cam No Unknown 7.97 Yes None 7.51 No TLSv1.2 7.73
Belkin motion Yes None 5.16
NEST smoke No Unknown 7.25 No TLSv1.2 7.54
Netatmo cam No IPsec 8.00 Partially HTTP 7.97 No TLSv1.2 7.98
Dlink cam Yes None 5.40
Hello Barbie No TLSv1.2 7.99
Withings sleep No Unknown 7.84 No TLSv1.2 7.63
Dropcam No TLSv1.2 7.99 No TLSv1.2 7.94
lightbulbs to power switches and health monitoring devices. We verify our method-
ology on some devices with known security flaws [57] and also evaluate the security
and privacy posture of other IoT devices with security vulnerabilities that are un-
known to us.
Confidentiality
Our confidentiality assessment results are shown in Table 2.1 by three measures over
three communication channels (as discussed in §2.5.1). It can be seen that most
of the devices have fairly secure communication in two channels namely device-
to-server and mobile-app-to-server since they use secure protocols like TLS/SSL
most of the time. However, a majority of the vulnerabilities arise when the device
communicates with the mobile-App – five devices send in plaintext, only one device
uses SSL with fairly lower entropy values. Note that for some devices (e.g. Belkin
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video/audio	header
HTTP	payload
video/audio	data
Base64	encoded
Figure 2.2: TPLink camera POST message
Switch, Samsung Smart Cam), the security protocol is not identified but together
with plaintext and entropy tests, we can evaluate the confidentiality of a given
channel. Considering the user privacy, we see quite a few devices such as Phillips
Hue lightbulb, Belkin power switch, HP Envy printer, TPLink camera, and Belkin
motion sensor, communicate in plaintext (some of them were discussed in [20]),
– revealing private information, for example, whether the Belkin power switch is
on/off, or when the Phillips Hue lightbulb was last used.
Our results also enable us to discover new vulnerabilities in some devices such as
the TPLink camera. Fig. 2.2, which depicts a detailed insight into packets captured
from the TPLink camera (i.e. a POST request packet payload in red text followed
by the HTTP response packet in blue text). The video/audio stream is sent in plain-
text (the video/audio header is human-readable even though its data doesn’t seem
human-readable). This data can be sniffed by an attacker and then used to reassem-
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Figure 2.3: Control bit pattern of LiFX lightbulb
ble the video/audio data. Surprisingly, it reveals not only the video/audio data but
also the authentication password required for logging in to the device. This pass-
word is exposed in the basic authentication field of the packet shown in Fig. 2.2 (i.e.
YWRtaW46WvdSdGFND0=) – this is a Base64 version of “admin”. Given the password,
we are able to log into the device by simply guessing the user-name as “admin” which
is a common default credential used in many IoT devices.
The efficacy of our entropy measure can be seen in the LiFX lighbulb. Our
plaintext test for this device shows that the LiFX bulb is not communicating in
a human-readable format, whereas its traffic data has a low entropy value of 4.56.
When taking a closer look into the LiFX packets, we are able to discover that
packets associated with certain commands (from the user App) are identical and
certain bits represent specific functions of the device, meaning that the data is just
encoded as shown in Fig. 2.3. Similarly in the TPLink power switch, we see that
the data is not in plaintext but the entropy value is 5.33, suggesting that it could
possibly be encoded or poorly encrypted. By guessing that the data is sent in JSON
format (i.e. {data}), we attempt to XOR the first byte with the character “{” to
obtain the single byte key. We then apply the key to the encrypted message and are
able to extract the message in plaintext. This indicates a weak encryption is used
in the TPLink power switch. Note that some devices employ stronger encryption
protocols. For example, Amazon Echo uses TLSv1.2 for all traffic it communicates
(shown in Fig. 2.4), or Netamo camera implements IPsec, protecting the IP address
of endpoints from potential attackers (shown in Fig. 2.5).
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Figure 2.4: Wireshark capture of Amazon Echo
Lastly, we evaluate the confidentiality of devices’ communication after their ini-
tial setup phase is complete. There are, however, some devices that communicate
in an insecure manner when they initially pair with the user App. For example,
Fig. 2.6 shows that Belkin camera exposes the password of the local WiFi network
in plaintext (i.e. ThisIsMyWiFiPassword in Fig. 2.6) when responding to a GET
request.
Integrity and Authentication
Our assessment results for the posture of integrity and authentication in twenty IoT
devices are shown in Table 2.2. Considering the test for replay attacks, five of our
IoT devices are susceptible such as the Philips Hue light bulb, Belkin power switch,
HP Envy printer, LiFX light bulb, and TPLink switch. Some of these exploits
have been already reported. For example, the Belkin switch was evaluated to be
insecure against replay attacks due to the lack of authentication [20] or the LiFX
lightbulb that communicates encoded messages with the user App [66]. An attacker
Figure 2.5: Wireshark capture of Netatmo camera
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Figure 2.6: Belkin camera is pairing with user app
can turn on/off the Belkin switch with a well-crafted fresh packet, or change the
color/brightness of the LiFX bulb using the control bit pattern shown in Fig. 2.3.
On the other hand, those IoT devices that employ secure protocols (e.g. SSL) are
protected against replay attacks such as the Awair air monitor and Amazon Echo.
Our DNS security test results show that none of 20 IoT devices implements
DNSSEC protocol that is primarily designed to prevent DNS spoofing attacks. This
vulnerability enables attackers to hijack the DNS query and possibly impersonate
the legitimate server to the IoT device. Even if DNS spoofing is successful, the victim
IoT device may protect itself by some form of authentication. According to the last
column of Table 2.2, some devices such as the Phillips Hue lightbulb and LiFX bulb
do communicate with the fake server, after a successful DNS spoofing. The Phillips
Hue lightbulb sends an HTTP message to the fake server that is listening on the
same port as the real server, while the LiFX bulb sends data to our fake server which
appears to be in its own unique data format (as shown in Fig. 2.3).
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Table 2.2: Posture of integrity and authentication
Devices Replay Attack DNS spoofing Fake Server
Hue bulb Yes Yes HTTP
Belkin switch Yes Yes Fail SSL
Samsung cam No Yes Fail SSL
Belkin cam No Yes Fail SSL
Awair air quality No Yes Fail SSL
HP printer Yes Yes Fail SSL
LiFX bulb Yes Yes Plaintext
Canary cam No Yes Fail SSL
TPlink plug Yes Yes Fail SSL
Amazon Echo No Yes Fail SSL
SmartThings No Yes Fail SSL
Pixstar photo No Yes Fail SSL
TPlink cam No Yes Fail SSL
Belkin motion Yes Yes Plaintext
NEST smoke No Yes Fail SSL
Netatmo cam No Yes Fail Ipsec
Dlink cam Yes Yes Plaintext
Hello Barbie No Yes Fail SSL
Withings sleep No Yes Fail SSL
Dropcam No Yes Fail SSL
Access Control and Availability
Our access control and availability evaluation shown in Table 2.3 assesses the state
of ports as: “open” indicating that a service is actively accepting TCP connections
and/or UDP datagrams, “closed” indicating that the port receives and responds to
probe packets, but there is no service listening on it, and “filtered” indicating a port
scanner cannot determine whether the port is open or closed (a filtering method
prevents probes to reach the port). The results shown in Table 2.3 indicate that
almost all devices have some form of vulnerabilities in terms of open ports which
enable intruders to communicate with or access into the device. For example, the
Belkin smart camera exposes a large number of ports, 5 TCP and 31 UDP. Another
vulnerable device is the HP printer with 9 open TCP ports and 10 open UDP ports.
Among all these open ports, we note that the HP printer responds on a special TCP
port 9100 that is used for printing with no authorization – this vulnerability was
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Table 2.3: Posture of access control and availability
Devices
Open Ports
(TCP)
Open Ports
(UDP)
Vulnerable
Ports
Weak
Passwords
ICMP
DoS
UDP
DoS
No. of
TCP Con.
Hue bulb 80, 8080 1900, 5353 80 No Protected Protected 112
Belkin switch 53, 49155 53, 1900, 3111, 7638, 13965,
14675, 17143, 19422, 22894,
23835, 26011, 27047, 38849,
40014, 41970, 42518, 43403,
47836, 53121, 53330, 55353,
65484
None 23Mbps 6.3Mbps 97
Samsung cam 80, 443, 554,
943, 4520,
49152
161, 5353 80 No 90Mbps 4.1Mbps 17
Belkin cam 80, 81, 443,
9964, 49153
1900, 10000, 13105, 19827,
26854, 28971, 32596, 32435,
33435, 35042, 35316, 35056,
36500, 36943, 38587, 38606,
39632, 39714, 43588, 43834,
47709, 48190, 44179, 49156,
49201, 49360, 52042, 52144,
52603, 55254, 56284
80 No 7.7Mbps 74Kbps 256
Awair air quality Filtered Filtered 36Mbps 7.2Mbps
HP printer 80, 443, 631,
3910, 3911,
8080, 9100,
9220, 53048
137, 161, 543, 3702, 5353,
5355, 7235, 53592, 56693,
56723
80, All
ports allow
telnet
No 1
LiFX bulb Closed Filtered 6Mbps 82Kbps
Canary cam Closed Closed 6.4Mbps
TPlink plug 80, 9999 1040 80 No 5.5Mbps 25Mbps 15
Amazon Echo 4070 5353 None Protected 9.2Mbps 258
SmartThings 23, 39500 Filtered 23 No 130Mbps 8.8Mbps 1
Pixstar photo Closed 137 Protected Protected
TPlink cam 80, 554, 1935,
2020, 8080
1068, 3702, 5353, 42941 80 Yes 48Mbps 870Kbps 130
Belkin motion 53, 49152 53, 1900, 3080, 3081, 3082,
3179, 3229, 3236, 3619,
4050, 4052, 4053, 4054,
4055, 4289, 4996, 4997,
4998, 14675
None 11.3Mbps 350Kbps 109
NEST smoke Closed and
filtered
17395, 17466, 17471, 18184,
18234, 18455, 18721, 18916,
19090, 19112, 19217, 19458,
19581
Protected Protected
Netatmo cam 80, 5555 654, 7242, 26082, 29110,
31574, 35826, 39408, 46721,
48080, 56943
80 No 8.2 Mbps 45Kbps 256
Dlink cam 21, 23, 5001,
5004, 16119
1900, 5002, 5003, 10000 5004 NoPassword 49Mbps 292Kbps 20
Hello Barbie Closed Closed 10Mbps
Withings sleep 22, 7685, 7888 5353 22 No Protected Protected 22
Dropcam Closed Closed of filtered 4Mbps
recently exploited to attack more than 150000 printers [67]. On the other hand, a
device like the Awair air monitor has all ports closed, and hence is protected against
common attacks such as SYN flooding.
We note that some IoT devices allow remote access via SSH (port 22), Telnet
(port 23), or HTTP(port 80). Until recently, many IoT devices had weak credentials
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(from a list of about 60 common defaults) that Mirai malware [25] exploited to hijack
hundreds of thousands of IoTs, launching a major DDoS attack on the Internet.
None of these 60 defaults were valid when we used them for our 20 IoT devices.
Surprisingly, we have two devices with no protection for remote access: HP printer
allows Telnet without asking for a password; and the DLink camera asks for no
credentials during SSH access – some manufacturers seemingly open remote access
ports for testing/debugging purposes.
From the DoS attack test results shown in Table 2.3, it can be seen that most
devices are susceptible to at least one form of DoS attacks, either of ICMP-, UDP-
or TCP-based. We note that the required traffic rate to cause a device to stop func-
tioning is not significant in many cases especially when UDP is used (i.e. less than
1 Mbps for Belkin SmartCam, LiFX lightbulb or TPLink camera). For Samsung
Smart camera, it can handle ICMP traffic rate up to 90 Mbps, however it stops
functioning (the camera will not be able to transmit live video stream to the user
App), if it is bombarded by UDP-based traffic at a rate more than 4.1 Mbps.
Reflection Attacks
Lastly, we consider ICMP, SSDP and SNMP protocols by checking if a given device
reflects traffic of these types. Our results are shown in Table 2.4. We can see that
all devices, except the LiFX lightbulb, are reflecting ICMP traffic. We then test
the SSDP protocol which is commonly enabled in many IoT devices for ease of
discovery. When we use SSDP, the reflected traffic (i.e. response) is amplified by
a large factor since it contains service and presence information of the IoT device
– this makes it an attractive protocol for DDoS attackers. We observe that five
of our devices are vulnerable to SSDP reflection attacks – the rest of them do not
use SSDP for discovery. Lastly, we examine SNMP protocol which is not widely
used by IoT devices. Furthermore, with SNMP v2c (and v3), it is possible to use
public community strings such that the amplification factor is significantly high.
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Table 2.4: Posture of reflection attacks
Devices ICMP Reflection SSDP Reflection SNMP Reflection
Hue bulb Yes Yes No
Belkin switch Yes Yes No
Samsung cam Yes No v2c
Belkin cam Yes Yes No
Awair air quality Yes No No
HP printer Yes No v1
LiFX bulb No No No
Canary cam Yes No No
TPlink plug Yes No No
Amazon Echo Yes No No
SmartThings Yes No No
Pixstar photo Yes No No
TPlink cam Yes No No
Belkin motion Yes Yes No
NEST smoke Yes No No
Netatmo cam Yes No No
Dlink cam Yes Yes No
Hello Barbie Yes No No
Withings sleep Yes No No
Dropcam Yes No No
The SNMP v2c is only available in the Samsung Smart camera. Sending a getBulk
request to the camera, it will iterate the getNext request multiple times, and hence
a larger amount of traffic is generated.
2.5.3 Security Rating of IoT Devices
Without doubt, hundreds of consumer IoT devices are going to emerge in the years
ahead, and their security/privacy vulnerabilities are going to be diverse. Our results
from evaluation of the twenty devices highlight the security posture of consumer
IoTs, and reveal the problems that users have to deal with. In this section we
discuss how our methodology can be used for a security ratings system that is
beneficial to consumers or insurance companies. We propose a three-level rating:
“A” being secure, “B” being moderately secure/insecure, and “C” being insecure.
Table 2.5 shows our attempt to rate each of IoT devices that we assessed their
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Table 2.5: Security rating
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Phillip Hue lightbulb A A A C C C A A A C C C C C C C A B C C C C A A
Belkin Switch B A C C C A A A C C C A C C A A C C C C C A A
Samsung Smart Cam A A A A A A A A A A C A C C C A C C C C A C C
Belkin Smart Cam A A A A A A A A A A C A C C C A C B C C C A A
Awair air monitor A A A A A A A A A A A C A B B A A C C A C A A A
HP Envy Printer A A A C C C A A A C C C A C C C A A A C C A C A
LiFX lightbulb A A A A C A A A A C C C A B A A C B A A A A A
Canary Camera A A A A A A A A A A A C A A A A A C A A C A A A
TPLink Switch A A A C A A A A C C A C C C A C C C C A A A
Amazon Echo A A A A A A A A A A A C A C C A A B C C C A A A
Samsung Smart
Things
A A A A A A A A A A A C A C B C A C C C C A A A
Pixstar Photo Frame A A A A A A A A A A A C A A C A A A C A A A
TPLink Camera A A C C A A A A C A C A C C C C C B C C A A A
Belkin Motion Sensor A A A C C C A A A C A C C A A C B C C C A A
Nest Smoke Alarm A A A A A A A A A A C A B C A A A C A A A
Netamo Camera A A A B C A A A A A A C A C C C A C B C C A A A
Dlink Camera C C C A A A A A A A A C C C C C B C C C A A
Hello Barbie
Companion
A A A A A A A A A A A C A A A A A C A A C A A A
Whithings Sleep
Monitor
A A A A A A A A A A C A C C C A C C A A A
Nest Drop Camera A A A A A A A A A A A C A A B A A C A A C A A A
security posture on the four dimensions – all ratings in this table are subjective
and given based on authors perceptions. One may consolidate our table by giving
weights to each dimension in the future.
We use color codes for ease of visualization, green for A rating, yellow for B
rating, and red for C rating. We also use gray color for cells where the data is not
available. For example, the encryption protocol of Belkin switch is not identified on
Wireshark for the device-to-server communication; DNS query is not performed in
Belkin motion sensor; normal functionality of the Pixtar photo frame is not affected
by a DoS attack. Using our color-coded ratings table, consumers are able to quickly
visualize the security posture of individual devices. All devices display some form
of vulnerability in either of integrity, access control and reflection dimensions –
this raises concerns for consumers as well as for the Internet ecosystem in general.
Devices such as the Amazon Echo, Hello Barbie, Nest Dropcam, Whitings Sleep
monitor seem relatively secure by the measure of confidentiality. Amazon Echo in
particular is a top-rated device in security with encrypted communication channels
and having almost all of its ports closed. On the other hand, devices such as Phillips
Hue lightbulb and the Belkin switch seem fairly poor in security. The Phillips Hue
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in particular communicates in plaintext to the user App, is susceptible to replay
attacks, has many open ports and can be used to launch various reflection attacks
to victim servers.
We recognize that security is but one concern amongst many that manufacturers
of IoT devices are dealing with. The surge in demand for IoT is leading many
manufacturers to rush to market with their product, and increasing user appeal to
gain market traction can become more paramount than ensuring fool–proof security.
No matter how it evolves, consumers would eventually demand for a rating system
(much like the energy rating system given to home appliances) that needs to be
developed by standard bodies and tracked by regulation entities. This would protect
consumers rights and incentivize manufacturers to improve the security of their
device to receive an acceptable rating that can lead to a good share of the market.
2.6 Existing IoT Security Solutions
Security and monitoring solutions for traditional IT network have been extensively
studied [68–70] in the past few decades by the research community. Those studies
include both the Host-based Intrusion Detection System (HIDS) and Network-based
Intrusion Detection System (NIDS).
Anti-virus in computers is a good example of the implementation of HIDS. It
monitors the activities of the devices based on the system log files as well as network
packets on its interfaces [71]. The host-based security systems are unlikely to be
embedded in IoT devices due to resource constraints and are not resilient enough
to maintain security standards for the long term since automatically applying the
security patches is hard.
NIDS solution protects all the devices in a network to complement device vendor
security implementation [72] by analyzing the activities of devices from the network
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traffic. NIDS monitor the activity of the devices based on the techniques such as
signature-based detection, specification-based detection, and anomaly-based detec-
tion [73]. The advantages of NIDS over HIDS are: 1) it can be implemented using
a centralized controller and hosted in the cloud environment rather than using the
device resources; and 2) upgrading the system is easy and protection of all devices
can be handed over to security experts rather than expecting all the users to be
tech-savvy.
2.6.1 Signature-based Intrusion Detection
The signature-based attack identification system is the commonly used technique
in the present NIDS implementations such as Bro [74], Snort [75], and commercial
hardware. They compare the traffic with already known attack signatures collected
from the sandbox environment and honeypots. However, the signature-based meth-
ods do not show good performance with zero-day (attacks that have never seen
before) vulnerabilities. The main implication of signature-based attack detection is
that it is not scalable in the IoT domain due to the heterogeneity of IoTs. Generat-
ing the attack signature for a growing number of IoT types is not a feasible solution,
whereas, in a traditional network, most of the devices run on similar platforms (e.g.,
Windows, Unix, Linux, Android).
2.6.2 Specification-based Intrusion Detection
The specification-based intrusion detection mechanism is monitoring the device
based on the rules (i.e., specification) that define the allowed or malicious net-
work activities [69, 76]. The specification-based detection has the ability to act as
both: 1) learn the attack characteristics and identify the attacks that follow those
specification; or 2) learn the benign behavior of the device and detect the variations
when a traffic flow overrule the specification [77–80].
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In [81], Amaral et al. propose a specification-based approach for a wireless
sensor network and expect the network operators to generate the specification by
themselves. In [82] Nguyen et al. develop a protection system called “IoTSAN” which
allows the users to define specification by semantic rules. However, generating the
specifications for every device is a tedious task. Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF) recently released a standard called Manufacturer Usage Description (MUD)
to outline the network activities of the devices intended by the manufacturers [83].
The work in [84] proposes an IDS by automatically profiling each device using MUD
at the initial stage and then identifies the attacks that violate the profiles. This
work has been extended in [85] to identify the volumetric anomalies along with the
specification violations.
Although the specification based IDS make better accuracy in identifying attacks
and policy violations, generating specifications for the proliferation of IoT is hard,
and the standards like MUD have not yet been adopted by manufacturers.
2.6.3 Anomaly-based Instruction Detection
The anomaly detection technique is to learn legitimate behavior from the normal
network traffic and identify the variations from it. Since anomaly detection just
inspects deviations from the benign traffic rather than the attack signatures, it has
the capability to identify the zero-day attacks as well.
Although there is an extensive body of literature [70, 86–90] in anomaly detec-
tion based instruction systems, it has achieved only a very limited amount of success
rate [91] in the traditional IT network. The reasons are manifold [92]: 1)legitimate
traffic shows high variability in IT networks; 2) difficult to get the ground truth in
the training dataset; 3) very limited public datasets to learn the normal network
behaviors; 4) both wrongly identifying a legitimate traffic as illegitimate, and illegit-
imate traffic as legitimate incur a high cost; and 5) practical challenges in evaluating
the system.
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However, in the domain of IoT, these methods give some promises since the
activities of IoT devices is less complicated than servers or computers and due to
their limited functionality and following similar patterns, it is easy to characterize
the whole behavior of the device [93] from the network traffic.
2.7 IoT Behavioral Monitoring
Nowadays network operators lack real-time visibility into connected devices – over
40% of today’s endpoints are unknown and unmanaged by the organizations which
lead to significant infrastructure blind spots, unauthorized access, and data leaks [18].
Based on the fact that IoT devices exhibit limited traffic patterns, we believe it is pos-
sible to identify and characterize their network behavior [94]. It enables the operator
to: 1) manage the assets connected in the network [5]; 2) enforce the device-specific
policies [95]; and 3) locate the vulnerable and blacklisted devices effortlessly [96].
2.7.1 IoT Traffic Characterization
Significant research work is carried out in the existing literature to characterize the
general Internet traffic [97–100]. These prior works largely focus on application
detection (e.g. Web browsing, Video streaming, Gaming, Mail, Skype VoIP, Peer-
to-Peer, etc.). However, studies focusing on characterizing IoT traffic (also referred
to as machine-to-machine or M2M traffic) are still in their infancy.
Analysis of Empirical Traces
The work in [101] is one of the first large-scale studies to delve into the nature
of M2M traffic. It is motivated by the need to understand whether M2M traffic
imposes new challenges for the design and management of cellular networks. The
work uses a traffic trace spanning one week from a tier-1 cellular network operator
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and compares M2M traffic with traditional smartphone traffic from a number of
different perspectives – temporal variations, mobility, network performance, and
so on. They conclude that M2M traffic is substantially different from smartphone
traffic as it tends to exhibit higher uplink to downlink traffic volume, varying diurnal
patterns, and larger round-trip times. The study informs network operators to be
cognizant of these factors when managing their networks.
In [102], Nikaein et al. note that the amount of traffic generated by a single
M2M device is likely to be small, but the total traffic generated by hundreds or
thousands of M2M devices would be substantial. These observations are to some
extent corroborated by [103, 104], which note that a remote patient monitoring
application is expected to generate about 0.35 MB per day and smart meters roughly
0.07 MB per day.
Aggregated Traffic Model
A Coupled Markov Modulated Poisson Processes (CMMPP) framework to capture
the behavior of a single machine-type communication, as well as the collective be-
havior of tens of thousands of M2M devices, is proposed in [105]. The complexity of
the CMMPP framework is shown to grow linearly with the number of M2M devices,
rendering it effective for large-scale synthesis of M2M traffic.
In [106], Markus et al. show that it is possible to split the (traffic) state of
an M2M device into three generic categories, namely periodic update, event-driven,
and payload exchange, and a number of modelling strategies that use these states
are developed. An illustration of model fitting is shown via a use-case in fleet
management comprising 1000 trucks run by a transportation company. The fitting is
based on measured M2M traffic from a 2G/3G network. A simple model to estimate
the volume of M2M traffic generated in a wireless sensor network-enabled connected
home is constructed in [107]. Since the behavior of sensors is very application-
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specific, the work identifies certain common communication patterns that can be
attributed to any sensor device.
Although all the above studies do fundamental studies in the IoT traffic charac-
terizations, they do not undertake a fine-grained characterization in consumer IoT
devices. On this scenario, we present insights into the underlying network traf-
fic characteristics using statistical attributes such as activity cycles, port numbers,
signalling patterns, and cipher suites in [5] and [6] which is discussed in Chapter 3.
2.7.2 IoT Finger-Printing and Classification
Traffic fingerprinting and classification is widely used for various applications such
as network management [108, 109], QoS [110, 111], and cyber-security [112–115].
However, IoT traffic fingerprinting and classification methods are still in its early
stages [116]. The recent attention on IoT security and asset management has at-
tracted researchers to observe IoT devices using both active and passive fingerprint-
ing techniques.
The active fingerprinting comprise various techniques – identifying vendor from
OUI prefix of the MAC Address, device name from the host-name field of DHCP ne-
gotiation, services offered by the device using discovery protocols or actively parsing
service banners and estimating the device types by probing the ports [4]. Shodan [22]
is one of the examples that actively scan and classify (mainly by parsing service ban-
ners) the IoT devices. The main disadvantage of the active scanning approach is
they greatly impact the network and degrade the performance of connected devices.
Although the passive fingerprinting techniques are not simple and straight for-
ward as active, they tend to provide a rich set of information about the devices and
their states without generating additional congestions. These passive fingerprints
can be recorded by monitoring the network traffic (i.e., passive network teleme-
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try) using the middle-boxes (e.g., switches) or mirroring the traffic to a dedicated
inspection engine.
Passive Network Telemetry
Network traffic measurement has been a subject of interest to academia and indus-
try. Many different methods have been proposed and practically used ranging from
traditional port-based counting using SNMP [117], WiFi packet sniffing [118–120]
and packet sampling [121] to flow-based telemetry [122, 123].
Traditional fingerprinting methods like sniffing wireless (e.g., WiFi, Zigbee, Blue-
tooth) packets require special hardware [124]. Although, these methods may reveal
valuable information in attack scenarios, they provide network operators with very
limited insights into the operation of their network.
Modern telemetry methods can be categorized into: (a) packet-based [121, 125,
126]; and (b) flow-based [122, 123, 127]. sFlow [121] is one of the commonly used
methods that randomly samples (i.e., one in N) packets from the network switches.
Due to its random sampling, sFlow tends to collect packets from elephant flows
(those that carry heavy traffic and are long in duration), and hence mice flows are
likely to get missed which results in an inaccurate measurement. To address this
issue, Everflow [125] proposes to collect specific packets (e.g., TCP SYN, FIN, and
RST) using the match and mirror functionality of data-center switches. Planck [126]
estimates the throughput of flows at very tight time-scales by mirroring traffic of
multiple ports to a monitoring port at which a collector performs high-rate sampling.
Overall, packet-level telemetry can only provide partial visibility into network traffic
flows.
Commercial switches equipped with NetFlow [122] (used in Chapter 3) engines
export flow records. However, there are two limitations: (a) they only export a
flow record once it expires (not in real-time); and (b) updating and maintaining
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flow records result in computational cost [128]. FlowRadar [123] overcomes the
limitations of Netflow by incorporating an encoded hash table (data structure for
flow counters) with low memory overheads and exporting flows periodically (e.g., 10
ms). However, FlowRadar is still not supported by commercial switches available on
the market. SDN APIs [127] which is commonly available on OpenFlow supported
switches, enable us to measure traffic flows at low cost with reasonable resolutions.
Thus, we propose flow-level telemetry using SDN APIs as an effective solution in
Chapter 4.
Classification and Anomaly detection
IoT traffic classification has been the subject of recent researches for a variety of
purposes: 1) recognizing IoT from mixture of IoT and non-IoT devices [6, 129]; 2)
classifying the type of IoT device [130, 131]; 3) identifying the operating states [119,
132]; and 4) detecting the abnormal behaviors [93, 133] of the IoT traffic.
Attribute selection: The proposed classification mechanisms in the literature
rely on a wide range of attributes from as simple as, a set of IP addresses (of servers)
that each device communicates [131], to sophisticated as the entropy of payloads
exchanged by the devices [134]. However, these attributes come in various extraction
cost and different level of impact on the classification process (e.g., Although the
set of IP addresses is a low-cost attribute, it is not much reliable since the IP
address belongs to an elastic IPv4 address allocation – employed for dynamic cloud
computing like Amazon AWS). Thus, the trade-off between the cost and robustness
of attributes plays a vital role in the attribute selection.
Work in [130] develops a classification system called “IoT Sentinel” to recognize
and identify the IoT device types immediately after it connected to the network. It
employs a single attribute vector with the elements of 276 (i.e., first 12 packets with
23 attributes for each). The proposed 23 attributes including 16 binary attributes
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(indicating the use of various protocols at application, transport, network, and link
layers) along with IP layer header options, remote IP address/port numbers, and
size and raw byte value of packets. In order to minimize the attribute extraction
cost, the system limits the classification process during the device connecting phase-
only – it is not feasible for continuous monitoring. [134] proposes a technique to
improve the “IoT Sentinel” by extracting payload entropy, TCP payload length,
TCP window size in addition to the subset of above mentioned attributes for every
five packets. Although this method solves the limitation, it incurs a high cost in
attribute extraction.
Work in [135] uses over 300 attributes from each TCP session of IoT traffic to
classify the device type by applying majority voting for every 20 consecutive sessions.
It highlight the most important attributes as packets Time-To-Live (minimum, me-
dian, and average), the ratio of transmitted-bytes to received-bytes, and the Alexa
rank of servers which the device communicates. In this method, the IoT devices
which rarely use TCP sessions, or which have long TCP sessions (e.g., [6] men-
tions Google Dropcam initiates TCP connection during the boot states and keep it
alive as long as it has network connectivity) may take a long duration to be classi-
fied. Some researchers [136] argue that traffic attributes need to be automatically
learned (from a raw sequence of packet payloads in TCP flows) instead of being
hand-crafted. We believe that the extraction of packet payloads makes it difficult
to scale this method. Our first approach to classify IoT devices (explained in Chap-
ter 3) uses attributes which can be extracted relatively easily using the network
elements that are instrumented with hardware-accelerated flow-level analyzers (e.g.,
Netflow capable devices).
Although the attributes mentioned above provides a rich set of information about
the IoT behavior, obtaining them require specialized hardware accelerators – be-
comes more expensive, and unscalable due to the need of deep packet inspection
in real-time. To tackle this, researchers in [132] have proposed a model which uses
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traffic patterns of encrypted network flows (with a server measured outside NAT) to
reveal the existence of IoT specific devices inside a home network without the need
for detailed packet or flow inspection. One of our works [7] show that the IoT traffic
can be: 1) channeled based on either protocols; or endpoints specific flows, and 2)
monitored at low cost using SDN enabled switches. This inspired us to extract the
flow level measurements (i.e., byte count, packet count) corresponding to individual
devices as attributes of specific flows (e.g., DNS query, DNS response, NTP query,
NTP response, and etc.) in Chapter 4. Also, we compute the attributes in different
time-granularities since the traffic attributes are better in characterizing the network
behavior of IoTs in multiple time-scales [137].
Classification & Anomaly Techniques: Machine learning techniques do a
prominent role in state-of-the-art traffic classification and anomaly detection en-
gines [138]. The previous studies have used a different kind of machine learning
techniques which can be categorized into two-fold: 1) supervised; and 2) unsuper-
vised.
Supervised classification algorithms such as Support Vector Machines (SVM),
naive Bayes, decision trees (e.g., : C4.5, random forest), k-nearest neighbor (KNN),
and neural network/Multilayer Perceptron(MLP) are commonly used for the traffic
classification purposes. The supervised classification techniques tend to give high
performance in distinguishing the known classes due to their discriminative ability.
In the literature, these algorithms are used in two different modes: 1) Multi-class
classification – classify the data between tgree or more than classes (e.g., IoT de-
vice classification/state classification); and 2) Binary classification – make a binary
decision (i.e., Positive or Negative).
In [109], Lippmann et al. evaluate the performance of multiple multi-class clas-
sifier performance (i.e., KNN, SVM, Binary decision Tree and MLP) in classifying
the computer operating systems (e.g., : Linux 2.0, Linux 2.1, MacOS9, Win9x,
WinNT, WinXP) using TCP/IP header information and concludes the KNN and
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Binary decision tree outperforms the rest. Despite the simplicity and reasonably
good performance on a low dimensional dataset, KNN may be prone to be affected
by high dimensionality in the data and high computational cost in classification [139].
Performance of SVM is very sensitive to the selection of hyperparameters, and it
becomes difficult to train the accurate models [140]. In [116], Lopez-Martin et al.
classify the network application traffic (e.g., : Google, YouTube, Office 365) using
the multi-class neural network which is proven to be effective in complex data struc-
tures, but it requires a large amount of data to train the system. Decision tree-based
classifiers are commonly used since they are easy to build discriminative models with
relatively small amount of data. However, they are prone to being over-fit for the
training dataset. Random forest perfectly handles the over-fitting issue using en-
semble decision trees. Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 therefore explore the use of it for
classifying the device types and their states. The main constraint of the multi-class
classification is scalability – a high number of classes makes the classifier complex
and updating the classifier requires full retraining.
Unlike multi-class classifiers, binary classifiers are trained only based on two
different classes. In the traffic classification domain, this approach is used for various
purposes like distinguishing between known attack vs. benign traffic [141] or IoT vs.
non-IoT traffic, etc. In [133], Doshi et al. train the binary classifier to identify the
DDoS attack traffics (made by Mirai botnets) and benign traffic of the IoT devices.
Although this method shows high performance in detecting the trained attacks from
benign traffic, the efficacy of unknown attack detection cannot be guaranteed. The
reason is supervised classifiers learn only the differences between classes rather than
profiling the whole behavior. On the other hand, the work in [129] proposes to
build individual binary classification model for each class in a device classification
problem to eliminate the complexity issue of multi-class classification. It is achieved
by individually training each device traffic with the mixture of the rest of the devices
– ‘one vs. rest’ approach. It is a well-known fact that supervised machine learning
methods may suffer due to an unbalanced dataset (unequal number of data points
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between classes). This makes scalability issues in ‘one vs. rest’ binary classification
approach when the proportion of the ‘rest’ part keeps increasing.
Unsupervised machine learning techniques are generative, which can model the
whole behavioral pattern of the data to detect the abnormal behavioral changes in
the traffic. Over the decade, many unsupervised network traffic anomaly detection
methods have been proposed for general Internet traffic [142–144]. They use various
algorithms such as probabilistic (e.g., Gaussian mixture models),domain-based (e.g.,
one-class SVM), and cluster-based (e.g., DBSCAN, Kmeans) [85, 145]. The work
in [146] use unsupervised clustering approaches to distinguish the botnet C&C com-
munication channels from the benign traffic of traditional network traffic as well as
the malicious activity during the attack mode. The study in [143] shows that unsu-
pervised algorithms may suffer due to the curse of high dimensional data. Therefore,
it proposes to reduce the attribute dimension using Principal Component Analysis
(PCA) which transform the attributes to a reduced set of uncorrelated attributes.
In the context of IoT, , [147] authors use neural network-based deep autoencoders
to detect anomalies. Similarly, work in [148] proposed a deep-learning framework
to fingerprint iPads and iPhones using packets inter-arrival time. However, these
intensive packet-based approaches are computationally expensive. In [85], Hamza
et al. propose a volumetric attack detection mechanism by monitoring the MUD-
compliant activities which require fine-grained flow for each device. To achieve this,
they use X-Means, which is a version of K-Means clustering algorithm.
The main negative aspect of the unsupervised learning method is they are not
discriminative as supervised machine learning algorithms – difficult for classification
purposes. One of our work [9] resolves this issue by proposing a probability-based
conflict resolver, which is extended to anomaly detection in Chapter 5.
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2.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have comprehensively studied the IoT ecosystem as well as the
challenges introduced by it, especially in the areas of cybersecurity and user privacy.
Initially, the market segments of IoT devices are identified based on the category of
industrial, consumer, and enterprises IoTs. The challenges in securing IoT devices
compared to traditional general-purpose devices are investigated in order to further
move on to specialized security solutions for the IoT ecosystem. We have discussed
the roles and responsibilities of key players in securing the IoT ecosystem. We pro-
posed a systematic approach to evaluate the security of IoT devices. From there we
compared the existing security solutions and the challenges to be encountered when
adapting it to the IoT domain. Finally, we set the foundation for characterization,
classification, and anomaly detection in IoT traffic, which will be discussed deeply
in the following chapters.
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Our study in the previous chapter showed the importance of real-time visibility
into IoT network using behavioral monitoring. In this chapter, we study the network
behavioral patterns of IoT devices using traffic characteristics obtained at the net-
work level. Using this, we develop an inference engine to classify the device types.
Our contributions are fourfold. First, we instrument a smart environment with 28
different IoT devices spanning cameras, lights, plugs, motion sensors, appliances and
health-monitors. We collect and synthesize traffic traces from this infrastructure for
a period of six months, a subset of which we release as open data for the community
to use. Second, we present insights into the underlying network traffic character-
istics using statistical attributes such as activity cycles, port numbers, signalling
patterns and cipher suites. Third, we develop a multi-stage machine learning based
classification algorithm and demonstrate its ability to identify specific IoT devices
with over 99% accuracy based on their network activity. Finally, we discuss the
trade-offs between cost, response time, and performance involved in deploying the
classification framework in real-time. Parts of this chapter have been published in [5]
and [6].
3.1 Introduction
The number of devices connecting to the Internet is ballooning, ushering in the era
of the “Internet of Things” (IoT). As we mentioned in previous chapters, the pro-
liferation of IoT, creates an important problem. Operators of smart environments
can find it difficult to determine what IoT devices are connected to their network
and further to ascertain whether each device is functioning normally. This is mainly
attributed to the task of managing assets in an organization, which is typically
distributed across different departments. For example, in a local council, lighting
sensors may be installed by the facilities team, sewage and garbage sensors by the
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sanitation department and surveillance cameras by the local police division. Co-
ordinating across various departments to obtain an inventory of IoT assets is time
consuming, onerous and error-prone, making it nearly impossible to know precisely
what IoT devices are operating on the network at any point in time. Obtaining
“visibility” into IoT devices in a timely manner is of paramount importance to the
operator, who is tasked with ensuring that devices are in appropriate network secu-
rity segments, are provisioned for requisite quality of service, and can be quarantined
rapidly when breached. The importance of visibility is emphasized in Cisco’s most
recent IoT security report [18], and further highlighted by two recent events: sensors
of a fishtank that compromised a casino in Jul 2017 [35], and attacks on a University
campus network from its own vending machines in Feb 2017 [42]. In both cases, net-
work segmentation could have potentially prevented the attack and better visibility
would have allowed rapid quarantining to limit the damage of the cyber-attack on
the enterprise network.
One would expect that devices can be identified by their MAC address and DHCP
negotiation. However, this faces several challenges: (a) IoT device manufacturers
typically use NICs supplied by third-party vendors, and hence the Organizationally
Unique Identifier (OUI) prefix of the MAC address may not convey any information
about the IoT device; (b) MAC addresses can be spoofed by malicious devices; (c)
many IoT devices do not set the Host Name option in their DHCP requests [149];
indeed we found that about half the IoT devices we studied do not reveal their host
names, as shown in Table 3.1; (d) even when the IoT device exposes its host name
it may not always be meaningful (e.g. WBP-EE4C for Withings baby monitor in
Table 3.1); and lastly (e) these host names can be changed by the user (e.g. the HP
printer can be given an arbitrary host name). For these reasons, relying on DHCP
infrastructure is not a viable solution to correctly identify devices at scale.
In this chapter, we address the above problem by developing a robust frame-
work that classifies each IoT device separately in addition to one class of non-IoT
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Table 3.1: MAC address and DHCP host name of IoT devices used in our testbed.
IoT device MAC address OUI DHCP host name
Amazon Echo 44:65:0d:56:cc:d3 Amazon Technologies Inc.
August Doorbell Cam e0:76:d0:3f:00:ae AMPAK Technology, Inc.
Awair air quality monitor 70:88:6b:10:0f:c6 Awair-4594
Belkin Camera b4:75:0e:ec:e5:a9 Belkin International Inc. NetCamHD
Belkin Motion Sensor ec:1a:59:83:28:11 Belkin International Inc.
Belkin Switch ec:1a:59:79:f4:89 Belkin International Inc.
Blipcare BP Meter 74:6a:89:00:2e:25 Rezolt Corporation
Canary Camera 7c:70:bc:5d:5e:dc IEEE Registration Authority Ambarella/C100F1615229
Dropcam 30:8c:fb:2f:e4:b2 Dropcam
Google Chromecast 6c:ad:f8:5e:e4:61 AzureWave Technology Inc. Chromecast
Hello Barbie 28:c2:dd:ff:a5:2d AzureWave Technology Inc. Barbie-A52D
HP Printer 70:5a:0f:e4:9b:c0 Hewlett Packard HPE49BC0
iHome PowerPlug 74:c6:3b:29:d7:1d AzureWave Technology Inc. hap-29D71D
LiFX Bulb d0:73:d5:01:83:08 LIFI LABS MANAGEMENT PTY LTD LIFX Bulb
NEST Smoke Sensor 18:b4:30:25:be:e4 Nest Labs Inc.
Netatmo Camera 70:ee:50:18:34:43 Netatmo netatmo-welcome-183443
Netatmo Weather station 70:ee:50:03:b8:ac Netatmo
Phillip Hue Lightbulb 00:17:88:2b:9a:25 Philips Lighting BV Philips-hue
Pixstart photo frame e0:76:d0:33:bb:85 AMPAK Technology, Inc.
Ring Door Bell 88:4a:ea:31:66:9d Texas Instruments
Samsung Smart Cam 00:16:6c:ab:6b:88 Samsung Electronics Co.,Ltd
Smart Things d0:52:a8:00:67:5e Physical Graph Corporation SmartThings
TP-Link Camera f4:f2:6d:93:51:f1 TP-LINK TECHNOLOGIES CO.,LTD. Little Cam
TP-Link Plug 50:c7:bf:00:56:39 TP-LINK TECHNOLOGIES CO.,LTD. HS110(US)
Triby Speaker 18:b7:9e:02:20:44 Invoxia
Withings Baby Monitor 00:24:e4:10:ee:4c Withings WBP-EE4C
Withings Scale 00:24:e4:1b:6f:96 Withings
Withings sleep sensor 00:24:e4:20:28:c6 Withings WSD-28C6
devices with high accuracy using statistical attributes derived from network traffic
characteristics. Qualitatively, most IoT devices are expected to send short bursts of
data sporadically. Quantitatively, our preliminary work in [5] was one of the first
attempts to study how much traffic IoT devices send in a burst and how long they
idle between activities. We also evaluated how much signaling they perform (e.g.
domain lookups using DNS or time synchronization using NTP) in comparison to
the data traffic they generate. This chapter significantly expands on our prior work
by employing a more comprehensive set of attributes on trace data captured over
a much longer duration (of 6 months) from a test-bed comprising 28 different IoT
devices.
There is no doubt that it is becoming increasingly important to understand the
nature of IoT traffic. Doing so helps contain unnecessary multicast/broadcast traffic,
reducing the impact they have on other applications. It also enables operators of
smart cities and enterprises to dimension their networks for appropriate performance
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levels in terms of reliability, loss, and latency needed by environmental, health, or
safety applications. However, the most compelling reason for characterizing IoT
traffic is to detect and mitigate cyber-security attacks. It is widely known that IoT
devices are by their nature and design easy to infiltrate [2, 20, 57, 58, 150, 151]. New
stories are emerging of how IoT devices have been compromised and used to launch
large-scale attacks [152]. The large heterogeneity in IoT devices has led researchers
to propose network-level security mechanisms that analyze traffic patterns to identify
attacks (see [37] and our recent work [7]); success of these approaches relies on a
good understanding of what “normal” IoT traffic profile looks like.
Our primary focus in this chapter is to establish a machine learning framework
based on various network traffic characteristics to identify and classify the default
(i.e. baseline) behavior of IoT devices on a network. This chapter fills an important
gap in the literature relating to classification of IoT devices based on their network
traffic characteristics. Our contributions are
1. We instrument a living lab with 28 IoT devices emulating a smart environment.
The devices include cameras, lights, plugs, motion sensors, appliances and
health-monitors. We collect and synthesize data from this environment for a
period of 6 months. A subset of our data is made available for the research
community to use.
2. We identify key statistical attributes such as activity cycles, port numbers,
signaling patterns and cipher suites, and use them to give insights into the
underlying network traffic characteristics.
3. We develop a multi-stage machine learning based classification algorithm and
demonstrate its ability to identify specific IoT devices with over 99% accuracy
based on their network behavior.
4. We evaluate the deployment of the classification framework in real-time, by
examining the trade-offs between costs, response time, and accuracy of the
classifier.
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The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: We present our IoT setup and
data traces in §3.2, and in §3.3 characterize traffic attributes of the various IoT
devices. In §3.4 we propose a machine learning based multi-stage device classification
method and evaluate its performance, followed by a discussion on the real-time
operation of the proposed system in §3.5. The chapter is concluded in §3.6.
3.2 IoT Traffic Collection and Synthesis
In this section, we describe our smart environment infrastructure for collecting and
synthesizing traffic from various IoT devices.
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Figure 3.1: Testbed architecture showing connected 28 different IoT devices along
with several non-IoT devices, and telemetry collected across the infrastructure is fed
to our classification models.
52
Chapter 3. IoT Traffic Characterization and Classification
3.2.1 Experimental Test-bed
A real-life architecture of a “smart environment” is depicted in Fig. 3.1 that serves a
wide range of IoT and non-IoT devices over its (wired/wireless) network infrastruc-
ture and allows them to communicate with the Internet servers via a gateway. Our
lab setup is a specialized implementation of this architecture, housed at our campus
facility, comprises one node of TP-Link Archer C7 v2 WiFi access point (repre-
senting internal switch) collocated with the Internet gateway. The TP-Link access
point, flashed with the OpenWrt firmware release Chaos Calmer (15.05.1, r48532),
serves as the gateway to the public Internet. We also installed additional OpenWrt
packages on the gateway, namely tcpdump (4.5.1-4) for capturing traffic, bash
(4.3.39-1) for scripting, block-mount package for mounting external USB storage
on the gateway, kmod-usb-core and kmod-usb-storage (3.18.23-1) for storing
the traffic trace data on the USB storage.
In our lab setup, the WAN interface of the TP-Link access point is connected to
the public Internet via the university network, while the IoT devices are connected
to the LAN and WLAN interfaces respectively. Our smart environment has a total
of 28 unique IoT devices representing different categories along with several non-IoT
devices. Here, IoT refers to specific-purpose Internet connected devices (e.g. cameras
and smoke sensors), while general-purpose devices (e.g. phones and laptops) fall into
the non-IoT category.
The IoT devices include cameras (Nest Dropcam, Samsung SmartCam, Netatmo
Welcome, Belkin camera, TP-Link Day Night Cloud camera, Withings Smart Baby
Monitor, Canary camera, August door bell, Ring door bell), switches and triggers
(iHome, TP-Link Smart Plug, Belkin Wemo Motion Sensor, Belkin Wemo Switch),
hubs (Smart Things, Amazon Echo), air quality sensors (NEST Protect smoke alarm,
Netatmo Weather station, Awair air quality monitor), electronics (Triby speaker,
PIXSTAR Photoframe, HP Printer, Hello barbie, Google Chromecast), healthcare
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devices (Withings Smart scale, Withings Aura smart sleep sensor, Blipcare blood
pressure meter) and light bulbs (Phips Hue and LiFX Smart Bulb). Several non-IoT
devices were also connected to the testbed, such as laptops, mobile phones and an
Android tablet. The tablet was used to configure the IoT devices as recommended
by the respective device manufacturers.
3.2.2 Trace Data
All the traffic on the LAN side was collected using the tcpdump tool running on
OpenWrt [153]. It is important to have a one-to-one mapping between a physical
device and a known MAC address (by virtue of being in the same LAN) or IP address
(i.e. without NAT) in the traffic trace. Capturing traffic on the LAN allowed us to
use MAC address as the identifier for a device to isolate its traffic from the traffic mix
comprising many other devices in the network. We developed a script to automate
the process of data collection and storage. The resulting traces were stored as pcap
files on an external USB hard drive of 1 TB storage attached to the gateway. This
setup permitted continuous logging of the traffic across several months.
We started logging the network traffic in our smart environment from 1-Oct-
2016 to 13-Apr-2017, i.e. over a period of 26 weeks. The raw trace data contains
packet headers and payload information. The process of data collection and storage
begins at midnight local time each day using the Cron job on OpenWrt. We wrote
a monitoring script on the OpenWrt to ensure that data collection/storage was
proceeding smoothly. The script checks the processes running on the gateway at 5
second intervals. If the logging process is not running, then the script immediately
restarts it, thereby limiting any data loss event to only 5 seconds. To make the trace
data publicly available, we set up an Apache server on a virtual machine (VM) in our
university data center and wrote a script to periodically transfer the trace data from
the previous day, stored on the hard drive, onto the VM. The trace data from two
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weeks is openly available for download at: http://iotanalytics.unsw.edu.au/.
The size of the daily logs varies between 61 MB and 2 GB, with an average of 365
MB.
3.3 IoT Traffic Characterization
We now present our observations using passive packet-level analysis of traffic from
28 IoT devices over the course of 26 weeks. We study a broad range of IoT traffic
characteristics including activity patterns (e.g. distribution of volume/times during
active/sleep periods), and signalling (e.g. domain names requested, server-side port
numbers used and TLS handshake exchanges).
IoT traffic constitutes (i) traffic generated by the devices autonomously – e.g.
DNS, NTP, etc. that are unaffected by human interaction, as well as (ii) traffic
generated due to users interacting with the devices – e.g. Belkin Wemo sensor
responding to detection of movement, Amazon Echo responding to voice commands
issued by a user, LiFX lightbulb changing colour and intensity upon user request,
Netatmo Welcome camera detecting an occupant and instructing the LiFX light
bulb to turn on with a specific colour, and so on. Our dataset well captures these
two types of IoT traffic from a lab that represents a living smart environment (i.e.
covering periods over which humans are present or absent in the environment).
To provide insights into the IoT traffic characteristics, we show in Fig. 3.2 a
Sankey plot of network traffic seen over a 24 hour period for Amazon Echo and
LiFX lightbulb. These devices are chosen just for illustrative purposes. Each plot
depicts the flow-level information generated by the respective device. Flows are: (a)
either unicast or multicast/broadcast, (b) destined to either local hosts (LAN) or
Internet servers (WAN), and (c) tied to protocols (TCP, UDP, ICMP or IGMP) and
port numbers.
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(a) Amazon Echo.
LiFX Smart Bulb
Broadcast
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v2.broker.lifx.co
pool.ntp.org
8.8.8.8
192.168.1.1
192.168.1.255
123
67
UDP
TCP56700
53
WAN
(b) LiFX lightbulb.
Figure 3.2: Sankey diagram of daily network activity for two representative IoT
devices, Amazon Echo and LiFX lightbulb. A clear distinction is observed in terms
of their communication patterns, i.e. the servers they talk to, and the port numbers
and protocols used for data exchange.
Fig. 3.2 provides a visual aid depicting the underlying traffic signature exhibited
by the two devices. For example, DNS (port number 53) and NTP (port number
123) are used by both Amazon Echo and LiFX lightbulb. While Amazon Echo
uses HTTP (port number 80), HTTPS (port number 443) and ICMP (port num-
ber 0), LiFX lightbulb does not use any of these applications. Further, each device
seems to communicate to a unique port number on a WAN server; TCP 33434 for
Amazon Echo and UDP 56700 for LiFX lightbulb, as shown by the top flow in
Figures 3.2a and 3.2b. Finally, we observe that Amazon Echo accesses a number
of domain names including softwareupdates.amazon.com, device-metrics-su.
amazon.com, example.org, pindorama.amazon.com and pool.ntp.org. However,
LiFX lightbulb communicates with only two domains, i.e. v2.broker.lifx.co and
pool.ntp.org.
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3.3.1 IoT Activity and Volume Pattern
We start with the activity pattern of IoT devices that is defined by the properties of
their traffic flows. We define four key attributes at a per-flow level to characterize IoT
devices based on their network activity: flow volume (i.e. sum total of download
and upload bytes), flow duration (i.e. time between the first and the last packet
in a flow), average flow rate (i.e. flow volume divided by the flow duration), and
device sleep time (i.e. time interval over which the IoT device has no active flow).
We plot in Fig. 3.3 the probability distribution of the above four attributes for
a chosen set of IoT devices using the trace data collected over 26 weeks. It can be
observed from Fig. 3.3a that each IoT device tends to exchange a small amount of
data per flow. For the case of the LiFX lightbulb (depicted by red bars), 26% of
flows transfer between [130, 140] bytes and 20% between [120, 130] bytes. The flow
volume for the Belkin motion sensor (depicted by green bars) is slightly higher; over
35% of flows transfer between [2800, 3800] bytes. For the Amazon Echo (depicted
by blue bars), over 95% of flows transfer less than 1000 bytes. Though we present
the flow volume histogram for only a few devices, most of our IoT devices exhibit a
similar predictable pattern.
A similar pattern emerges for the flow duration as well. Referring to Fig. 3.3b,
we note that the flow duration of 53 seconds is seen in more than 40% of flows for
Amazon Echo, while a duration of 60 seconds is seen for the LiFX lightbulb and
Belkin motion sensor with a probability of 50% and 21% respectively.
For the average flow rate attribute, Fig. 3.3c shows that the mean rate is rather
small, in the bits-per-second range as one would qualitatively expect. Quantitatively,
the figure shows that the LiFX lightbulb has an average flow rate of 18 bits-per-
second nearly 60% of the time. Nearly 30% of Belkin flows have a bit rate in the
range 59 to 60 bits-per-second while nearly 40% Amazon Echo flows have a bit range
in the range 70 to 71 bits-per-second.
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Figure 3.3: Distribution of IoT activity pattern: (a) flow volume, (b) flow duration,
(c) average flow rate and (d) device sleep time.
Lastly, in terms of the sleep time for the devices Fig. 3.3d shows that the Belkin
motion sensor and the LiFX lightbulb exhibit a distinct sleep pattern. The duration
is 1 second and 60 seconds with probability 73% and 48% respectively. However,
multiple sleep times with small probabilities are observed for the Amazon Echo. This
is because Amazon Echo keeps its TCP connections alive and goes to sleep only when
it disconnects from the Internet. Other devices in our test-bed also perform like the
Echo and do not seem to have a dominant sleep pattern.
3.3.2 IoT Signaling Pattern
We now focus on the application layer protocols, inferred using the port numbers,
that IoT devices mostly use to communicate locally in the LAN and/or externally
with servers on the public Internet.
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(a) Amazon Echo {10}. (b) LiFX lightbulb {5}. (c) Awair air monitor {7}.
(d) Belkin motion sensor {7}. (e) Belkin power switch {7}. (f) Belkin camera {9}.
(g) Netatmo weather station {4}. (h) Non-IoT {2382}.
Figure 3.4: Word-cloud of server ports (total count of unique ports is shown in
{sub-captions} next to the device name).
Server port numbers
Fig. 3.4 shows the word cloud of server-side port numbers of all flows initiated from
a variety of IoT devices. For each device, if a port is used more frequently then it is
shown by a larger font-size in the respective word cloud. Sub-captions (i.e. numbers
within {}) report the number of unique server ports for each device. It can be seen
that IoT devices each uniquely communicate with a handful of server ports whereas
non-IoT devices use a much wider range of services (i.e. 2382 unique ports are shown
in Fig. 3.4h and many of them are very infrequent). We observe that non-standard
ports 33434, 56700, 8883, and 25050 are prominently seen in traffic originating from
Amazon Echo, LiFX lightbulb, Awair air quality monitor, and Netatmo weather
station respectively, as shown in the top row of Fig. 3.4. Further, we note devices
from the same manufacturer share certain ports. For example, port numbers 8443
and 3478 are common between Belkin’s motion sensor, power switch, and camera,
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(a) Amazon Echo {30}. (b) Google Dropcam {5}. (c) HP printer {6}.
(d) Belkin camera {11}. (e) Belkin motion sensor {5}. (f) Belkin power switch {8}.
(g) Awair air quality {5}. (h) LiFX lightbulb {2}. (i) Non-IoT {11927}.
Figure 3.5: Word-cloud of domain names (total count of unique domains is shown
in {sub-captions} next to the device name).
as shown in Figures 3.4d-3.4f. We also note that well-known standard port numbers
such as 53 (DNS), 123 (NTP), 0 (ICMP) and 1900 (SSDP) are used by many of the
IoT devices as well as the non-IoTs with various frequencies, as shown in Fig. 3.4.
Moreover, the server-side port number of 443 (TLS/SSL) is also used by many of
the IoT devices.
DNS queries
DNS is a common application used by almost all networked devices. Since IoT
devices are custom-designed for specific purposes, they access a limited number
of domains corresponding to their vendor-specific end-point servers. We plot in
Fig. 3.5 the word cloud of domain names accessed by several IoT devices as well
as non-IoTs. It is seen that IoT devices are fairly distinguishable by the domain
names they communicate with. For example, as depicted in Figures 3.5a-3.5c,
domains such as example.com, example.net, and example.org are frequently re-
quested by Amazon Echo; sub-domains of hp.com and hpeprint.com are seen in
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DNS queries from the HP printer. However, we also see that some prominent do-
main names are shared between the different devices. For example, belkin.com and
d3gjecg2uu2faq.cloudfront.net are commonly used by Belkin devices (i.e. cam-
era, motion sensor and power switch) as shown in Figures 3.5d-3.5f; or pool.ntp.org
is prominent in traffic flows generated from Google Dropcam, Awair air quality mon-
itor and LiFX lightbulb, as shown in Figures 3.5b-3.5h. Again considering non-IoTs
in Fig. 3.5i, we see about 12000 unique domains visited which is far diverse com-
pared to IoT devices with only a handful of domains accessed repeatedly. We also
found that IoT devices differ from one other in how often the DNS protocol is used.
We have observed from our traffic traces that IoT devices generate DNS queries
during different stages of its operation; for example only during the boot-up phase
(e.g. Google Dropcamp) or when interacting with a user (e.g. Hello Barbie) or
periodically (e.g. Amazon Echo). As shown in Fig. 3.6a, certain IoT devices exhibit
a characteristic signature in the frequency of their DNS queries. The LiFX light-
bulb and Amazon Echo send DNS queries very frequently (i.e. every 5 minutes) but
a device like the Belkin motion sensor requests domain names only once every 30
minutes.
NTP queries
As mentioned earlier, NTP is another popular protocol used by IoT devices because
precise and verifiable timing is crucial for IoT operations [154]. Many IoT devices
tend to use NTP protocol (UDP port 123) in a periodic manner in order to synchro-
nize their time with publicly available NTP servers. For example, Awair air quality
monitor, LiFX lightbulb and Google Dropcam obtain the IP address of time servers
from pool.ntp.org. We also find that time synchronization occurs repeatedly in
our test-bed and many IoT devices exhibit a recognizable pattern in the use of NTP.
For example, the Belkin power switch, LiFX lightbulb and SmartThings hub send
NTP requests every 60, 300 and 600 seconds respectively, as shown in histogram
plot of Fig. 3.6b.
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Figure 3.6: Distribution of IoT signaling pattern: (a) DNS interval, (b) NTP inter-
val.
Cipher suite
A number of IoT devices use TLS/SSL protocol (port number 443) to communicate
with their respective servers on the Internet [115]. In order to initiate the TLS
connection and negotiate the security algorithms with servers, devices start hand-
shaking by sending a “Client Hello” packet with a list of “cipher suites” that they can
support, in the order of their preference. For example, Figures 3.7a and 3.7b depict
cipher suites that Amazon Echo offers to two different Amazon servers. Each cipher
suite (i.e. 4-digit code) can take one of 380 possible values and represents algorithms
for key exchange, bulk encryption and message authentication code (MAC). For ex-
ample, the cipher 002f negotiated by an Amazon server uses RSA, AES_128_CBC,
and SHA protocols for key exchange, bulk encryption and message authentication,
respectively.
We find that 17 out of the 28 IoT devices in our setup, including the Amazon
Echo, August Doorbell Cam, Awair air quality monitor, Belkin Camera, Canary
Camera, Dropcam, Google Chromecast, Hello Barbie, HP ENVY Printer, iHome,
Netatmo Welcome camera, Philips Hue lightbulb, Pixtar photoframe, Ring Door
Bell, Triby, Withings Aura smart sleep sensor and Withings Scale, use TLS/SSL for
communication. We find that Amazon Echo uses total of five different cipher suite
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{"ciphersuite":["c014", "c00a", "0039", "0038", "0037", "0036", "0088", "0087", "0086", 
"0085", "c00f", "c005", "0035", "0084", "c013", "c009", "0033", "0032", "0031", "0030", 
"009a", "0099", "0098", "0097", "0045", "0044", "0043", "0042", "c00e", "c004", "002f", 
"0096", "0041", "0007", "c011", "c007", "c00c", "c002", "0005", "0004", "c012", "c008", 
"0016", "0013", "0010", "000d", "c00d", "c003", "000a", "0015", "0012", "000f", "000c", 
"0009", "00ff"] , "negotiated cipher":"002f"}
(a) cs1 of Amazon Echo.
{"ciphersuite":["c030", "c02c", "c028", "c024", "c014", "c00a", "00a5", "00a3", "00a1", 
"009f", "006b", "006a", "0069", "0068", "0039", "0038", "0037", "0036", "0088", "0087", 
"0086", "0085", "c032", "c02e", "c02a", "c026", "c00f", "c005", "009d", "003d", "0035", 
"0084", "c02f", "c02b", "c027", "c023", "c013", "c009", "00a4", "00a2", "00a0", "009e", 
"0067", "0040", "003f", "003e", "0033", "0032", "0031", "0030", "009a", "0099", "0098", 
"0097", "0045", "0044", "0043", "0042", "c031", "c02d", "c029", "c025", "c00e", "c004", 
"009c", "003c", "002f", "0096", "0041", "0007", "c011", "c007", "c00c", "c002", "0005", 
"0004", "c012", "c008", "0016", "0013", "0010", "000d", "c00d", "c003", "000a", "0015", 
"0012", "000f", "000c", "0009", "00ff"] , "negotiated cipher": "c02f"}
(b) cs2 of Amazon Echo.
Figure 3.7: Signature of cipher suite.
strings when communicating SSL to different servers, Triby speaker uses two strings,
while the Pixtar photoframe uses only one string for all of its SSL communications.
We plot unique cipher suite strings from these three devices in Fig. 3.8 as discrete
signals: x-axis is the order of 4-digit cipher codes that appear in the offered suite, and
y-axis is the index of the individual cipher codes (i.e. a value from {1, 2, ..., 380}).
It is seen that the collection of cipher suite signals enunciates a unique signature for
each IoT device. Exceptionally, we found that Pixtar photoframe shares its single
cipher suite with one of 18 suites that are used by August door-bell – we will see in
§3.4.2 that relying only on cipher suite attribute would not be effective in classifying
Pixtar photo-frame traffic.
There are however many devices that rarely exchange cipher suites but instead
prefer to keep their TLS connections alive for a long period. For example, Google
Dropcam establishes a TLS connection to its own server whenever it boots up and
maintains this connection as long as it has network connectivity, while Amazon Echo
and Pixstar photoframe initiate on average 1 and 2 TLS connections respectively
every hour.
Summary: In this section, we have identified 8 key attributes based on the
underlying network traffic characteristics of IoT devices. They are flow volume, flow
duration, average flow rate, device sleep time, server port numbers, DNS queries,
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Figure 3.8: Signature of cipher suite.
NTP queries and cipher suites. Although, some devices (e.g. Amazon Echo, or
LiFX lightbulb) can be uniquely identified by considering just one or two traffic
attributes such as the list of domain-names, port-numbers, or cipher suites, these
come with challenges. For example, a strong attribute like the list of cipher-suites is
observed very infrequently in the traffic (e.g. only once a day). As another example,
different types of devices from the same vendor visit similar domains and use the
same port numbers to access cloud servers. Capturing aspects such as the number
of occurrences for these attributes (e.g. number of times a domain is accessed or
number of streams that use the port), in combination with other attributes, vastly
improves the prediction capability to distinguish between devices from the same
manufacturer. In the next section, we develop a multi-stage machine learning based
algorithm using combinations of these attributes to help classify IoT devices with
high accuracy.
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3.4 Machine Learning Based Classification
In order to synthesize the attributes from our trace data, we first convert the raw
pcap files into flows on an hourly basis using the Joy tool [155]. Then, for a given
IoT device, we compute the traffic activity and signalling attributes defined in the
previous section over the hourly instances. The number of instances for each device
obtained from the trace spanning 26 weeks varies depending on factors such as the
duration for which a device is online, or how a device generates traffic (autonomously
or interactively). For example, there were only 13 hourly instances for the Blipcare
BP monitor since it generates traffic only when the device is used by a user. On the
other hand, we collected 4177 instances for Google Dropcam.
3.4.1 Multi-Stage Device Classification Architecture
We note that three of our attributes namely “set of domain names”, “set of remote
port numbers” and “set of cipher suites” are nominal (i.e. are not treated as numeric
values) and multi-valued (for example, {“53”:3, “123”:1, “443”:2} represents a set of
remote port numbers with three occurrences of port number 53, two occurrences
of port 123, and one occurrence of port number 443). Our remaining attributes
including flow volume/duration, flow rate, sleep time, and DNS/NTP intervals con-
tain single quantitative and continuous values. We therefore employ a two-stage
hierarchical architecture for our IoT classifier as shown in Fig. 3.9.
In this architecture, we first feed each multi-valued attribute to its corresponding
stage-0 classifier in the form of a “bag of words”. A bag of words is a matrix whose
rows represent labeled instances, and columns represent unique words. This matrix
has M rows (i.e. total number of instances) and N columns (i.e. number of unique
words). We observed 356, 421 and 54 unique words for domain-names, remote port
numbers and cipher suite strings, as shown in Fig. 3.9. In addition to these unique
65
Chapter 3. IoT Traffic Characterization and Classification
!
"
#
$
"
%
%
"
&
'
'
'
"
"
%
"
%
(
)
*+
,
-.
! " # $ % & $
/
0
0
12
3
*/
20
-4
5
5
5
2,
67
8
/
1,
23
,
*
5
5
5
29
,
1:
;3
2<
0
8
5
5
5
28
,
,
*+
=
,
2<
0
8
>
$
29
-0
:
,
-2
1;
?6
2<
0
(
)
*+
,
-.
" # $ $ $ & $
@A
A
A
%
BA
A
A
!
B2
22
@C
A
#
%
BC
A
#
#
B2
2
@C
A
$
D
BC
A
$
E
B(
@C
A
"
A
BC
A
$
C
B2
2
@C
C
F
G
BC
C
F
&
B2
22
(
)
*+
,
-.
$ $ $ " " & $
'()*+,)(-./
'()*+0-1234)5
'()* 123/
6(//7+34./
896+453/1,2(
9:;+453/1,2(
<(2==+>)1+?2@+)>+7)13+5-.?/1=
<)5>40/5A/+>)1+?2@+)>+7)13+5-.?/1=
<(2==+>)1+?2@+)>+)>+0).245+52./=
<)5>40/5A/+>)1+?2@+)>+0).245+52./=
<(2==+>)1+?2@+)>+A47B/1+=-43/=
<)5>40/5A/ >)1+?2@+)>+<47B/1+6-43/=
!"#$%&$'()%*($+%'*$,-).('/
!"#$%&$0%)"1,$,")(/
!"#$%&$21+3('$4-1*(/
92C,/+D2E/=+
F-(345).42(+A(2==4>4/1+
92C,/+D2E/=+
F-(345).42(+A(2==4>4/1+
92C,/+D2E/=+
F-(345).42(+A(2==4>4/1+
4*"#(56 4*"#(57
<(2==
<)5>40/5A/
G
2
5
0
)
.
+'
)
1/
=3
+
A(
2
==
4>
4/
1
Figure 3.9: System architecture of the multi-stage classifier.
words, we aggregated all corresponding words for non-IoT devices as “others” - a
column called “others” in each Stage-0 matrix represents words not seen in IoT
traffic. Each cell of this matrix is the number of occurrences of such unique words
in a given instance.
As shown in Fig. 3.9, each classifier of Stage-0 generates two outputs, namely
a tentative class and a confidence level, which together with other single-valued
quantitative attributes (i.e. flow volume, duration, rate, sleep time, DNS, NTP
intervals) are fed into a Stage-1 classifier that produces the final output (i.e. the
device identification with a confidence level).
Stage-0: Bag-of-words Classifiers
We employ a Naive Bayes Multinomial classifier to analyze each bag of words in the
stage-0 of our machine. It has been shown [156] that this classifier performs well in
text classification when dealing with a large number of unique words. During the
training phase, the classifier takes the distribution of words, e.g. individual unique
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domain names, and computes the probability of each word given a class using:
Pr(wtrainj |ci) =
1 +
D∑
l=1
nl,ci,wj
train
N +
N∑
k=1
D∑
l=1
nl,ci,wk
train
(3.1)
where wj is a unique word in the training dataset (e.g. port number 56700); ci is
a class label (e.g. LiFX lightbulb); D is the total number of instances; nl,ci,wj train
is the number of wj occurrences in each of instances with class label of ci; N is the
total number of unique words (e.g. we have N = 421 unique port numbers in our
dataset).
During the testing phase, the classifier needs to compute the following probability
for all possible classes:
Pr(ci|W test) = Pr(ctraini )
N∏
j=1
Pr (wj
train|ci)n
test
j (3.2)
where W test is a set represented by {w1 : ntest1 , w2 : ntest2 , ..., wN : ntestN }; ntestj is the
occurrence number of individual unique words wj in a given test instance; Pr(ctraini )
is the presence probability of a class ci in the whole training dataset (i.e. number of
ci training instances divided by total number of all training instances). The classifier
finally chooses the class that gives the maximum probability in (3.2) for a given set of
words along with their occurrences. Note that a Naive Bayes Multinomial classifier
performs well if training instances are fairly distributed among various classes [156].
Stage-1 Classifier
We have a stage-1 classifier that takes all quantitative attributes along with the pair
of outputs from each stage-0 classifier. Since the stage-1 attributes are not linearly
separable and the outputs of stage-0 classifiers are nominal values, we use a Random
Forest based stage-1 classifier. Another reason for selecting the Random Forest is
its high tolerance to over-fitting compared to other decision tree classifiers.
67
Chapter 3. IoT Traffic Characterization and Classification
3.4.2 Performance Evaluation
We use the Weka [157] tool for our IoT device classification. We have collected a
total of 50,378 labeled instances from our traffic traces. As mentioned earlier, we
have a number of instances from different devices – those that generate traffic when
triggered by user interaction have small number of instances (e.g. 13 for Blipcare BP
monitor, 21 for Google Chromecast) and those that autonomously generate traffic
have a fairly large number of instances (e.g. 2,868 for Samsung Smart Things or
2,247 for Amazon Echo). We have randomly split instances into two groups, one
containing 70% of the instances for “training” and another containing 30% of the
instances for “testing”.
Table 3.2 shows the performance of our classifier under various scenarios, each
captured by a pair of columns. For a given scenario, we measure the true positive
rate (i.e. fraction of test instances that are correctly classified) and false positive
rate (i.e. fraction of test instances that are incorrectly classified) for every device
corresponding to the rows in Table 3.2. We also obtain the average confidence level
(i.e. a number between 0 and 1 depicted within square brackets in each cell) of our
classifier for correctly classified and incorrectly classified instances. In addition, we
aggregate the performance of individual classes and compute the overall accuracy
(i.e. total true positive rate) along with the overall root relative squared error
(RRSE) as measures of performance for our classifier. These measures are reported
in the top row of each scenario in Table 3.2. Note that our objective is to achieve a
high accuracy (close to 100%) with a fairly low error (close to zero).
Performance of Stage-0: Port Numbers Attribute
The first three columns correspond to those cases in which we consider only nominal
attributes of stage-0 (i.e. bag of words corresponding to port numbers, domain
names and cipher suites). The first column shows that when we only use a list of
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Table 3.2: Performance of the proposed IoT device classifier under different sets of
attributes.
Devices
Port Numbers Domain Names Cipher Suite Combined stage-0 Final
Accuracy: 92.13%
RRSE: 39.93%
Accuracy: 79.48%
RRSE: 57.56%
Accuracy: 36.15%
RRSE: 86.73%
Accuracy: 97.39%
RRSE: 18.24%
Accuracy: 99.88%
RRSE: 5.06%
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Amazon Echo 100.0%
[1.00]
99.6%
[1.00]
Dropcam: 0.4% [0.08] 100.0%
[1.00]
99.9%
[1.00]
HP printer: 0.1% [0.52] 99.7%
[1.00]
Non IoT: 0.1% [0.37]
Dropcam: 0.1% [0.43]
August doorbell 99.0%[1.00]
iHome: 0.6% [1.00]
Others: 0.4% [0.65]
100.0%
[1.00]
78.8%
[1.00]
Pixstar photo: 21.2% [1.00] 100.0%
[1.00]
100.0%
[1.00]
Awair air quality 97.6%[1.00]
Non IoT: 2.0% [0.32]
Amazon Echo: 0.4% [0.53]
99.2%
[1.00]
SmartThings: 0.4% [0.49]
Dropcam: 0.4% [0.08]
99.2%
[0.63]
Dropcam: 0.8% [0.08] 100.0%
[1.00]
100.0%
[1.00]
Belkin cam 95.5%[1.00]
Belkin motion: 3.0% [0.94]
Others: 1.5% [0.67]
39.4%
[0.99]
Belkin motion: 59.8% [0.62]
Non IoT: 0.8% [1.00]
0.0%
[-]
Dropcam: 100.0% [0.08] 97.7%
[0.99]
Non IoT: 1.5% [0.74]
Dropcam: 0.8% [1.00]
97.7%
[0.99]
Non IoT: 1.5% [0.60]
Netatmo cam: 0.8% [0.57]
Belkin motion 99.8%[1.00]
Non IoT: 0.2% [1.00] 0.0%
[-]
Belkin switch: 100.0% [0.57] 0.0%
[-]
Dropcam: 100.0% [0.08] 99.5%
[1.00]
Samsung cam: 0.3% [0.79]
Non IoT: 0.2% [1.00]
99.8%
[1.00]
Non IoT: 0.2% [0.97]
Belkin switch 99.5%[1.00]
Belkin motion: 0.2% [0.77]
Others: 0.3% [0.75]
99.7%
[0.57]
Dropcam: 0.2% [0.08]
Blipcare BP: 0.1% [0.79]
0.0%
[-]
Dropcam: 100.0% [0.08] 99.8%
[1.00]
Belkin motion: 0.2% [1.00] 99.8%
[1.00]
Belkin motion: 0.2% [0.93]
Canary cam 100.0%
[1.00]
100.0%
[1.00]
100.0%
[1.00]
100.0%
[1.00]
100.0%
[1.00]
Dropcam 98.1%[0.33]
SmartThings: 0.6% [0.99]
Others: 1.3% [0.59]
100.0%
[0.09]
100.0%
[0.09]
74.0%
[0.96]
HP printer: 25.7% [0.52]
Others: 0.3% [0.41]
100.0%
[1.00]
LiFX bulb 100.0%
[1.00]
99.7%
[0.70]
SmartThings: 0.1% [0.42]
Dropcam: 0.1% [0.08]
0.0%
[-]
Dropcam: 100.0% [0.08] 100.0%
[1.00]
100.0%
[1.00]
NEST smoke 100.0%
[1.00]
100.0%
[1.00]
0.0%
[-]
Dropcam: 100.0% [0.08] 100.0%
[1.00]
100.0%
[1.00]
Netatmo weat. 99.8%[1.00]
Dropcam: 0.2% [0.08] 99.9%
[1.00]
Dropcam: 0.1% [0.08] 0.0%
[-]
Dropcam: 100.0% [0.08] 100.0%
[1.00]
100.0%
[1.00]
Netatmo cam 95.4%[1.00]
Dropcam: 2.0% [0.97]
Others: 2.6% [0.70]
97.8%
[1.00]
Dropcam: 2.2% [0.08] 99.7%
[0.92]
Dropcam: 0.3% [0.08] 99.8%
[1.00]
Pixstar photo: 0.1% [0.54]
Dropcam: 0.1% [0.60]
99.9%
[1.00]
Hue bulb: 0.1% [0.37]
Pixstar photo 99.7%[1.00]
Dropcam: 0.3% [0.08] 99.3%
[1.00]
Dropcam: 0.7% [0.08] 0.0%
[-]
August doorbell: 99.7% [0.71]
Dropcam: 0.3% [0.08]
100.0%
[1.00]
100.0%
[1.00]
Samsung cam 99.4%[1.00]
Belkin motion: 0.6% [1.00] 14.5%
[1.00]
Dropcam: 73.4% [0.10]
SmartThings: 12.0% [0.43]
0.0%
[-]
Dropcam: 100.0% [0.08] 100.0%
[1.00]
100.0%
[1.00]
SmartThings 97.5%[1.00]
LiFX bulb: 1.9% [0.99]
Others: 0.5% [0.68]
79.9%
[0.50]
LiFX bulb: 20.1% [0.50] 0.0%
[-]
Dropcam: 100.0% [0.08] 99.8%
[1.00]
LiFX bulb: 0.1% [0.88]
Dropcam: 0.1% [0.97]
99.8%
[1.00]
LiFX bulb: 0.1% [0.71]
Dropcam: 0.1% [0.67]
TPlink cam 100.0%
[1.00]
99.7%
[1.00]
Dropcam: 0.3% [0.08] 0.0%
[-]
Dropcam: 100.0% [0.08] 100.0%
[1.00]
100.0%
[1.00]
TPlink plug 99.7%[1.00]
Dropcam: 0.3% [0.08] 99.7%
[0.99]
Dropcam: 0.3% [0.08] 0.0%
[-]
Dropcam: 100.0% [0.08] 100.0%
[1.00]
100.0%
[1.00]
Triby speaker 98.0%[1.00]
Netatmo weat.: 1.2% [0.37]
Others: 0.8% [0.49]
100.0%
[1.00]
41.2%
[0.99]
Dropcam: 54.8% [0.08]
Netatmo weat.: 4.0% [0.16]
99.9%
[1.00]
Non IoT: 0.1% [1.00] 99.9%
[1.00]
Non IoT: 0.1% [0.84]
Withings sleep 96.8%[1.00]
Non IoT: 1.9% [0.99]
Others: 1.2% [0.55]
99.6%
[1.00]
Dropcam: 0.4% [0.08] 23.5%
[1.00]
Dropcam: 76.5% [0.08] 100.0%
[1.00]
100.0%
[1.00]
Hue bulb 88.8%[1.00]
Samsung cam: 11.1% [0.45]
Belkin motion: 0.1% [1.00]
89.0%
[1.00]
Dropcam: 11.0% [0.08] 0.8%
[0.71]
Dropcam: 99.2% [0.08] 99.9%
[1.00]
Non IoT: 0.1% [0.57] 99.9%
[1.00]
Non IoT: 0.1% [0.47]
Chromecast 62.5%[1.00]
Amazon Echo: 25.0% [0.52]
Non IoT: 12.5% [0.60]
100.0%
[1.00]
100.0%
[0.98]
87.5%
[1.00]
Dropcam: 12.5% [0.69] 87.5%
[0.98]
Dropcam: 12.5% [0.57]
HP printer 61.5%[0.99]
Dropcam: 38.0% [0.16]
Others: 0.6% [0.86]
3.8%
[1.00]
Dropcam: 96.2% [0.08] 2.5%
[0.45]
Dropcam: 97.1% [0.08]
Others: 0.4% [0.75]
99.3%
[0.82]
Dropcam: 0.4% [0.85]
Others: 0.2% [0.39]
99.8%
[0.99]
Non IoT: 0.1% [0.67]
Dropcam: 0.1% [0.28]
iHome 79.2%[0.90]
Dropcam: 10.2% [0.34]
Others: 10.6% [0.42]
87.5%
[0.97]
Dropcam: 12.5% [0.08] 18.0%
[0.57]
Dropcam: 82.0% [0.08] 89.8%
[1.00]
Dropcam: 9.8% [0.96]
HP printer: 0.4% [0.52]
100.0%
[0.99]
Withings baby mon. 58.2%[1.00]
Non IoT: 41.8% [1.00] 100.0%
[1.00]
0.0%
[-]
Dropcam: 100.0% [0.08] 100.0%
[1.00]
100.0%
[1.00]
Withings scale 74.8%[0.98]
Non IoT: 15.3% [0.56]
Others: 9.9% [0.19]
41.4%
[0.79]
Withings sleep: 56.8% [0.96]
Dropcam: 1.8% [0.08]
42.3%
[0.33]
Dropcam: 57.7% [0.08] 99.1%
[1.00]
Dropcam: 0.9% [0.54] 100.0%
[1.00]
Ring doorbell 0.6%[0.98]
Netatmo weat.: 95.8% [0.18]
Others: 3.6% [0.60]
100.0%
[0.98]
7.8%
[1.00]
Dropcam: 92.2% [0.08] 100.0%
[1.00]
100.0%
[1.00]
Blipcare BP 20.0%[0.54]
Ring doorbell: 80.0% [0.41] 40.0%
[0.79]
HP printer: 60.0% [0.44] 0.0%
[-]
Dropcam: 100.0% [0.08] 100.0%
[0.90]
100.0%
[0.85]
Hello Barbie 0.0%[-]
Dropcam: 71.4% [0.08]
Others: 28.6% [0.50]
21.4%
[1.00]
Dropcam: 71.4% [0.08]
HP printer: 7.1% [0.45]
21.4%
[0.99]
Dropcam: 78.6% [0.08] 14.3%
[0.97]
HP printer: 78.6% [0.52]
Dropcam: 7.1% [0.61]
92.9%
[0.99]
Hue bulb: 7.1% [0.35]
Non IoT 74.2%[0.98]
Triby speaker: 16.6% [0.90]
Others: 9.2% [0.69]
66.9%
[0.97]
Dropcam: 29.7% [0.08]
Others: 3.4% [0.73]
59.5%
[0.79]
Dropcam: 36.3% [0.08]
Others: 4.2% [0.73]
98.8%
[1.00]
HP printer: 1.1% [0.56]
Dropcam: 0.2% [0.75]
99.7%
[0.99]
HP printer: 0.3% [0.55]
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server-side port numbers for device classification, a reasonable accuracy of 92.13%
is achieved, but RRSE is poor (at 39.93%). Inspecting the individual classes, we
observe that certain classes highlighted by yellow or light-green (e.g. Ring door bell,
Blipcare BP monitor, Hello Barbie, and Google chromecast) are poorly classified.
We explain the reason behind this misclassification next.
Ring door bell: Out of 486 instances, 465 contain a single occurrence of the
DNS query (i.e. remote port number 53). We see that 95.8% of test instances are
incorrectly classified as Netatmo weather station. This is because of two reasons:
(i) there are 2451 training instances of Netatmo compared to 323 of Ring door
bell, which makes Pr(ctraini ) of Netatmo larger than that of Ring door bell, and (ii)
many Netatmo instances contain several (on average 4 times) occurrences of port
53 as opposed to only one for Ring Door bell, which also contributes to Pr(wj|ci)
of Netatmo being greater than that for Ring door bell in (3.1). Thus, Ring door
bell instances get classified as Netatmo weather station, warranting a second stage
of classification with additional attributes for improved accuracy.
Blipcare BP monitor: It uses only two remote port numbers, namely 8777
and 53, in a total of 13 instances - the port numbers appear only once or twice
in each instance. Surprisingly, we see that 80% of Blipcare test instances are in-
correctly classified as Ring Door Bell though the remote port number of 8777 is
unique to the Blipcare BP monitor. This is because there are only a very small
number of Blipcare instances in our dataset, which results in a fairly small value
of Pr(“53”|Blipcare) = 0.0203 and Pr(“8777”|Blipcare) = 0.0294 in (3.1), and
a negligible value of Pr(Blipcaretrain) = 0.0003 in (3.2). On the other hand,
Pr(“8777”|Ring) becomes very small as the remote port number 8777 is never used
by the Ring Door Bell in our dataset. However, the probability of Pr(“8777”|Ring) =
0.0011 in (3.1) is sufficient enough to maximize the classifier probability Pr(Ring|{“53” :
1, “8777” : 1}) in (3.2), given Pr(Ringtrain) = 0.0097.
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Other devices: Server-side port numbers are empty in 72% of instances for
Hello Barbie, since it communicates with local devices instead of Internet-based
end-points. Similarly for HP printer (38%) and iHome power plug (10%). The lack
of server-side port number information explains why these devices are classified as
Dropcam, which has the highest value of Pr(Dropcamtrain) = 0.0828 in (3.2). We
note that the confidence level of our stage-0 classifier is fairly low (i.e. less than 0.4)
in these cases, suggesting that the classifier chooses the most probable class given
empty attribute (i.e. all ntestj are zero).
Performance of Stage-0: Domain Names Attribute
We now focus on the stage-0 machine that uses only a bag of domain-names, which
yields an accuracy of 79.48% with a fairly high RRSE value of 57.56%, as shown in
the second column in Table 3.2. In this scenario, more classes suffer from misclas-
sification (i.e. those with yellow coloured cells) compared to the previous scenario
where only remote port numbers were considered. The reasons behind the misclassi-
fication are threefold: (i) since devices from the same manufacturer share a collection
of domain names, as discussed in §3.3.2, 59.8% of Belkin camera test instances are
misclassified as Belkin Motion sensor and 100% Belkin Motion sensor instances are
misclassified as Belkin switch. Similarly, 56.8% of Withings scale instances are in-
correctly classified as Withings sleep sensor, and 12% of Samsung smart cam are
misclassified as Samsung Smartthings. (ii) a significant number of instances from
select devices contain no DNS query entries (e.g. 96.2% of HP printer, 73.4% of
Samsung Smart Cam, 71.4% of Hello Barbie, 12.5% of iHome power plug, 11% of
Hue bulb) and are thus incorrectly classified as a Dropcam, which also rarely gen-
erates DNS packets. (iii) the low number of training instances with domain names
leads to poor performance (e.g. Blipcare BP meter and Hello Barbie).
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Performance of Stage-0: Cipher Suite Attribute
Considering only the cipher suite attribute, this stage-0 classifier results in a fairly
low accuracy of 36.15% with a high RRSE of 86.73%, as shown in the third column
in Table 3.2. Again, the main reason for such poor performance is the scarcity of
cipher suite attribute in the training instances, though this attribute carries a very
strong signature to uniquely identify an IoT device. Note that many of the IoT
devices do not use secure communication at all and are thus devoid of this attribute
(i.e. have an empty field for it). Unsurprisingly, instances of devices that exchange
cipher suite fairly frequently including Amazon Echo, Awiar air quality monitor,
Canary camera, Google Chromecast and Netatmo camera are correctly classified, as
shown by the dark-green color cells in the corresponding column in Table 3.2. In
addition, we find that August doorbell cam is sharing one of its cipher suite strings
(out of total 18) with Pixstar photoframe, which has a single cipher suite string.
Thus, 21.2% of August door bell instances are misclassified as Pixstar photoframe
and almost all instances of Pixstar photoframe are classified as August doorbell.
Performance of Stage-0: Combination of Attributes
We expect the combination of the three bags of words (port numbers, domain names,
and cipher suites) to significantly enhances the accuracy of our classifier, as indeed
shown by the fourth column titled “Combined stage-0” in Table 3.2. The overall
accuracy reaches to 97.39% with RRSE of 18.24%. It can be seen that the majority
of test instances are correctly classified, except for Hello Barbie. This is because
most of the Hello Barbie attributes are empty in stage-0 and thus it is classified as
Dropcam, as mentioned earlier.
Interestingly, we see that all test instances of Blipcare BP monitor are classified
correctly though the accuracy of individual stage-0 was fairly poor. This is because
our decision-tree-based classifier in stage-1 sees a strong correlation between the
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outputs of stage-0 classifiers and the actual class of training instance, even though
those outputs (tentative class) are incorrect – e.g. having the tentative output from
remote port number classifier as Ring door bell, having the tentative output from
cipher suite classifier as Dropcam, and having the confidence level from domain
name classifier less than 0.66 collectively is a strong indication of Blipcare instance.
Overall Performance
As the last step, we incorporate the outputs from the stage-0 classifiers into stage-1
(without the latter having any notion of the quantitative attributes from the former),
and additionally include quantitative attributes (flow volume, duration, rate, sleep
time, DNS and NTP intervals). The last column of Table 3.2 shows the overall
performance of the classification framework. In this case, the accuracy reaches a
remarkably high value of 99.88%, with almost all classes labeled correctly with a
very small value of RRSE at 5.06%. Fig. 3.10 shows the full confusion matrix of
our classification when all the attributes are used in conjunction, and corroborates
that the diagonal entries (corresponding to correct classification) are all at or very
close to 100%, with just two exceptions – the Google Chromecast and the Hello
Barbie. As explained earlier, the Chromecast gets classified as the Dropcam in some
instances, while the Hello Barbie gets classified as a Hue bulb.
3.5 Real-Time Operation in a Network
Thus far, we have examined the performance of our multi-stage classifier using off-
line analysis on captured traffic traces (i.e. pcap files). In this section, we discuss
how one can realize a real-time implementation of our system taking into account
the various stages involved in the analysis, namely attribute collection, machine
training, and interpreting the classifier’s output.
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Amazon Echo
August doorbell
Awair air quality
Belkin cam
Belkin motion
Belkin switch
Blipcare BP
Canary cam
Dropcam
Chromecast
Hello Barbie
HP printer
iHome
LiFX bulb
NEST smoke
Netatmo weat.
Netatmo cam
Hue bulb
Pixstar photo
Ring doorbell
Samsung cam
SmartThings
TPlink cam
TPlink switch
Triby speaker
Withings sleep
Withings baby mon.
Withings scale
non IoT
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99.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1
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Figure 3.10: Confusion matrix of our IoT device classification using all attributes
(accuracy: 99.88%, RRSE: 5.06%).
3.5.1 Computing Attributes
Extracting the attributes on-the-fly requires infrastructure that has sufficient visi-
bility into the traffic flowing on the network. Flow related attributes such as flow
volume, flow duration and flow rate can be extracted relatively easily using network
switches that are instrumented with special hardware-accelerated flow-level analyz-
ers, e.g. NetFlow capable devices [158]. We therefore deem the extraction cost of
flow related attributes to be fairly low, and show them via blue color bars in Fig. 3.11
that depicts the relative costs and merits of the various attributes.
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Figure 3.11: Merit of attributes.
Attributes including bag of port numbers, sleep-time, and frequency of DNS/NTP
requests can be extracted using flow-aware network switches with extra computation
and state management. For example, remote port numbers of all flows associated
with a given IoT device need to be recorded for the bag of port numbers. How-
ever, this specific state is not captured by default in commodity switches. Similarly,
time intervals between successive UDP packets of NTP/DNS should be recorded,
which requires additional computation. We therefore associate these attributes with
medium cost, and shown as yellow color bars in Fig. 3.11.
Lastly, two of our attributes, namely bag of domain names and bag of cipher
suite strings, can only be extracted by looking inside the payload of the appropriate
packets, which imposes considerable cost on processing. Thus, we associate these
attributes with high collection cost, and shown them via red color bars in Fig. 3.11.
Having understood the extraction cost of various attributes, let us now examine
the relative importance of the attributes in classifying the IoT devices. We quantify
the importance of each attribute by employing the select attributes tool in Weka
with InfoGain attribute evaluator and Ranker search method. Fig. 3.11 shows the
attributes in decreasing order of merit score. A high merit score translates to superior
strength in identifying the class of an instance. We can see that the “flow-volume”
is the most important attribute, followed by “bag of remote port numbers”, “bag of
domain names” and “flow duration” respectively. The sleep-time and NTP interval
are the attributes with the lowest merit.
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Table 3.3: Impact of attributes combination on performance of classifier.
Accuracy RRSE
all attributes 99.88% 5.06%
low- and medium-cost attributes 99.68% 7.70%
only low-cost attributes 97.85% 18.63%
Knowing the relative cost and merit of each attribute allows us to evaluate the
performance of our classifier using: (a) only low cost attributes, (b) combination of
low and medium cost attributes, and (c) all attributes. The classifier accuracy and
RRSE are shown in Table 3.3. It is seen that using only low-cost attributes results
in 97.85% accuracy with an RRSE value of 18.63%; the additional use of medium-
cost attributes increases accuracy to 99.68% and significantly reduces the RRSE
error to 7.7%; while including all attributes yields an overall accuracy of 99.88% and
RRSE of 5.06%. The method can therefore be tuned to achieve appropriate balance
between attribute collection cost and accuracy/error of classification.
3.5.2 Training the Machine
The duration of the training data set is another source of cost incurred by our
classification. In Fig. 3.12a, we plot the accuracy of the classifier on the left y-axis
and the RRSE on the right y-axis as a function of the number of days involved in
collecting the training data set. Note that the x-axis is in log-scale and each day
represents 24 instances.
It can be seen that the classifier achieves an overall accuracy is 99.28% with
only one day of training and saturates at 99.76% when trained over 16 days. On
the other hand, RRSE drops from 14.43% to 7.5% when the training duration is
increased from 1 day to 16 days. It further falls to 5.82% when we train using 70%
of all instances from 128 days. As mentioned in §3.4, the RRSE value is sensitive to
the accuracy of individual classes. We therefore believe that if there is a balanced
number of instances from various classes, our classifier would perform better in terms
of RRSE.
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Figure 3.12: Operational insights for real-time implementation of our device classi-
fier: (a) impact of training and (b) confidence-level for correct/incorrect classifica-
tion.
3.5.3 Interpreting the Output of Classifier
As discussed in §3.4.1, our classifier generates a confidence level during the testing
phase. This can be used as a measure of reliability for our classifier. If adequate
information is not provided by a test instance then the classifier will choose a random
class (as discussed in §3.4.2) with a low confidence level - this can be interpreted as
an “unknown” class. For example, given instances with an empty value for the cipher
suite attribute, the corresponding stage-0 classifier will output Dropcam class with
a confidence value of less than 10% - even for Dropcam instances that are classified
correctly the confidence level is low within the same range.
We plot the CCDF of confidence level of our stage-1 classifier in Fig. 3.12b for
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instances classified as correct and incorrect. It is clearly seen that the confidence
level is always below 80% when an instance is incorrectly classified, as shown by the
red dotted line - the average confidence level for incorrectly classified instances is
54.22%. On the other hand, our classifier has an average 99.74% confidence level
for instances that are correctly classified. We note that for only a negligible fraction
of correctly classified instances (i.e. 0.37%) the confidence level is less than 80% as
shown by the blue dashed line. This suggests that we can comfortably rely on our
classifier’s output for a device if it results in a confidence level of greater than 80%,
otherwise we need to collect more traffic (and richer instances) from that device in
order to increase the confidence level.
To demonstrate the ability of our classifier in detecting changes of normal be-
havior, we have launched UDP reflection and TCP SYN attacks of varying rates on
the Samsung camera. When our classifier is fed these attributes during the attack,
it incorrectly identifies the device, but its confidence-level drops to less than 50%.
We note that the confidence level is 100% for normal traffic from Samsung camera,
as shown in the last column of Table 3.2. This is taken as a sign of anomalous
behavior that warrants further investigation by the network operator. Note that the
anomaly detection is not the primary focus of this chapter, and hence our evaluation
is limited to only one attack type. Later in Chapter 5 we will study in detail several
attacks when we evaluate our anomaly detection scheme.
3.6 Conclusion
Despite the proliferation of IoT devices in smart homes, enterprises, campuses, and
cities around the world, operators of such environments lack visibility into what IoT
devices are connected to their networks, what their traffic characteristics are, and
whether the devices are functioning appropriately free from security compromises.
This work is the first to systematically characterize and classify IoT devices at run-
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time. We instrumented a smart environment with 28 unique IoT devices and col-
lected traffic traces continuously over 26 weeks. We then statistically characterized
the traffic in terms of activity cycles, signalling patterns, communication protocols
and cipher suites. We developed a multi-stage machine learning based classification
framework that uniquely identifies IoT devices with over 99% accuracy. Finally,
we evaluated the real-time operational cost, response time, and accuracy trade-offs
of our classification method. This chapter shows that IoT devices can be identi-
fied with high accuracy based on their network behavior, and sets the stage for
detecting misbehaviors resulting from security breaches in the smart environment.
However, obtaining all of these characteristics using specialized hardware accelera-
tors in real-time becomes more expensive, and unscalable due to the need of deep
packet inspection. In the following chapter, we will discuss an approach to monitor
the devices with low-cost attribute extraction.
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In the previous chapter, we distinguish the types of IoT devices based on their
network characteristics. However to secure the IoT devices, we need to detect their
anomalous activities and behavioral drifts. This turns out to be non-trivial as it (a)
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requires an inference engine that monitors the fine-grained activities of the devices
(b) should incur a low-cost computational cost for telemetry. The existing IoT
traffic monitoring techniques use specialized acceleration on network switches, or
full inspection of packets in software, which can be complex, expensive, inflexible,
and unscalable. In this chapter, we use an SDN paradigm combined with machine
learning to leverage the benefits of programmable flow-based telemetry with flexible
data-driven models to manage IoT devices based on their network activity. Our
contributions are three-fold: (1) We analyze traffic traces of 17 real consumer IoT
devices collected in our lab over a six months period and identify a set of traffic flows
(per-device) whose time-series attributes computed at multiple timescales (from a
minute to an hour) characterize the network behavior of various IoT device types,
and their operating states (i.e., booting, actively interacted with user, or being idle);
(2) We develop a multi-stage architecture of inference models that use flow-level
attributes to automatically distinguish IoT devices from non-IoTs, classify individual
types of IoT devices, and identify their states during normal operations. We train
our models and validate their efficacy using real traffic traces; and (3) We quantify
the trade-off between performance and cost of our solution, and demonstrate how
our monitoring scheme can be used in operation for detecting behavioral changes
(firmware upgrade or cyber attacks). Parts of this chapter have been published in
[7] and [8].
4.1 Introduction
The lack of effective security on IoTs [30, 36, 150] presents a number of challenges
for network operators of large organizations who are looking to bring these devices
online at scale. Implementing device-level security would definitely help protect
against automated attacks [159], but its efficacy can vary across manufacturers and
device types depending upon devices capabilities and their mode of operation [72].
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In a parallel effort, IETF has approved an Internet standard called “Manufacturer
Usage Description" (MUD) [83] to protect IoT devices. This framework allows
manufacturers to formally specify the intended behavior of their devices that can be
used to generate and enforce access control lists (ACLs) [84] for IoT devices, limiting
their network behavior to only a tight set of services. Although MUD policies can
reduce the surface of attacks on IoTs they are still insufficient, since ACL rules do
not restrict temporal variation of traffic flows (e.g., traffic with unwanted volume or
pattern cannot be prevented if endpoints and protocols conform to MUD rules).
Therefore, it is crucial for organizations to maximize visibility into their IoT
infrastructure [6], and thus better manage security risks of these vulnerable de-
vices [18]. Network administrators need to know all connected devices and their ex-
pected operations on the network, and continuously monitor their activities ensuring
IoTs behave “normally” [18]. Existing traffic monitoring solutions are either purely
software-based (hence unscalable to high traffic rates) or customized hardware-based
(hence inflexible and expensive) [123]. Network operators, today, widely use Net-
Flow [122] (an embedded switch instrumentation) to obtain aggregate measurement
of traffic flows. However, it comes at cost of CPU resources on the switch [160] for
generating, collating, and exporting flow records. To reduce this overhead, opera-
tors statistically mirror packet samples (e.g., sFlow [121]) to a remote collector for
extracting flow information that inevitably leads to reduced accuracy. On the other
hand, special-purpose hardware appliances (i.e., deep packet inspection engines) of-
fer both accuracy and performance in traffic monitoring but they are prohibitively
expensive for many network operators.
In this chapter, we aim to monitor behavior of IoT devices on the network using
a combination of Software Defined Networking (SDN) telemetry and machine learn-
ing methods. We believe that the SDN paradigm by its nature provides flow-level
isolation and visibility in a low-cost and scalable manner. For accurate detection
of devices and tracking of their dynamic behaviors, we employ machine learning
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algorithms to learn key patterns of traffic flows. Our first contribution is to identify
a set of TCP and UDP flows (for each IoT device) and highlight characteristics at-
tributes, computed from time-series of flows at multiple time-scales, distinguishing
various IoT device types and their behavioral states (booting, active, or idle) on
the network. Our second contribution develops a multi-stage architecture consisting
of a set of inferencing models that use flow-level attributes to automatically recog-
nize traffic of IoT devices from non-IoTs, classify types of IoT devices, and identify
operating states of each IoT during normal operation. We train our models and
validate their performance to obtain high accuracy using real traffic traces. Finally,
we demonstrate the efficacy of our scheme in detecting network behavioral changes
due to firmware upgrade or cyber-attacks. Also, we quantify the trade-off between
performance and cost of our monitoring solution for real-time deployment.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: In §4.2 we present our dataset
and traffic flows, and characterize attributes of various IoT devices and their oper-
ating states. We propose the architecture of IoT traffic inference and evaluate its
performance in §4.3, followed by a discussion on the operational trade-off and use
of the proposed system in §4.4. The chapter is concluded in §4.5.
4.2 Traffic Flows and Attributes
In this section, we begin by analyzing real traffic traces collected in our lab. We
then identify traffic attributes to distinguish IoT devices from non-IoTs, classify
individual IoTs, and determine their operating states.
4.2.1 Traffic Trace Dataset
We used two sets of full PCAP traffic traces collected from our testbed. The first
dataset (i.e., DATA1) was collected from a network consisting of more than thirty
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IoT and non-IoT devices for a duration of six months (i.e., 01-Oct-2016 to 31-Mar-
2017) [6]. We select 17 IoT devices, those whose trace was present for at least 60
days in packet traces. These devices include Amazon Echo, August doorbell, Awair
air quality, Belkin motion sensor, Belkin switch, Dropcam, HP printer, LiFX bulb,
NEST smoke sensor, Netatmo weather, Netatmo camera, Hue bulb, Samsung smart
camera, Smart Things, Triby speaker, Withings sleep sensor, and Withings scale.
Note that our dataset contains traffic traces of six non-IoT devices including Android
phone, Android tablet, Windows laptop, MacBook, and two iPhones.
The second dataset (i.e., DATA2) consists of traces with state annotation for
selected IoT devices including Amazon Echo, Belkin switch, Dropcam, and LiFX
bulb. We developed a software tool to automatically interact with these four devices
over two days and annotate their traffic traces. Annotations indicate three operating
states of IoT devices, namely “boot” (i.e., getting connected to the network), “active”
(i.e., interacting with users), and “idle” (i.e., not being booted or actively used).
The main purpose of state classification is to monitor the activity of IoT devices
at a fine-grained level, augmenting the device classification model. We believe that
boot, active, and idle states are generic and across all IoT devices. Hence, the state
classifier is able to capture minor variations in the activity patterns of a device
regardless of various attack models.
For the boot state, we used a TP-Link HS110 smart plug (whose traffic is not
considered in our analysis) supplying power to these four devices. We wrote a script
to automatically turn off/on this smart plug resulting a boot state for the subjected
IoT device. For the active state, we used an app called “RepetiTouch Pro” and a text
to-speech engine called espeak[161]. The former records and replays interactions of a
real user with three IoT devices including Belkin switch, Google Dropcam camera,
and LiFX lightbulb via their manufacturer app – the user interactions (i.e., turning
on/off the switch, streaming video from the camera, and turning on/off the bulb)
were recorded on an Android tablet which was connected to the local network of our
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testbed. The latter periodically asks scripted questions (e.g., “How is the weather in
Sydney, Australia”) from Amazon Echo. For the idle state, we used all traffic traces
that were annotated as neither boot nor active, during the data collection period.
The difficulty of capturing all possible user interactions in the active state, led us to
limit the number of devices studied to only four.
4.2.2 Traffic Flows and Attributes
In Chapter 3 we showed that individual IoT devices exhibit identifiable patterns in
their traffic flows such as DNS/NTP/SSDP signaling profiles, activity cycles, and
volume patterns. Although, these attributes contain a rich set of information to
fingerprint IoTs and their activities, they incur high cost of extraction from the
network in real-time.
In this chapter, our attributes are computed for individual 2-tuple and/or 3-tuple
flows (coarse-grained). Note that this differs from our attributes in Chapter 3 where
IoT traffic attributes such as activity volume and average flow rates were computed
for individual 5-tuple flows (fine-grained). The attributes employed in Chapter 3
provide a richer set of information, and hence the trained models yield a very high
accuracy. However, those attributes are expensive to extract and compute from
the network traffic in real-time. Instead, the attributes we identify and use in this
chapter are largely at aggregate level (more cost-effective) but give a slightly lower
accuracy (still reasonably acceptable) when compared to results in Chapter 3.
As we mention in the Chapter 2, flow-level telemetry provided by SDN APIs [127]
enables us to dynamically measure specific traffic flows at low-cost with reasonable
resolutions. Also, we note that SDN-enabled switches that are currently available
in the market typically support a large number of flow rules without experiencing
performance degradation. For example, a NoviSwitch provides massive table with
up to 1 million flow rules in TCAM for wildcard matches while offering up to 400
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Figure 4.1: System architecture of network telemetry and inference engines.
Gbps throughput. This means that with insertion of 8 OpenFlow rules, one switch
can essentially manage monitoring of more than 100K IoT devices.
Inspired by recent proposals [7, 162] on network telemetry using SDN, we consider
a set of flow rules that collectively characterize traffic signature of IoT devices. We
choose eight low-cost flow entries that can cover a subset of most commonly used
signaling and activity patterns of the IoT device that we studied in Chapter 3. For
each device, these flow rules are pro-actively inserted into SDN-enabled switch(es)
to which IoT devices are connected, as shown in Fig. 4.1. We use MAC address as
the identifier of a device – one may use IP address (without NAT), physical port
number, or VLAN for a one-to-one mapping of a physical device to its traffic trace.
For real-time monitoring, counters of these flow rules are periodically (i.e., every
minute) measured via the SDN controller that will form traffic attributes of each
device.
Table 4.1 shows eight flow rules which we use to measure network traffic of each
IoT device with the following order: (1,2) DNS outgoing queries and incoming
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responses on UDP 53; (3,4) NTP outgoing queries and incoming responses on UDP
123; (5) SSDP outgoing queries on UDP 1900; (6,7) other “remote” (e.g., Internet)
traffic outgoing from and incoming to the device that passes through the gateway;
and (8) all “local” (i.e., LAN) traffic incoming to the device. Note that we do
not measure incoming SSDP traffic to IoT devices in order to avoid capturing (and
mixing with) discovery activities of other devices on the local network. Note that
rules priority (the second last column in Table 4.1) are used to split the traffic of each
device into three levels: signaling packets (i.e., priority 100), other remote packets
(i.e., priority 10), and local packets (i.e., priority 1).
For each of the eight flows (mentioned above), we use two key attributes [5]
namely average packet size and average rate . Also, note that traffic attributes
can better characterize network behavior of individual devices if they are computed
at multiple time-scales [137]. We, therefore, collect packet counts and byte counts
per each flow every minute, and compute attributes at time-granularities of 1-, 2-,
4-, 8-, 16-, 32-, 64-minutes. This way, we generate fourteen attributes for each flow
which means a total of 112 attributes per device.
In order to synthesize flow rules, we wrote a native SDN simulator [163] that
takes an input PCAP trace, and performs packet-by-packet service (matching packet
headers against flow table entries, updating statistics, applying required actions)
Table 4.1: Flow rules specific to each device, proactively inserted into SDN switch
for real-time telemetry.
Flow description srcETH dstETH srcIP dstIP Protocol srcPort dstPort Priority Action
DNS query (DNS↑) <devMAC> * * * 17 * 53 100 forward
DNS response (DNS↓) * <devMAC> * * 17 53 * 100 forward
NTP query (NTP↑) <devMAC> * * * 17 * 123 100 forward
NTP response (NTP↓) * <devMAC> * * 17 123 * 100 forward
SSDP query (SSDP↑) <devMAC> * * * 17 * 1900 100 forward
outgoing remote (Rem.↑) <devMAC> <gwMAC> * * * * * 10 forward
incoming remote (Rem.↓) <gwMAC> <devMAC> * * * * * 10 forward
incoming local (Loc.↓) * <devMAC> * * * * * 1 forward
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Figure 4.2: Histogram of traffic profile to compare IoT and non-IoT devices: (a)
remote traffic volume over 32-minute; and (b) DNS query count over 64-minute.
inside a software SDN switch. The simulator records counters of flow bytes and
packets periodically (e.g., one minute). Using the output of the simulator, we use
another script to generate instances of traffic attributes for each device every minute.
An instance is a vector of 112 attributes with a label (e.g., Amazon Echo:boot).
4.2.3 Traffic Characteristics of IoT Devices
We now highlight traffic characteristics of individual IoT devices that can be learned
so as to distinguish them from non-IoTs, classify their device type, and identify their
operating states.
IoT versus non-IoT: We begin with traffic attributes that differentiate IoT
devices from non-IoTs. Fig. 4.2 shows the probability density of two representative
attributes, namely remote traffic volume at 32-minute resolution, and DNS query
count at 64-minute resolution. We can see in Fig. 4.2a that IoT devices tend to
transfer a small volume of traffic from remote (i.e., Internet) network and 90% of
instances they download less than 500 KB every half-an-hour. However, for non-
IoTs this value is widely spread between 10 KB to 100 MB and mostly they transfer
more than 500 KB. In terms of DNS activity in Fig. 4.2b, IoTs display identifiable
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(c) Volume of SSDP traffic (8-min).
Figure 4.3: Histogram of traffic profile for representative IoT devices: (a) NTP
response count, (b) download volume of remote traffic, and (c) upload volume of
SSDP traffic.
patterns of query count mostly less than 100 (e.g., 22% of instances with four queries
per hour), while non-IoTs have a wider range of DNS query count (i.e., 10 to 3000
DNS queries over an hour) with almost equal probabilities.
IoT device types: Focusing on IoT devices, we now consider three traffic at-
tributes, namely NTP responses count at 16-min resolution, upload volume of remote
traffic at 8-min resolution, and volume of SSDP responses at 8-min resolution, as
shown in Fig. 4.3. We quantitatively compare traffic characteristics of four repre-
sentative IoT devices from three different manufacturers (i.e., Amazon, Belkin, and
LiFX). It is observed from Fig. 4.3a that the LiFX bulb (depicted by solid green
lines) sends three NTP responses every 16-minute interval for more than 90% of
90
Chapter 4. Behavioral Monitoring using Low-Cost Attributes
instances. This measure varies between 7 to 42 responses for Amazon Eco (depicted
by dashed red lines). For Belkin power switch and motion sensor (depicted by solid
blue and dotted pink lines), we see two significant peaks at a count of one and two
NTP responses, each with a different probability – Belkin switch seems more active
(compared to Belkin motion), with 70% probability of generating 2 NTP responses
at 16-minute resolution.
For download volume of remote traffic attribute at 8-minute resolution, shown
in Fig. 4.3b, we see a relatively unique pattern in the probability density function
for each of these four devices: for Belkin switch and Belkin motion it peaks at 573
bytes and 3KB, respectively, while the LiFX bulb and Amazon Echo each exhibits
a range of values, [0.5, 3] KB and [7, 33] KB, respectively.
Considering the upload volume of SSDP traffic in Fig. 4.3c, the Belkin switch
seems distinctive from Belkin motion (i.e., probability of 82% for 8 KB volume in
Belkin switch compared to 73% chance for 800 bytes volume in Belkin motion).
Amazon Echo displays a strong pattern with a peak of 100% at volume of 650 bytes.
Lastly, we observe that LiFX does not use SSDP protocol at all, and thus lacks this
attribute in its traffic profile.
Operating states of IoT: We now look at selected traffic attributes of Ama-
zon Echo, Belkin switch, and Dropcam at the three operating states, shown in
Fig. 4.4. We focus on download volume of remote traffic for Amazon Echo since
it frequently communicates with its cloud servers; download volume of local traffic
for Belkin switch since it receives command from user mobile app connected to the
local network; and upload volume of remote traffic for Dropcam since it tends to
send videos to its cloud servers. We can see that the three operating states are fairly
distinct in chosen attributes shown in Fig. 4.4. It is observed that all three devices
exchange smaller volume of traffic during their idle state (shown by dashed green
lines) compared to active and boot states. As an example,for Amazon Echo, shown
in Fig. 4.4a, 75% of idle instances receive between [0.5, 1] KB from remote servers
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(a) Amazon Echo: remote traffic (2-min).
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(b) Belkin switch: local traffic (1-min).
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(c) Dropcam: remote traffic (2-min)
Figure 4.4: Histogram of traffic profile for IoT devices at three operating states: (a)
Amazon Echo, (b) Belkin switch, and (c) Dropcam.
at 2-minute resolution, while the probability density function for boot and active
instances peaks at 30 KB and 70 KB, respectively. Additionally, we observe for
Belkin switch that the volume of local traffic during boot state is larger than active
state. This is because this device sends SSDP discovery when it boots up and that
results in the arrival of responses from all SSDP-capable devices on the network.
Therefore, a peak at 110 KB is seen for boot state (dotted red line) in Fig. 4.4b.
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4.3 IoT Traffic Inference Engines
In this section, we develop a multi-stage architecture to automatically infer IoT
traffic, train a set of models, and evaluate their performance.
4.3.1 Inference Architecture
For a given device on the network, we have three objectives: (a) to determine if
the device is IoT or non-IoT, and if it is detected as IoT; (b) to classify its device
type (e.g., Amazon Echo, Dropcam); and (c) to identify the operating state of IoT
(i.e., boot, active, idle). To meet these objectives we need a set of trained models:
a bi-class classifier to distinguish IoT devices from non-IoTs (i.e., IoT detector); a
multi-class classifier to determine the type of a given IoT device (i.e., IoT classifier);
and a set of multi-class classifiers to identify IoT operating states (i.e., a state
classifier for each device type). Note that state classifiers are specialized models
and each learns traffic patterns of one device in the three states of operation. State
classifiers tend to have narrower views, and hence become more sensitive to change
of behavior for their respective devices (compared to the device classifier with a
broader view). Therefore, these specialized models are able to enhance the visibility
of network operators into subtle changes [164] in their IoT infrastructure.
There exist a number of techniques [165] such as Neural Networks, Support
Vector Machines (SVMs), and Decision Trees that can be used to train models
to infer predefined classes. Neural networks have proven to be very effective in
classifying input data with high dimensions, but they demand a large amount of
training data. Also, neural networks are seen as black box models since it becomes
difficult to interpret their reasoning process. Performance of SVMs is very sensitive
to the selection of hyper-parameters, and hence it becomes difficult to train an
accurate model. On the other hand, decision tree-based techniques are widely used
since it is easier to generate (reasonably) accurate models with a relatively small
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Figure 4.5: Hierarchical architecture of IoT traffic inference engines.
amount of data. Importantly, they generate trees which can be readily interpreted.
Note that decision tree algorithms are prone to over-fitting which can be avoided
by the use of ensemble decision trees. In this work, we employ Random Forest [166]
which builds an ensemble of decision trees, each uses a random subset of attributes.
It is best known for its performance in various classification tasks [6, 162, 167].
Fig. 4.5 illustrates our hierarchical architecture for IoT traffic inference. It con-
sists of three layers of random-forest classifiers (i.e., an IoT detector, an IoT classi-
fier, and a set of IoT state classifiers). Once a new device connects to the network,
the programmable switch is pushed by additional flow rules (Table 4.1) pertinent
to the device. We first feed the IoT detector model by full set of periodic flow-level
attributes (i.e., at time-scales of powers of two between 1-min to 64-min). Upon
detection of an IoT device with sufficiently high confidence (say, more than 80%),
the second model (i.e., IoT classifier) is called by the full set of attributes – a device
will not be checked by the second layer of inference, if it is detected as non-IoT at
the first layer. The output of the IoT classifier triggers a pertinent state classifier at
the third layer of our architecture. Our state classifier models consume a subset of
attributes, however, it is only up to 4-minute resolution. This is because change of
states (e.g., boot) result in short-term effects on device traffic pattern – considering
long-term attributes may reduce the ability of the model to accurately detect the
operating state in real-time.
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4.3.2 Models Training and Performance Evaluation
We now label instances to train our classifiers, and generate models needed for the
three layers of the inference architecture, as shown in Fig. 4.5. We next evaluate
their performance using test instances. For both training and testing the traffic
classifiers we use Weka [157] tool.
Instances: Recall from §4.2.2 that our instances are computed every minute.
Since two of our models consume full-set attributes (i.e., 1-min to 64-min) we down
sample our instances by the factor of 15 to avoid over-fitting for the IoT detector
and the IoT classifier – it is likely to have heavily-correlated instances generated
within 15 minutes. Note that the risk of over-fitting is less for the state classifiers
given that they only use short timescale attributes.
We have collected a total of 115,237 instances of IoT and non-IoT devices from
our DATA1 (in §4.2.1) and 10,423 instances of four IoT devices (i.e., Amazon Echo,
Belkin switch, Dropcam, and LiFX bulb) with state annotation from our DATA2 (in
§4.2.1). We have a different number of instances across various devices in our dataset,
depending upon their presence and activity on the testbed, and their interactions
with the lab users. Among all devices, NEST smoke-sensor has the lowest number
(i.e., 865) of instances since it communicates once a day for a short period of time.
The highest count belongs to Dropccam with 11,873 instances as it was online more
than 90% of days during the 6-month period of packet capture and it frequently
communicates with its cloud-servers whenever it is on the network.
Metrics: Since classes are not evenly distributed in our datasets, we use three
metrics including weighted “precision”, “recall ”, and “F1 score” along with confusion
matrix to evaluate the performance of each model. These metrics are defined as
follows:
precision =
TP
TP + FP
(4.1)
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recall =
TP
TP + FN
(4.2)
F1 =
2× precision× recall
precision+ recall
(4.3)
where TP is the rate of true positive, FP is the rate of false positive, and FN is
the rate of false negative. Note that F1 conveys the balance between precision and
recall values and is computed by the harmonic mean of these two values in Eq. 4.3.
All metrics take a value between 0 and 1.
In addition to the correctness of classification, we record confidence-level of our
random-forest models for all instances, correctly classified and incorrectly classified
ones. Ideally, we expect our models to display high confidence (i.e., close to 1)
when they predict a correct class for an input instance, and low confidence (i.e.,
close to 0) when they predict an incorrect class. Lack of confidence indicates that
the tested instance contains attributes different from those that were learned before
(i.e., new or unseen pattern). We next look at individual models at various layers
of the inference architecture
IoT Detector: In our DATA1, there exist 1212 instances labeled as non-IoT
and 114,025 instances labeled as 17 types of IoT. For the training set, we randomly
choose 800 instances (i.e., 66%) from non-IoT and 50 instances from each class of
IoT device (i.e., a total of 850). Remaining instances in DATA1 are used to test
this bi-class classifier.
Fig. 4.6 shows the confusion matrix of the IoT detector model. The rows show
actual labels (i.e., IoT or non-IoT) and columns show predicted labels – cell numbers
are in percentage. Table 4.2 shows all performance metrics of this model. It is seen
that 98.7% of IoT test instances and 97.8% of non-IoT test instances are correctly
classified, as shown by diagonal values of the confusion matrix in Fig. 4.6. Looking
at the last two columns of Table 4.2, the confidence-level of this model is fairly
high on average (i.e., 0.968 and 0.947) for correct classification and is relatively
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Figure 4.6: Confusion matrix of the IoT detector.
low on average (i.e., 0.635 and 0.701) for incorrect classification. Also, the three
performance metrics; namely precision, recall, and F1; all indicate reasonable high
values on average as 0.983, 0.982, and 0.983 respectively.
IoT Classifier:
For this model, we split IoT instances of the DATA1 into chronological sets of
training and testing given a sufficient number of instances available in our dataset
over six-month period. This way the performance of the model is evaluated over
time. Therefore, we use instances collected during the first three months (i.e., 01-
Oct-2016 to 31-Dec-2016) for training and the remaining issuances (i.e., collected
between 01-Jan-2017 and 31-Mar-2017) for testing.
Fig. 4.7 depicts the confusion matrix of the IoT classifier. We observe that the
model performs well in predicting most of classes. For example, the correct predic-
tion rate for Amazon Echo, August doorbell, Belkin switch, or Dropcamp is more
than 97%. However, the model performance does not seem acceptable for certain
classes. For example, it is seen that 12.0% of NEST smoke-sensor instances are
Table 4.2: Performance metrics of the IoT detector model.
IoT/non-IoT TP FN FP Precision Recall F1
TP avg.
confidence
FN avg.
confidence
IoT 0.987 0.013 0.022 0.979 0.987 0.983 0.968 0.635
non-IoT 0.978 0.022 0.013 0.987 0.978 0.983 0.947 0.701
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Figure 4.7: Confusion matrix of IoT classifier trained by the first three months’
worth of data.
misclassified as Withings scale, and 39.8% of HP printer instances are misclassified
as Belkin switch. Additionally, for the Awair air-quality sensor only 77.1% of test
instances are correctly classified while 8.6% and 13.0% are misclassified as August
doorbell and Withings scale, respectively. We note that the model displays a low
confidence on average for incorrect prediction of these three classes, i.e., 0.485 for
Awair air-quality, 0.535 for HP printer, and 0.389 for NEST sensor – due to space
constraints we omit detailed table of performance metrics per individual classes.
Additionally, we find that even though 94.0% of Hue bulb instances are correctly
classified the average confidence of our model is 0.572 (i.e., undesirably low).
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(a) HP printer.
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(b) Hue light-bulb.
Figure 4.8: Time trace of IoT classifier outputs with test traffic instances from: (a)
HP printer, and (b) Hue light-bulb.
To better analyze the poor performance of the model in certain classes, we plot in
Fig. 4.8 the time trace of model outputs with test traffic instances from HP printer
and Hue light-bulb. Each circle represents an instance and its color shows the model
confidence. A color bar on the right side of plots shows the mapping of confidence
values to colors – dark green indicates high confidence and yellow indicates low
confidence. Starting from Fig. 4.8a, we observe that instances of HP printer from
the first week of January are mostly classified correctly and are supported by high
confidence levels (i.e., dark green circles). The printer goes offline for about a
month and comes back online on 11-Feb-2017 and this is when its traffic is mostly
misclassified as Belkin switch with consistently low confidence levels from the model
(i.e., light green circles). This clearly shows that the behavior of HP printer changed
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Figure 4.9: Confusion matrix of IoT device classification re-trained by additional
data from two weeks in February.
when it restarted in mid-February – we manually inspected traffic traces and verified
that it was due to a legitimate firmware upgrade (i.e., benign changes). Moving to
Fig. 4.8b, we see classifier outputs for Hue bulb traffic instances during the whole
testing period. Though instances are mostly predicted correctly, the confidence
level starts falling, from an average of 0.93 to average 0.50, on 15-Feb-2017. Again
this behavioral change led to a manual inspection by which we verified that it was
legitimate.
Given these observations, we augment our training set with two weeks of data
(i.e., from 12-Feb-2017 to 25-Feb-2017) for duration over which new legitimate traffic
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Table 4.3: Performance metrics of the IoT classier model (after re-training).
IoT/Non-IoT TP FN FP Precision Recall F1 TP avg. confidence FN avg. confidence
Amazon Echo 0.977 0.023 0.000 1.000 0.977 0.989 0.994 0.430
August doorbell 0.989 0.011 0.001 0.999 0.989 0.994 0.974 0.509
Awair air-quality 0.936 0.064 0.002 0.998 0.936 0.966 0.850 0.616
Belkin motion-sensor 0.996 0.004 0.000 1.000 0.996 0.998 0.825 0.340
Belkin switch 0.999 0.001 0.001 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.990 0.604
Dropcam 0.990 0.010 0.001 0.999 0.990 0.994 0.987 0.462
HP printer 0.977 0.023 0.001 0.999 0.977 0.988 0.985 0.591
LiFX bulb 0.980 0.020 0.001 0.999 0.980 0.990 0.892 0.617
NEST smoke-sensor 0.976 0.024 0.001 0.999 0.976 0.987 0.818 0.472
Netatmo weather 0.997 0.003 0.002 0.998 0.997 0.997 0.935 0.824
Netatmo camera 0.973 0.027 0.001 0.999 0.973 0.986 0.980 0.371
Hue bulb 0.917 0.083 0.001 0.999 0.917 0.956 0.975 0.505
Samsung smart-cam 0.997 0.003 0.006 0.994 0.997 0.996 0.989 0.367
Smart Things 0.969 0.031 0.001 0.999 0.969 0.984 0.980 0.437
Triby speaker 0.941 0.059 0.001 0.999 0.941 0.969 0.785 0.452
Withings sleep-sensor 0.957 0.043 0.004 0.996 0.957 0.976 0.968 0.504
Withings scale 0.979 0.021 0.003 0.997 0.979 0.988 0.953 0.560
patterns emerged. Fig. 4.9 shows the performance of the IoT classifier after it is re-
trained. It is seen that the confusion matrix is almost diagonal with the TP rate
of more than 90% for all classes (i.e., on average 97.4%). We list in Table 4.3
all performance metrics of the IoT classifier after re-training. We observe that the
model average confidence is boosted across all classes – specifically it reaches to
0.975 for Hue bulb instances. Also, three performance metrics consistently display
an acceptable performance of classification with 0.998, 0.973, and 0.986 for average
precision, recall, and F1 score.
IoT State Classifiers: From our DATA2, we generated a different number of
instances of four IoT devices with state labels including: Amazon Echo (boot: 208,
active: 74, idle: 1795); Belkin switch (boot: 110, active: 84, idle: 2688); Dropcam
(boot: 145, active: 98, idle: 2639); and LiFX bulb (boot: 160, active: 84, idle:
2338). To train individual device-specific models, we randomly choose 40 instances
from each of their respective states – remaining instances are used to test the models.
Note that the state classifier are specialized models trained independently for each
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Figure 4.10: Confusion matrix of IoT state classifiers: (a) Amazon Echo; (b) Belkin
switch; (c) Dropcam; and (d) LiFX bulb.
device type, and hence adding more devices or increasing instances of a given device
will not affect the performance and robustness of existing state classifiers.
Fig. 4.10 shows the confusion maps of the four IoT state classifiers. Our first
observation is that all four models predict very well the active state – 100.0% TP rate
in three models (Amazon Echo, Dropcamp, and LiFX bulb), and 95.5% TP rate in
Belkin switch. Next, we see that boot instances are prone to be misclassified as idle,
and vice versa (e.g., 8.6% and 7.5% of boot instances respectively in Belkin switch
and LiFX bulb are misclassified as idle). This misclassification could be possibly
because instances pertinent to state transitions (e.g., boot to idle) are not precisely
annotated.
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4.4 Practical and Operational Considerations
In the previous section, we evaluated the performance of our inference engines using
all traffic attributes of devices during their normal operation. In this section, we
first quantify the cost of our scheme in practice and show how we can optimize
the trade-off between cost and performance. Next, we demonstrate how network
operators can interpret the outputs of inference engines, and therefore manage their
cyber-security risk.
4.4.1 Cost of Attributes
In order to quantify the cost of our scheme, we begin by examining the impact
of individual attributes on the performance of traffic inference. We have 112 at-
tributes for the IoT detector and the IoT classifier, and 48 attributes for the IoT
state classifiers. Note that some of these attributes could be highly correlated, and
hence become redundant. Also, some attributes may not be very relevant to class
prediction, and hence can be removed.
Redundant Attributes: We use a selection algorithm called Correlation-based
Feature Subset (CFS) [168] with best-first searching method. CFS is a filter that
uses a correlation-based heuristic to find a subset of attributes with the highest merit
– i.e., attributes highly-correlated with the class, yet uncorrelated with each other.
Importance of Attributes: In decision tree-based machine learning, the In-
formation Gain (IG) method is used to measure the weight of various attributes
in accurate prediction. Important attributes carry more information (i.e., large IG
value) to distinguish classes, and unrelated attributes have no information. We now
compute the IG value of attributes used for each of the three classifier types.
To better visualize the merit of various attributes, we illustrate in Fig. 4.11a
the IG values computed for all 112 attributes used by the IoT classifier. Each
cell represents an attribute (i.e., rows are flow counters and columns are various
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(b) Subset of nonredundant attributes.
Figure 4.11: Information gain value of: (a) all attributes, and (b) CFS-selected
attributes, for the IoT classifier.
timescales), and is labeled (and color coded) by its IG value – the darker the cell,
the higher the IG value. Fig. 4.11b shows a subset of 35 attributes selected by the
CFS algorithm eliminating correlated (i.e., redundant) attributes. Note that this
subset still results in the same performance of prediction as presented in the previous
section.
We observe that the highest IG value 3.36 corresponds to “outgoing remote byte-
count over 8-minute” followed by “incoming remote byte-count over 4-minute” with
IG 3.32. Another observation is that byte-count of both incoming/outgoing remote
over mid-term timescales (i.e., 4-, 8-, 16-min) have higher information compared to
other attributes, as shown by darker cells. Also, DNS counters over longer timescales
(i.e., 32- and 64-min) display a relatively high gain of information in predicting class
of IoT devices.
Overall, attributes of two flow rules related to incoming local traffic and outgoing
SSDP queries seem to have minimal impacts in IoT device classification. This is
mainly because only a few of IoT devices in our lab (e.g., Hue bulb, Bekin motion,
Amazon Echo) communicate on the local network or send SSDP queries. Even
though these flow rules (and associated attributes) may not seem important across
all devices, they can precisely characterize and help identify devices which use them
in their network traffic.
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(d) LiFX bulb.
Figure 4.12: Information gain of all attributes for state classier models: (a) Amazon
Echo, (b) Belkin switch, (c) Dropcamp, and (d) LiFX bulb.
Moreover, we have analyzed the impact of attributes for two other types of
classifiers. Fig. 4.12 and Fig. 4.13 show the information gain value of all and non-
redundant attributes for state classification models. We observe, for example, in
Fig. 4.13a that attributes of only for flow rules (i.e., incoming remote, outgoing
remote, incoming DNS, incoming NTP) are needed for the state classification of
Amazon Echo – there is no attribute selected for the other four flows. Another
observation is that attributes over very short timescales (i.e., 1-min and 2-min) be-
come important in classifying operating states of IoT devices. Also, we note that the
variation of IG values for non-redundant attributes is less (i.e., between 0.1 and 0.3)
compared to the IoT classifier model (i.e., between 0.86 and 3.36). For the IoT detec-
tor model, we found that attributes over longer timescale (i.e., outgoing/incoming
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Figure 4.13: Information gain of non-redundant attributes for state classier models:
(a) Amazon Echo, (b) Belkin switch, (c) Dropcamp, and (d) LiFX bulb.
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byte-count over 32-min and 64-min) have higher impact. It is important to note
that our observations and findings may change in different environments depending
upon types of devices and their possible interactions.
Cost versus Performance: There exist two sources of cost in our inference
scheme: (1) number of flow entries; and (2) space complexity of computing at-
tributes. Given the fixed size of TCAM on programmable (SDN) switches, efficient
management of flow entries [169] becomes crucial to scale of scheme for deployment
in a network with a large number of IoT devices. Since our attributes are computed
at multiple timescales up to 64-minutes, we need to maintain the time-series of flow
counters accordingly (i.e., 64 data-points each corresponds to a minute).
We, therefore, aim to reduce the cost by decreasing attributes, without signif-
icantly affecting performance. Table 4.4 shows the number of flow entries needed
by each inference model with non-redundant set of attributes – check-marked cells
indicate the flows needed for attributes of models in each row. It clearly shows room
for optimizing our approach by dynamic management of flow entries on the pro-
grammable switch. For example, the IoT detector model only needs four flow rules
per device. Once a device is detected as IoT, an additional four flows are needed by
the IoT classifier (i.e., a total of eight flows). Once the IoT device is successfully
classified, it may need a reduced number of flows depending upon its specialized
state classifier (some flows can be removed from the switch). The state classifier of
Amazon Echo, Belkin switch, Dropcam, and LiFX respectively need 4, 6, 3, and 5
flow entries per each unit of device.
Table 4.4: Flow entries (per-device) needed for non-redundant attributes set.
Inference model Rem.↑ Rem.↓ Loc.↓ DNS↑ DNS↓ NTP↑ NTP↓ SSDP↑ Num. of flow entries
IoT detector X X X X X 5
IoT classifier X X X X X X X X 8
State classifier - Amazon Echo X X X X 4
State classifier - Belkin Switch X X X v X X 6
State classifier - Dropcam X X X 3
State classifier - LiFX X X X X X 5
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Figure 4.14: Impact of attributes on: (a) performance; (b) cost, for the IoT classifier.
We further optimize by a careful trade-off between cost of performance. We:
(a) first sort non-redundant attributes in descending order; (b) then accumulate
attributes one-by-one from the sorted list; and lastly (c) quantify the cost and per-
formance at each step. Let us visualize this process for the IoT classifier in Fig. 4.14.
We plot performance metrics and cost signals, each as a function of cumulative set
of high-merit attributes. With 35 non-redundant attributes, it is seen in Fig. 4.14a
that average weighted precision, recall, F1 score reach to 97.5%, 97.3%, 97.4% re-
spectively, and in Fig. 4.14b that the total cost per device would reach to 8KB of
memory and 8 flow entries. We note that with the top 25 attributes we can achieve
about 97% in all performance metrics which can save four flow entries (i.e., 50%
saving) and reduce the space complexity to 5KB (i.e., 37% reduction).
Devices experimented in our testbed, indeed, represent majority of IoT devices
that are currently available in the market. We acknowledge that the importance of
the attributes can vary in different environments. That’s why we begin by incor-
porating all attributes for our baseline evaluation without removing any attribute.
Later, a network operator may use our method to perform cost-benefit analysis to
identify and possibly remove low-impact (less important) attributes for their envi-
ronment.
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4.4.2 Use of Inference Engines in Real-Time
We now demonstrate how our scheme can help network operators detect behavioral
changes due to malicious network activities or cyber-attacks.
Unlike traditional non-IoT devices, behavior profile of IoTs does not significantly
change by interactions with users or environment. We discussed in §4.3.2 how legit-
imate firmware upgrades can be detected by our solution (i.e., consistent misclassi-
fication and/or low confidence), as shown in Fig. 4.8. Note that sudden changes in
outputs of inference models (if persist) for given device(s) can trigger an investigation
by network administrators or inspection appliances.
We now test our classier models with attack traffic on IoT devices. We use a set
of publicly available PCAP traces [85] that contain both benign and attack traffic
(clearly annotated) corresponding to a few IoT devices we use in this work.
In Figures 4.15 and 4.16 we present results of three representative scenarios: (1)
the output label of the IoT classifier changes persistently (i.e., repeatedly misclas-
sifying) accompanied by a sudden drop in confidence; (2) the output label of the
IoT classifier does not change, but its confidence drops and persistently stays at
low levels; and (3) the output of the IoT classifier remains normal (expected label
with reasonable confidence), but the respective state classifier mis-behaves. In these
plots, red crosses indicate time periods over which attack traffic is launched to the
respective IoT device, and blue circles show purely benign traffic instances.
Fig. 4.15a illustrates the scenario 1 for Belkin switch. This time trace displays a
situation where the IoT device experiences TCP SYN reflection attack twice, each
for a duration of 10 minutes. It is seen that during attack periods (shown by red
cross markers) the predicted label changes from Belkin switch to Netatmo camera
with confidence less than 70%. Right after the attack, the output comes back to its
original label and the confidence starts rising gradually.
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(a) IoT classifier with Belkin switch traffic.
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(b) IoT classifier with Amazon Echo traffic.
Figure 4.15: Time trace of device classifier outputs with benign and attack traffic
of: (a) Belkin switch; and (b) Amazon Echo.
Fig. 4.15b (representative of the Scenario 2) displays a time trace of our moni-
toring scheme for Amazon Echo under UDP-based DoS attack over two periods of
10-minutes each. We observe that these attacks do not change the predicted label
of the IoT classifier, but cause the model confidence to decay rapidly (and remains
below 80% persistently).
Lastly, Fig. 4.16a (representative of the scenario 3) illustrates a situation where
attack traffic is not intense (i.e., ping of death attack on LiFX bulb), and hence
does not affect the broad view of the IoT classifier model. However, the specialized
model of the state classifier is significantly affected. During the attack periods, the
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(a) IoT classifier with LiFX bulb traffic.
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(b) LiFX state classifier with LiFX bulb traffic.
Figure 4.16: Time trace of outputs for: (a) device classifier, and (b) state classifier,
with benign and attack traffic of LiFx bulb.
LiFX bulb is persistently seen in an active state which is not normal for a light-bulb
since its activity (turning on/off or changing color) is expected to be relatively short.
Additionally, the confidence of the state classifier quickly falls to a level of about
50% which is not normal again.
Although drops in the confidence level indicate traffic anomalies, it can be chal-
lenging for a network administrator to differentiate random traffic variations (e.g.
noises) occurring over a very short time interval from a real attack which may persist
for a considerable amount of time. Next chapter will develop a method to clearly
differentiate anomalies from short term traffic variations.
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4.5 Conclusion
This chapter developed a real-time behavioral monitoring solution for IoT devices
employing low-cost flow-level telemetry with the support of OpenFlow enabled SDN
switches. We identified traffic flows that can collectively characterize the network
behavior of IoT devices and their states such as booting, user interaction or idle.
We then trained a set of classification models with supervised machine learning
algorithms for a three-stage inference architecture using real traffic traces of 17 IoT
devices collected over a period of six months. We validate their efficacy in detecting
IoT devices from non-IoTs, classifying their type, and identifying their operating
state. Lastly, we showed how we balance the trade-off between cost and performance
of our scheme, and demonstrated how operators can use it to detect IoT behavioral
changes (both legitimate and malicious). While this chapter mainly focused on
low-cost attributes and optimizing the cost of network telemetry, we just scratch
the surface of anomaly detection. The following chapter improves the sensitivity
of inference engine for detecting behavioral changes in IoT network traffic, due to
firmware upgrades or low-rate cyber-attacks, using clustering models.
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In the previous two chapters, we developed inference engines that help network
operators automatically identify IoT assets via network-level traffic analysis, and
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monitor their behavior in real-time. However, IoT manufacturers often tend to
release new firmware which improves device functionalities or even automatically
perform upgrades from cloud servers to devices that are operational in the field.
This becomes challenging for classification models to incorporate behavioral changes
(or new classes) dynamically without retraining the entire model.
In this chapter, we develop a modular device classification architecture that al-
lows us to dynamically accommodate legitimate changes in IoT assets, via either the
addition of a new device profile or an upgrade of existing profiles, without replacing
the entire set of models. Our contributions are threefold: (1) We develop an unsu-
pervised one-class clustering method for each device to detect their normal network
behavior. We use traffic attributes identified in the previous chapter that can be
obtained from flow-level network telemetry to characterize behavior of individual
IoT devices; (2) We tune individual device-specific clustering models and use them
to classify IoT devices from network traffic in real-time. We enhance our classifica-
tion by developing methods for automatic conflict resolution and model consistency
monitoring mechanism; and (3) We evaluate the efficacy of our scheme by applying
it to traffic traces (benign and attack) from 12 real IoT devices, and demonstrate its
ability to detect behavioral changes with overall accuracy of more than 94%. Parts
of this chapter have been published in [9] and [10].
5.1 Introduction
IoT devices are typically purpose built with limited functionalities – they communi-
cate with a specific set of endpoints (i.e., servers) using a small number of TCP/UDP
flows. Therefore, a growing number of traffic classification proposals are emerging
based on supervised machine-learning techniques (e.g., multi-class decision-trees or
neural-networks) that use packet-level [135], flow-level [136], or a combination of
packet-level and flow-level [6] traffic attributes for monitoring IoTs behavioral pat-
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terns on the network. In our prior work [9] we showed that generating the model
for multi-class classifiers becomes practically challenging when a new device type is
added to the network or the behavior of existing device types legitimately changes
(due to firmware upgrades by device manufacturers) – it is needed to regenerate the
entire model of all classes. In order to avoid over-fitting the generated model to
specific classes, we need to carefully balance (i.e., representing classes equally) the
training dataset comprising instances of all device types. However, certain devices
need much more instances to capture their normal behavior.
In this chapter, we employ a set of one-class clustering models (one per IoT de-
vice), and each can be independently trained and updated. Our first contribution
develops an inference engine using an unsupervised one-class clustering model for
each device to detect their normal network behavior using low-cost traffic attributes
that can be computed from real-time flow-level telemetry. Our second contribu-
tion tunes individual device-specific clustering models and uses them to classify IoT
devices types from network traffic in real-time. We enhance our classification by
developing methods for automatic conflict resolution and monitoring consistency of
individual models. Finally, we evaluate the efficacy of our scheme by applying it
to traffic traces (benign and attack) from 12 real IoT devices and demonstrate its
ability to detect behavioral changes with an overall accuracy of more than 94%.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: In §5.2, we present our dataset
and traffic attributes, and build unsupervised clusters to characterize network behav-
ior of individual IoT devices. In §5.3, we design and implement an inference engine
composed of classification models to identify the IoT devices and detect anomalies.
We also devise a scoring technique to measure the consistency of those classification
models. In §5.4, we evaluate the efficacy of the inference engine in classifying device
types and detecting the attack, followed by comparison on one-class classification
with a multi-class classification method. The chapter is concluded in §5.5.
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5.2 Clustering Flow-Level Attributes
In this section, we first outline our IoT dataset, network telemetry, and traffic at-
tributes. Next, we show how clusters of attributes will characterize network behavior
of individual IoT devices.
5.2.1 Flow-Level Telemetry and Traffic Attributes
Dataset: We use two sets of packet traces for this work, namely DATA1 (be-
nign traffic) and DATA2 (mix of benign and attack traffic). The first dataset (i.e.,
DATA1) was collected from a testbed consisting of more than 30 IoT devices for a
duration of six months (i.e., 01-Oct-2016 to 31-Mar-2017) [6]. We select 12 IoT de-
vices namely the Amazon Echo, Belkin motion sensor, Belkin switch, Dropcam, HP
printer, LiFX bulb, Netatmo weather station, Netatmo camera, Samsung camera,
Smart Things, Triby speaker, and Withings sleep sensor as those showed significant
activities during the early period of the dataset (i.e., 1-Oct-2016 to 15-Nov-2016).
We assumed that DATA1 does not contain any attack data and the devices we used
in our testbed are not compromised. However, we allowed the devices to update
their firmware automatically. Also, we aware that these data may contain uninten-
tional connection losses for some devices due to the downtimes of cloud service. We
evaluate (in §5.3) on DATA1 the efficacy of our inference engine in classifying device
profiles as well as detecting their behavioral changes.
Our second dataset (i.e., DATA2) contains more than eight weeks’ worth of
PCAP traces [85] collected from ten IoT devices (in a different environment) over
two months in 2018. DATA2 includes normal traffic (covering boot, active, and idle
operating states) and also annotated attack traffic (direct and reflective) on these
IoT devices. For this dataset, we assumed that no attacks occurred during the days
other than the annotated ones. In order to reduce the unintentional behavioural
116
Chapter 5. Behavioral Change Detection using Clustering Algorithm
changes, we minimize the automatic firmware updates by manually updating the
possible devices before collecting the data. We use DATA2 (in §5.4.3) to evaluate
the performance of our scheme in detecting cyber-attacks that cause behavioral
changes in real-time.
Flow-Level Telemetry and Attributes: We showed in Chapter 3 that indi-
vidual IoT devices exhibit identifiable patterns in their traffic flows such as activity
cycles and volume patterns, and profiles of signaling protocols such as DNS, NTP,
and SSDP. To monitor IoT behavior on the network in real-time, we identify a set
of flows (specific to each device) that collectively capture its entire traffic. These
flow rules can be programmed into an SDN-enabled switch [7, 162] through which
the traffic of IoT devices passes – rules of different devices are distinguished by a
match field corresponding to device identifier (i.e., MAC or IP address). Counters
of these flow rules are periodically (configurable, say, every minute) measured, and
will form traffic attributes of individual devices.
Table 5.1 shows eight flow rules that we use to measure network traffic of each
IoT device with the following order: (1,2) DNS outgoing queries and incoming
responses on UDP 53; (3,4) NTP outgoing queries and incoming responses on UDP
123; (5) SSDP outgoing queries on UDP 1900; (6,7) other “remote” traffic (e.g.,
Internet) outgoing from and incoming to the device that passes through the gateway;
and (8) all “local” traffic (i.e., LAN) incoming to the device. Note that we do not
monitor SSDP traffic incoming to IoT devices to avoid capturing (and mixing) the
Table 5.1: Flow rules (per-device) needed for network traffic telemetry.
Flow description srcETH dstETH srcIP dstIP srcPort srcPort proto
DNS↑ <devMAC> * * * * 53 17
DNS↓ * <devMAC> * * 53 * 17
NTP↑ <devMAC> * * * * 123 17
NTP↓ * <devMAC> * * 123 * 17
SSDP↑ <devMAC> * * * * 1900 17
remote↑ <devMAC> <gwMAC> * * * * *
remote↓ <gwMAC> <devMAC> * * * * *
local↓ * <devMAC> * * * * *
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discovery activities of other devices on the local network. Also, we do not monitor
local traffic coming to IoT device as this traffic is assumed to have originated from
another IoT device locally – this way, activity of local flows is counted only for one
device (receiver). We have used MAC address as the identifier of a device – one
may use an IP address (i.e., without NAT), physical port number, or VLAN for a
one-to-one mapping of a physical device to its traffic trace.
We use two key attributes [5] namely average packet size and average rate
for each of the eight flows mentioned above. We also note that traffic attributes can
better characterize individual devices if they are computed at multiple time-scales
[137] particularly in the characterization of long-range dependent traffic. We, there-
fore, collect per-flow packet and byte counts every minute, and compute attributes
at time-granularities of 1, 2, 4, and 8 minutes. This way we generate eight attributes
for each flow that means a total of 64 attributes per device.
Extracting Attributes: In order to synthesize flow entries and thereby extract
attributes from the traffic traces, we use our native packet-level parsing tool [5]. It
takes raw PCAP files as input, develops a table of flows (like in an SDN switch)
and exports byte/packet counters of each flow at a configurable resolution (e.g., 60
sec). Lastly, we generate a stream of instances (a vector of attributes periodically
generated every minute) corresponding to each of the individual devices.
We begin with DATA1, and use a month’s worth of its data (i.e., 01-Oct-2016
to 31-Oct-2016) for training and the following two weeks for testing our models –
the second column in Table 5.2 summarizes the number of training/testing instances
per each device type contained in this part of DATA1. Later in §5.3, we will use the
rest of DATA1 (spanning a longer period of traffic traces) to show how our models
detect changes in IoT behaviors.
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Table 5.2: Summary of partial DATA1 (benign traffic): Device instances and clus-
tering parameters.
Instance count
Unsupervised classifier
parameters
Device
Training
(1-month)
Testing
(2-week)
# Principal
components
#
clusters
Amazon Echo 40843 18694 19 256
Belkin motion 35153 18780 17 256
Belkin switch 40991 18771 18 256
Dropcam 41089 18787 9 128
HP printer 40713 18693 13 128
LiFX bulb 36952 18707 14 256
Netatmo cam 40788 18706 15 512
Netatmo weather 24896 17473 9 128
Samsung cam 40841 18696 16 256
Smart Things 41073 18799 13 256
Triby speaker 31898 18694 15 256
Withings sleep sensor 32033 10877 12 128
5.2.2 Attributes Clustering
Our primary objective is to train a number of models (one per IoT device) where each
model recognizes traffic patterns of a particular device type (i.e., class) and rejects
data from all other classes – i.e., one-class classifier generates “positive” outputs for
a known/normal instances, and “negative” otherwise. This approach enables us to
re-train each model independently (in case of legitimate changes). Also, it has been
shown that device-specialized models can better detect anomalous traffic patterns
(outliers) [85]. There are a number of algorithms for one-class classification. One
of the most common and efficient methods is K-means [113] which finds groups of
instances (i.e., “clusters”) for a given class that are similar to one another. Each
cluster is identified by its centroid, and an instance is associated with a cluster if
the instance is closer to the centroid of that cluster than any other centroids.
To provide insights into traffic characteristics of IoT devices, we show in Fig. 5.1
clusters of instances for three representative devices namely, the Amazon Echo,
Belkin switch, and LiFX bulb from our dataset. Note that our instances are multi-
dimensional (i.e., 64 attributes), and thus can not be easily visualized. Therefore,
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Figure 5.1: Clusters of data instances in two-dimensional space for representative
IoT devices: (a) Amazon Echo; (b) Belkin switch; and (c) LiFX bulb.
we employ the Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to project data instances to a
two-dimensional space just for illustration purposes – data instances are shown as
dots and cluster centroids are shown as crosses. Note that only 10% of instances are
shown in each cluster for better visualization – as an example, four dots in cluster
A1 of Amazon Echo, shown in Fig. 5.1.(a), approximately represent 40 instances.
Dotted circles depict the boundary of clusters. These boundaries will be used to
determine if a test instance belongs to clusters of a class or not. As per a rule of
thumb for finding outliers [170], a boundary for each cluster is chosen in a way to
exclude data points whose distance from the centroid is relatively large (i.e., values
more than 1.5 times the interquartile range from the third quartile). In other words
we define the boundary for each cluster that covers the first 97.5% [171] of data
points closest to the cluster center and exclude farther instances to avoid impurities
in our training dataset.
It is important to note that an actual cluster forms a contour (enclosing asso-
ciated data points) which could form a complex shape. Given that our individual
models consist of tens of clusters we approximate the shape of their contours, and
hence make our classification scheme computationally cost-effective and more effi-
cient. Furthermore, K-Means algorithm attempts to partition the training dataset
into spherical clusters when it is tuned optimally (i.e., equal distance from centroids
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Figure 5.2: Distance probability of clusters: (a) C3 of LiFX bulb;(b) B3 of Belkin
switch; and (c) A1 of Amazon Echo.
in all dimensions). This way, spherical boundaries will be easily used to determine
if a test instance belongs to clusters of a class or not.
From Fig. 5.1, it is seen that instances of Amazon Echo, Belkin switch, and LiFX
bulb are grouped into 16, 4, and 8 clusters, respectively. We observe that instance
clusters of Amazon Echo are fairly spread across the 2D space. For Belkin switch,
clusters are mainly spread across the principal-component-1 while their principal-
component-2 is limited between −20 and 20. Lastly, LiFX bulb instances are spread
along the principal-component-2, while limited between −20 and 20 in the principal-
component-1. Note that each cluster of a class has a probability (“cluster likelihood”)
of covering training instances from the corresponding device type, depending upon
device traffic patterns seen in the training dataset. As annotated in Fig. 5.1, highly
probable clusters for Amazon Echo are A2 (25.1%) and A3 (22.2%), for Belkin
switch are B1 (77.4%) and B2 (19.7%), and for LiFX bulb are C1 (38.8%) and
C2 (20.0%). These clusters highlight the dominant traffic characteristics of their
respective device.
We also note that distribution of instances within each cluster also varies across
clusters. Fig. 5.2 shows a zoomed version of one cluster from each of our three
representative IoT devices – instances are shown by green dots. Each cluster is
divided into 10 equal bands starting from the centroid to the cluster boundary. For
each band, we compute a probability that indicates the fraction of training instances
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it covers. The probability of bands is color coded on a linear scale (e.g., dark blue
indicates a higher probability).
It can be seen in Fig. 5.2a that 95% of LiFX instances inside cluster C3 fall under
four central bands of this cluster. Moving to B3 of the Belkin switch in Fig. 5.2b,
we observe that 81% of instances fall in middle bands (from 4th to 8th). Lastly,
looking at a less probable cluster of Amazon A1 in Fig. 5.2c, 85% of instances are
covered by the last five bands far from the centroid. We would like to reiterate that
the 2D space is used here for illustration purposes only. In our classification scheme,
we employ a hyper-sphere in 64-dimensional space for clustering instances of IoT
traffic attributes.
5.3 Unsupervised Classification of IoT Devices
In this section, we describe the architecture of our inference engine which consists
of a set of one-class models for individual device types. Next, we develop methods
to resolve conflicts between multiple models for device classification. Finally, we
develop a scoring technique to measure the consistency of the models in classifying
IoT devices, identify two monitoring phases namely initial and stable, and detect
behavioral changes.
5.3.1 Clustering Models: Generation, Tuning, and Testing
Prior to generating clustering models, we need to pre-process our raw dataset.
First, we normalize each attribute independently to avoid outweighing large-value
attributes (e.g., average bytes rate of incoming remote traffic at 8-min timescale)
over smaller attributes (e.g., average packet size of outgoing NTP traffic at 1-min
timescale) [172] as the scale of value for different attributes varies significantly (i.e.,
several orders of magnitude). We employ the Z-score method (i.e., computing µ
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Figure 5.3: Elbow method for selecting optimal number of clusters.
and σ from the training dataset) to scale individual attributes. Second, we project
data instances into a lower dimension space by using PCA [173] which results in lin-
early uncorrelated principal components. This is because our data is 64-dimensional
which can be computationally expensive for real-time prediction, and also affect the
clustering performance (possibly getting biased towards less significant attributes).
The orthogonal components enable K-means to detect clusters more clearly by re-
moving redundant and noisy attributes of training dataset. We choose the number of
PCA components to retain optimum “cumulative variance” [174] for our dimension
reduction engine.
Following dimension reduction, we apply K-means algorithm with varying K
values in the power-of-2 (i.e., 2i where i = 1, ..., 10). Note that setting K to small
values would not generate an accurate model of network behavior for IoT devices,
and large values increase the computational cost in both training and testing phases.
Also, a very large K results in smaller size clusters, and hence a rigid classifier which
cannot correctly detect normal (legitimate) instances with small deviations from the
training data – i.e., over-fitting. We find the optimal number of clusters using the
elbow method [175]. Fig. 5.3 shows the average square distance of instances from the
cluster centers (i.e., Inertia per instance) versus clusters count for two representative
device types. The optimal cluster number (marked by ‘×’ on each curve) is chosen
when the first derivative of inertia per instance exceeds a very small negative value
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−0.01 (almost flat) when increasing clusters count. It can be seen that the model
for Amazon Echo needs 256 clusters for optimal performance, and this measure
is 128 clusters for Dropcam. We show in the rightmost column of Table 5.2, the
model parameters for individual device types that are obtained from the methods
mentioned above.
Having clustering models generated, we test an instance of IoT traffic attributes
after scaling and dimension reduction, as shown by a sequence of steps in Fig. 5.4.
The test instance is presented to all of the device-specific models to find the near-
est centroid of each model – the minimum of euclidean distances between the test
instance and clusters centroid is chosen. Given a nearest centroid, the instance is
checked against the corresponding cluster to determine if it falls inside or outside
of that cluster boundary, and if inside, compute a confidence level. To better illus-
trate this process, let us consider the two-dimensional space of clusters we discussed
earlier in Fig. 5.1. Assume that a test instance has its principal component-1 and
component-2 equal to 0 and 20, respectively. The nearest centroids to this test in-
stance are A1 of Amazon Echo, B2 of Belkin switch, and C4 of LiFX. Since the test
instance falls outside of A1 boundary, the Amazon Echo model results in a negative
output while the other two models give positive outputs. In what follows next, we
show how to select the “winner” model in case of multiple positive outputs for a test
instance.
5.3.2 Conflict Resolution
Each model learns the normal behavior of one device type. Different devices may
display a slightly similar traffic behavior (e.g., DNS, NTP or SSDP) for a short
period of time [136]. This can result in multiple positive outputs generated by our
clustering models for an instance. We address this issue by using the “confidence”
of models which give positive output: the model with the highest confidence-level is
selected as the winner.
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Figure 5.4: Use of each clustering model for a test instance.
Confidence-level: We derive a probability value for test instances to be asso-
ciated with a cluster of that model - we call it “associate probability”. Given an
instance Ins receiving a positive output from a model Mi and falling in a distance
band Dl of the nearest cluster Cj (of the model Mi), the associate probability is
estimated by:
P test[Ins|Mi(Cj(Dl))] = P
train
[Cj |Mi] × P train[Dl|Cj ] (5.1)
where P train[Cj |Mi] is the likelihood of the nearest cluster Cj within the model Mi and
P train[Dl|Cj ] is the probability of distance band Dl inside the cluster Ci – both probability
values are obtained from the training dataset. We note that P train[Cj |Mi] is always non-
zero (by optimal tuning [176]), but it is possible to have P train(Dl|Cj) equal to zero when
none of the training instances fall inside a band Dl (i.e., unexplored distance bands
in the training data). To avoid a zero confidence for test instances, we slightly modify
the band probability using the Laplacean prior[156], priming each band instances
count with a count of one, as given by:
P train[Dl|Cj)] =
1 +NDl
L+NCj
(5.2)
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Figure 5.5: Distribution of clustering probability for training instances of three
device types.
where NDl is the number of training instances inside the band Dl; NCj is the
total number of instances in the cluster Cj; L is the total count of distance bands
in the cluster – we use ten bands in every cluster (L = 10).
The associate probability, to some extent, indicates the model confidence. How-
ever, it becomes challenging to select the winner among multiple models giving
positive output since the number of clusters and also the distribution of distance
bands vary across models, and hence the associate probability is scaled differently.
For example, models with large number of clusters may have relatively smaller val-
ues of P train(Cj |Mi), or a cluster with highly sparse bands would result in smaller values
of P train(Dl|Cj).
To obtain a metric of confidence for comparison across models, we scale the as-
sociate probability (computed above for a test instance) by using the distribution
of this probability in a training dataset. To better illustrate this scaling process,
we show in Fig. 5.5 the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the associate
probability for training instances from three IoT models namely, Amazon Echo,
Netatmo cam, and Smart Things. For example, we observe that the associate prob-
ability equals to 0.5% is a high value for Amazon Echo model (shown by dotted blue
lines) keeping it above more than 99% of training instances. However, this measures
becomes 90% and 52% for Smart Things (dashed green lines) and Netatmo (solid or-
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Figure 5.6: Architecture of our inference engine.
ange) models, respectively. Therefore, given the associate probability (from a model
that gives positive output for a test instance) we derive the model confidence-level
by computing the fraction of its training data that fall below the test instance (with
respect to the model’s empirical CDF of associate probability).
5.3.3 Consistency Score
Ideally, for monitoring individual IoT devices we expect consistent outputs to be
generated by the inference engine over time. It is important to note that a given
device which is consistently and correctly classified by a model over a period of time
(say, a week), may occasionally get missed (i.e., negative output) by its intended
model. To bootstrap the monitoring process for a newly connected (and possibly
unknown) device, we initially need this device to consistently receive positive outputs
from one of the existing models in order to accept the device and label it by a known
class (“stable state”). Once a device becomes known (accepted) and is at its stable
state, receiving negative outputs frequently from its indented model, which indicates
a change (legitimate or illegitimate) in the device behavior and thus requires further
investigations.
We develop a score (between 0 and 1) to track the consistency of our device
classification – we call it “consistency score”. Fig 5.6 shows the architecture of our
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Figure 5.7: Dynamics of consistency score for Smart Things instances in real-time.
inference engine consisting of classification followed by consistency scoring. For
instances of a given device, the consistency score is computed and tracked per each
model and updated following classification of instance – the consistency score of a
model rises by its positive output and falls by its negative output over time. To better
understand the dynamics of this score, let us begin with an example. We take three
day’s worth of instances from Smart Things device, and present (real-time replay)
this traffic to four trained models including Smart Things, Netatmo camera, Amazon
Echo, and Withing Sleep sensor. We show in Fig. 5.7 the consistency score of these
four models in real-time. It can be seen that as we expect the score of intended
model Smart Things (shown by solid lines) is dominant while the other three are
negligible (and hence invisible). For Smart Things the score slowly rises and reaches
to a high level of 0.8 after about 30 hours. We also observe that sometimes the score
of the intended model falls slightly and rises again – this is because some instances
may display patterns closer to other models. We zoom in to the gray band region
(Nov 4, 11pm - Nov 5, 2am) to see the magnified score of other models. It is observed
that once other models give positive output their score quickly spikes, but soon after
drops back to zero (shown by dotted red lines for Netatmo cam) as the intended
model Smart Things wins again.
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Figure 5.8: Real-time update rate of consistency score – for a given model, it falls
fast (from highest to lowest value in 3 hours) on continuous negative outputs, and
rises slowly (from lowest to highest value in 24 hours) on continuous positive outputs.
We update the consistency score with two rates: rising on positive output at
rate λr and falling on negative output at rate λf – these rates can be configured by
network operators. To update the consistency score, we use sigmoid functions which
are commonly used in processes like trust management [177] as they exhibit a soft
start and end, and are bounded within 0 and 1. The raw score is represented by
sequence {St} beginning at time t = 0, is dynamically updated by:
St =
St−1 × eλ
1 + St−1 × (eλ − 1) (5.3)
where, St−1 is the previous value of the estimated score, and λ is set dynamically
depending on the latest output of the model (i.e., λr > 0 for positive output, and
λf < 0 for negative output). Network operators can configure their λr and λf based
on their preferred policy in terms of how quickly (or slowly) they want to rise/fall
the score. Depending upon the time expected T to reach to a “target score” S∗
(between 0 and 1) from the mid-level score 0.50, we derive the value λ by:
λ =
log( S
∗
1−S∗ )
T
(5.4)
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In this chapter, we choose a conservative policy whereby the consistency score
rises at slower rate than it falls. Our λ values are the same for all models and
configured in such a way that it will take 12 hours to reach to a very high score 0.99
from the score 0.50 (λr = 0.0064) in case of successive positive outputs from the
model, while it will need only 1.5 hours to reach a very small score 0.01 from the
score 0.50 (λf = −0.0511) in case of successive negative outputs. Fig. 5.8 shows two
sample curves of consistency scores with our chosen λ values, each is monotonically
rising and falling on successive positive and negative outputs respectively. We note
that both curves saturate (reaching to ultimate values 0 and 1) in infinite time, and
change very slowly beyond certain levels, i.e., above 0.99 for the rising curve and
below 0.01 for the falling curve. In other words, entering into these regions can stifle
agility of our real-time monitoring (specially for detecting attacks in real-time). For
example, in order to fall from 0.999 to 0.99 it will take at least 45 minutes (half the
time needed to fall from 0.99 to 0.50). Similarly, it needs 6 hours to rise from 0.001
to 0.01. Therefore, we cap the score at 0.99 and 0.01 as our saturation levels, and
also initialize the score by S0 = 0.01.
5.3.4 Monitoring Phases
For monitoring behavior of each IoT device we consider two phases: (1) initial
phase, and (2) stable phase. Initial phase begins once a device connects to the
network for the first time (discovered). During this phase, our inference engine
(shown in Fig. 5.6) aims determine the device type (classification) by asking all
existing models. To achieve this aim, every instance of the device traffic is fed to all
models in real-time and their outputs are obtained. If multiple models give positive
outputs, then our conflict resolution is applied to choose a winner model. During this
phase, the consistency score of all winner models (giving positive output) is tracked
till the score of one model reaches an acceptable level (i.e., a threshold chosen by
the network operator, say 0.90) whereby the device type is verified. At this point
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the device gets labeled by a known class, its intended model is determined, and its
initial phase completes. Stable phase begins upon completion of the initial phase.
In the stable phase, the inference engine uses only the intended model to monitor
the real-time behavior of the device. In the next section, we see how the consistency
score of the intended model will be used to detect any change of behavior.
5.4 Performance Evaluation
We now evaluate the efficacy of our inference engine. First, we evaluate the perfor-
mance of one-class models and conflict resolution in selecting an intended model for
a given device during its initial phase of monitoring. Once the device type is clas-
sified (with sufficiently high level of consistency), we next demonstrate behavioral
changes using temporal consistency score of the intended model during its stable
phase of monitoring. Finally, we show the efficacy of our inference engine. We also
compare our one-class classification with a multi-class classification method.
5.4.1 Device Classification
We begin by evaluating the performance of device classification using part of test
instances from DATA1 (i.e., only two weeks spanning from 1-Nov-2016 to 14-Nov-
2016). We show in Fig. 5.9 the confusion matrix of classification before and after
resolving conflicts. Every clustering model (listed in rows) is presented by test
instances of IoT devices (listed in columns). For a given cell, the value indicates
the percentage of instances (from the device in corresponding column) that receive
positive output from the model in the corresponding row.
Starting from raw outputs in Fig. 5.9a, it can be seen that all models correctly
detect majority of instances from their own class as shown by diagonal elements
of the confusion matrix – except Triby speaker with 88.9%, others display more
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(a) Raw output of clustering models.
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Figure 5.9: Confusion matrix of device classification: (a) raw output of clustering
models; and (b) refined output after conflict resolution.
than 93.5% of correct detection (i.e., true positive). However, we observe that
models incorrectly detect device instances from other classes (i.e., false positive) as
shown by non-diagonal elements of the confusion matrix. For example, models for
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Amazon Echo and Belkin motion incorrectly give positive output to 99.8% and 98.9%
of instances from HP printer. Considering the raw outputs of various models, we
found 70% of test instances are detected by more than one model (in addition to their
expected model), and 2% of test instances are not detected by any of the models.
Next, we select the winner model for each test instance using model confidence-level
(§5.3.2).
Fig. 5.9b shows the confusion map after conflict resolution. It clearly shows a
significant enhancement in performance of our device classification by selecting the
model with the highest confidence. Note that the average false positive rate has
reduced to less than 0.4% while the average true positive rate is 93.9%.
Also, we observe that the conflict resolver has slightly reduced the rate of true
positive for almost all models. Note that Smart Things is impacted more compared
to other models by experiencing a drop from 96.9% to 88.9% in its true positive
rate largely because of the Netatmo camera model which gives positive output with
high confidence for 8.3% of Smart Things instances. Focusing on the model of
Netatmo camera, we found that its clusters overlap with a number of clusters of
several devices such as Belkin switch, LiFX, Smart things, and Triby speaker, and
hence results in false positives. This is mainly because of the aperiodic behavior
of the Netatmo camera which is event triggered – camera transmits video to its
cloud server whenever it recognizes a human face or detects a motion. As a result,
it displays a wider range of activity pattern at longer time scales, overlapping with
traffic patterns of other devices. For example, the average byte rate of incoming
NTP traffic of Netatmo camera at 8-min timescale can take a value from 0 to 700
bytes-per-min. Such a wide range overlaps with the value range of the same attribute
for LiFX bulb (varying between 8 − 12 bytes-per-min) and Smart Things (varying
between 15− 25 bytes-per-min).
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(a) Belkin switch.
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Figure 5.10: Time-trace of consistency score for normal behavior in: (a) Belkin
switch; and (b) Triby speaker.
5.4.2 Detecting Behavioral Change
In the previous subsection, we showed the efficacy of our system in classifying in-
dividual device instances using an array of models. Once classified, we monitor
activity of each IoT device in real-time using its intended model. We now check how
our models highlight behavioral changes by tracking dynamics of their consistency
scores (§5.3.3). For this evaluation, we use a longer portion of DATA1 spanning
from 01-Nov-2016 to 31-Mar-2017.
Fig 5.10a shows the consistency score of our inference engine, for traffic instances
of Belkin switch over a period between Nov 1, 2016 and Jan 28, 2017. It is seen that
the score ramps up to 99% within the first 48 hours – the device then goes offline
for a day as shown by dashed gray lines, and comes back online on Nov 4. After
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Time srcIP dstIP Protocol srcPort dstPort Info
2016-11-01  18:11:23 192.168.1.120 cfapmxc001-xsa DNS 58502 53 Standard query 0x02d1 A sip.invoxia.co
2016-11-01  18:11:23 cfapmxc001-xsa 192.168.1.120 DNS 53 58502 Standard query response 0x02d1 A sip.invoxia.com
2016-11-01  18:11:23 192.168.1.120 sip.invoxia.co SIP 52180 5228 Request: REGISTER sip:sip.invoxia.com
2016-11-01  18:11:23 sip.invoxia.co 192.168.1.120 SIP 5228 52180 Status: 200 OK  (1 binding) | 
2016-11-01  18:11:26 192.168.1.120 sip.invoxia.co TCP 52180 5228 52180  >  5228 [ACK] Seq=182817 Ack=168520 Win=65360 Len=0 
2016-11-01  18:12:20 sip.invoxia.co 192.168.1.120 TCP 5228 52180 5228  >  52180 [FIN, ACK] Seq=168520 Ack=182817 Win=63063 Len=0 
2016-11-01  18:12:20 192.168.1.120 sip.invoxia.co TCP 52180 5228 52180  >  5228 [FIN, ACK] Seq=182817 Ack=168521 Win=65360 Len=0 
2016-11-01  18:12:20 sip.invoxia.co 192.168.1.120 TCP 5228 52180 5228  >  52180 [ACK] Seq=168521 Ack=182818 Win=63063 Len=0 TSval=3211580419 TSecr=37617811
2016-11-01  18:12:30 192.168.1.120 sip.invoxia.co TCP 49814 5228 49814  >  5228 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=29200 Len=0 MSS=1460 SACK_PERM=1 
2016-11-01  18:12:30 sip.invoxia.co 192.168.1.120 TCP 5228 49814 5228  >  49814 [RST, ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=0 Len=0
2016-11-01  18:12:31 192.168.1.120 sip.invoxia.co TCP 49814 5228 [TCP Retransmission] 49814  >  5228 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=29200 Len=0 MSS=1460 SACK_PERM=1 
2016-11-01  18:12:31 sip.invoxia.co 192.168.1.120 TCP 5228 49814 5228  >  49814 [RST, ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=0 Len=0
2016-11-01  18:15:04 192.168.1.120 blue.invoxia.i TCP 35115 8090 [TCP Keep-Alive] 35115  >  8090 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=30016 Len=0 TSval=37634203 TSecr=3211446554
2016-11-01  18:15:04 blue.invoxia.i 192.168.1.120 TCP 8090 35115 [TCP Keep-Alive ACK] 8090  >  35115 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=2 Win=14480 Len=0 
2016-11-01  18:15:05 192.168.1.120 blue.invoxia.i TCP 35115 8090 [TCP Keep-Alive] 35115  >  8090 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=30016 Len=0 
2016-11-01  18:15:05 blue.invoxia.i 192.168.1.120 TCP 8090 35115 [TCP Keep-Alive ACK] 8090  >  35115 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=2 Win=14480 Len=0 
2016-11-01  18:16:04 192.168.1.120 sip.invoxia.co TCP 36682 5228 36682  >  5228 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=29200 Len=0 MSS=1460 SACK_PERM=1 
2016-11-01  18:16:04 sip.invoxia.co 192.168.1.120 TCP 5228 36682 5228  >  36682 [RST, ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=0 Len=0
2016-11-01  18:16:05 192.168.1.120 sip.invoxia.co TCP 36682 5228 [TCP Retransmission] 36682  >  5228 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=29200 Len=0 MSS=1460 SACK_PERM=1 TSval=37640299 TSecr=0
2016-11-01  18:16:05 sip.invoxia.co 192.168.1.120 TCP 5228 36682 5228  >  36682 [RST, ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=0 Len=0
2016-11-01  18:19:35 192.168.1.120 cfapmxc001-xsa DNS 58502 53 Standard query 0x02d2 A sip.invoxia.co
2016-11-01  18:19:35 cfapmxc001-xsa 192.168.1.120 DNS 53 58502 Standard query response 0x02d2 A sip.invoxia.co
2016-11-01  18:19:35 192.168.1.120 sip.invoxia.co TCP 54643 5228 54643  >  5228 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=29200 Len=0 MSS=1460 SACK_PERM=1 
2016-11-01  18:19:35 sip.invoxia.co 192.168.1.120 TCP 5228 54643 5228  >  54643 [RST, ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=0 Len=0
2016-11-01  18:19:36 192.168.1.120 sip.invoxia.co TCP 54643 5228 [TCP Retransmission] 54643  >  5228 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=29200 Len=0 MSS=1460 SACK_PERM=1 
2016-11-01  18:19:36 sip.invoxia.co 192.168.1.120 TCP 5228 54643 5228  >  54643 [RST, ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=0 Len=0
Figure 5.11: Wireshark capture of Triby speaker packets showing outage of SIP
server.
that device instances are consistently detected by the intended model, and hence
the score remains high with minor changes over this long period.
Fig 5.10b illustrates a scenario where consistency score drops for a relatively short
period of time (due to temporary change of behavior in traffic of Triby speaker),
and rises afterwards. We manually inspected packet traces corresponding to these
temporary drops of the score. We found that a remote SIP server (sip.invoxia.com),
with which Triby speaker keeps a continuous TCP connection, was responding with
ACK/RST packets during those periods, as highlighted by red rows in Fig. 5.11,
indicating the expected SIP service was not operational. Note that other services
for Triby speaker were functional normally.
We also note that the behavior of a device may change permanently due to
firmware upgrade. Fig 5.12a illustrates this scenario for Dropcam. We can see that
the consistency score of Dropcam model remains high throughout Nov 2016 until
Dec 5, 2016 when the device goes off-line, as shown by dotted gray lines – a couple
of slight drops are observed on Nov 15 and Nov 22 which get restored fairly quickly
(infrequent mis-classification is not surprising due to minor overlaps between clusters
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(b) Re-trained model (Dropcam).
Figure 5.12: Time-trace of consistency score due to firmware upgrade in Dropcam
traffic: (a) original model; and (b) re-trained model.
of various models). However, once Dropcam comes back online on Dec 25, the score
steeply drops to its lowest possible value 0.01 and stays at that level during the
whole January. It is seen that the score sometimes jumps up to 0.20 or even 0.30,
but it quickly drops back to its minimum value. We again manually inspect the
packet traces of Dropcam and found its behavior permanently changed. Note that
the Dropcam network activity is dominated by a single TLS connection which the
device establishes with its cloud server (nexus-us1.dropcam.com) [6], typically sending
packets of size 156 bytes and receiving packets of size 66 bytes. Manual inspections
revealed that the rate of packets for this flow changed in both directions (while
packet sizes remained unchanged), resulting in a decrease of upstream bitrate from
1896 bps to 1120 bps and downstream bitrate from 584 bps to 424 bps. It is also
important to note that the firmware upgrade for Dropcam is done automatically
136
Chapter 5. Behavioral Change Detection using Clustering Algorithm
when it reboots. Confirming firmware updates (after they occur) requires manual
inspection only when our inference engine flags anomalies. Note that automatic
detecting of firmware updates requires labeled instances which are not available to
us – each manufacturer uses a different method to update device firmware remotely.
Therefore, we are not able comment on the ability of our attributes in detecting
firmware updates. Once it is confirmed, we re-train the Dropcam model using
an additional two weeks’ worth of data (between Dec 25, 2016 and Jan 07, 2017)
after this firmware upgrade – adding new instances to training dataset resulted in
an increase in the number of PCA components (from 9 to 11) for Dropcam, while
the number of clusters remained the same. Fig. 5.12b shows how consistency score
returns back to its perfect level after augmenting the Dropcam model with attributes
of the firmware upgrade – the score is shown by dashed gray lines during the two
weeks of re-training period.
5.4.3 Detecting Attacks
We now evaluate the performance of our inference engine against attack traffic. For
this evaluation, we use our second dataset DATA2. It consists of well-annotated
attack and benign traffic of ten real IoT devices namely Amazon Echo, TPlink
switch, Belkin motion sensor, Belkin switch, LiFX bulb, Netatmo camera, Hue bulbs,
iHome switch, Samsung Smart camera, and Google Chromecast. These attacks on
IoT devices are in various types including directly targeted attacks such as ARP
spoofing, TCP SYN flooding, Fraggle (UDP flooding), and Ping of Death, and also
reflection attacks such as SNMP, SSDP, TCP SYN, and Smurf. Each type is at
three different rates (i.e., low: 1 packet-per-second, medium: 10 pps, and high: 100
pps). Additionally, attacks are diversified in terms of the location of attacker being
remote or local to victim/reflector IoT devices. In total, DATA2 contains 200 attack
sessions, and each lasts for around 10 minutes.
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Table 5.3: Summary of DATA2: device instances and clustering parameters – benign
traces for training, and mix of benign and attack traces for testing).
Instance count
Unsupervised classifier
parameters
Device
Training
(4-week)
Testing
(4-week)
# Principal
components
#
clusters
Amazon Echo 27102 27510 20 256
Belkin motion 38229 37216 13 256
Belkin switch 21038 12689 17 256
Chromecast 17396 24316 17 512
Hue bulb 17329 25830 19 512
LiFX bulb 25903 26181 15 256
Netatmo cam 13529 10639 16 256
Samsung cam 38227 36747 15 256
TPlink switch 38211 35205 14 128
iHome 37866 35761 16 128
Note that DATA2 was collected from a different IoT environment, and therefore
we need to regenerate our clustering models using data of IoT behaviors specific to
that environment. From DATA2 traces, we choose four weeks’ worth of data (i.e.,
May 28-31, Jun 8-19, Oct 9-19) containing pure benign traffic for training, and the
remaining four weeks (Jun 1-8, Jun 19-20, Oct 19-Nov 10) containing a mix of benign
and attack traffic for testing. Table 5.3 shows the number of instances (training and
testing) per each device as well as parameters of individual clustering models.
Let us now evaluate the efficacy of individual models against traffic mix of attack
and benign instances. We measure four metrics: fraction of attack instances getting
negative output (TN: true negative), fraction of benign instances getting negative
output (FN: false negative), fraction of benign instances getting positive output
(TP: true positive), and fraction of attack instances getting positive output (FP:
false positive). On average, our models yield acceptable performance metrics – TN,
FN, TP, and FP equals to 92.0%, 6.1%, 93.9%, and 8.0%, respectively.
Focusing on attacks, Table 5.4 and 5.5 show the detection rate of our models for
direct and reflection attacks. Each attack type-location scenario in columns (e.g.,
ARP Spoofing R→D: remote attacker launching direct spoofing attack to device) is
repeated three times at rates 1, 10, and 100 pps.
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Starting from Table 5.4 corresponding to direct attacks, it can be seen that the
average detection rate for ARP Spoofing, Ping of Death, TCP SYN flooding, and
Fraggle is 84.3%, 89.4%, 91.3%, and 86.2%, respectively. However, we observe that
the Belkin motion model displays a poor performance in detecting attacks launched
from local attackers (highlighted cells). For example, the detection rates of Ping of
Death, TCP SYN flooding, and Fraggle are 43.3%, 13.3%, and 3.0% respectively.
This is mainly because Belkin motion typically communicates with its mobile App
locally by UPnP messages reporting current state of the sensor, and hence local
attacks are not seen as so abnormal by the corresponding model – soon we will
further investigate and address this issue.
Moving to Table 5.5 to check the performance of models against reflection at-
tacks, we see the rate of detection for Smurf, SNMP, SSDP and TCP SYN reflection
attacks on average is 99.1%, 58.8%, 88.5%, and 92.0%, respectively. Again, we ob-
serve that some of broadcast attacks (i.e., SSDP reflection attack on Chromecast)
and local attacks (i.e., TCPsyn on Belkin motion and SNMP on Samsung cam)
are missed. This is primarily because we only monitor local traffic targeted to IoT
devices (§5.2.1), and hence broadcast traffic and reflected outgoing local traffic gets
missed. It is important to note that models of Belkin motion and Hue bulb are
detecting local SSDP reflection attacks (L→D→L) only because these two devices
have limited processing power, and hence under local SSDP attacks their normal
operation (activity pattern of other flows) gets impacted leading to abnormal be-
havior.
Table 5.4: Detection rate (%) of direct attacks: per model (in rows) and per attack-
type (in columns).
Attack ARP Spoofing Ping of Death TCP SYN Fraggle
Attacker L→D L→D L→D R→D L→D R→D
Rate 1 10 100 1 10 100 1 10 100 1 10 100 1 10 100 1 10 100
Amazon Echo 100 75 88 100 100 100 100 100 100
Belkin motion 80 70 80 70 50 10 10 30 0 75 100 95 0 0 10
Belkin switch 100 90 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Chromecast 80 80 90 100 100 100 50 70 90
Hue bulb 70 90 90 90 90 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
LiFX bulb 88 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Netatmo cam 25 88 75 100 100 100 80 100 100
Samsung cam 100 90 90 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
TPlink switch 60 70 60 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
iHome 100 100 100
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Table 5.5: Detection rate (%) of reflection attacks: per model (in rows) and per
attack-type (in columns).
Attack Smurf SNMP SSDP TcpSynReflection
Attacker &
Victim L→D→L L→D→L L→D→R R→D→R L→D→L L→D→R R→D→R L→D→L R→D→R
Rate 1 10 100 1 10 100 1 10 100 1 10 100 1 10 100 1 10 100 1 10 100 1 10 100 1 10 100
Amazon Echo
Belkin motion 100 90 80 100 100 100 100 100 100 30 30 0 85 95 100
Belkin switch 100 100 100 100 95 100
Chromecast 0 30 0 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 40 90 100
Hue bulb 90 100 100 100 90 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
LiFX bulb 100 100 100
Netatmo cam 100 100 100 100 100 100
Samsung cam 100 100 100 0 0 0 30 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
TPlink switch 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
iHome
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Figure 5.13: CDF: distribution of confidence-level for Belkin motion instances.
Enhancing Detection Rate: As discussed earlier in this section, models in gen-
eral perform well for a mix of benign and attack traffic except in certain situations.
Among all models, we found that the Belkin motion model does not perform well
especially for attack instances, and results in a relatively high FP 32.1%. To further
investigate such performance, we look at its confidence-level. Fig. 5.13 shows the
CDF of the Belkin model confidence for incorrectly classified attack instances (FP)
as well as correctly classified benign instances (TP). We note that the model gives a
very low confidence-level (less than 2.5%) for a majority (61%) of the FP instances
while such low confidence is seen for a tiny fraction (3%) of the TP instances. Again
the acceptable confidence-level will be chosen by the network operator depending
on their desired sensitivity. In our case, choosing confidence threshold 2.5%, the
performance metrics is significantly enhanced for Belkin model – FP is improved
down to 12.5% while TP is slightly degraded (from 95.5% to 92.6%).
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Such enhancement is observed across all models after filtering model outputs
with confidence less than 2.5%, and thus overall TN, FN, TP, and FP reaches to
94.7%, 9.03%, 92.0%, and 5.3%, respectively across all models. We show in Table 5.6
the performance of individual models after this enhancement. We can see that every
model now displays acceptable value in performance metrics (high rate of true alarms
and low rate of false alarms).
Performance Comparison of One-Class vs. Multi-Class: Lastly, we com-
pare the performance of our one-class classifier scheme versus previously studied
multi-class classifiers (including Chapter 3). For our comparison, we use Random
Forest algorithm (based on decision trees) to generate and tune a multi-class model
using the training instances (same as for our one-class models) from DATA2.
Before comparing the two schemes, we need our devices to operate in their stable
phase of monitoring. Note that, the first two days of testing data contains pure
benign traffic from all of the ten devices. This amount of data is sufficient for all of
intended one-class models to be selected (consistency score of winner models exceeds
our chosen threshold 0.90). In other words, every device passes its initial phase and
enters into the stable phase. In the stable phase, the inference engine is expected
to give negative output whenever attack traffic instances are present and generate
positive output for pure benign traffic.
Table 5.6: Performance of one-class classifiers for mix of attack and benign traffic.
Detected as
attack benign
TN (%) FN (%) TP (%) FP (%)
Amazon Echo 98.8 6.0 94.0 1.2
TPlink switch 95.9 5.8 94.2 4.1
Belkin motion 87.5 7.4 92.6 12.5
Belkin switch 99.2 8.1 91.9 0.8
LiFX bulb 99.3 7.3 92.7 0.7
Netatmo cam 94.6 6.0 94.0 5.4
Hue bulb 97.3 15.7 84.3 2.7
iHome 100.0 7.1 92.9 0.0
Samsung cam 92.4 6.7 93.3 7.6
Chromecast 81.9 10.2 89.8 18.1
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(a) one-class clustering model.
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(b) multi-class decision-tree model.
Figure 5.14: Performance comparison for traffic of Samsung cam during attack: (a)
one-class model; and (b) multi-class model.
Fig. 5.14 illustrates the consistency of the two schemes for a sample of traffic
from Samsung smart cam during a week period with 380 instances of attack traffic
– each instance is worth a minute of traffic. In Fig. 5.14a we plot the real-time
consistency score for Samsung smart cam during attack periods – attack instances
are marked by red ‘×’. It can be seen that the model correctly detects attack traffic
instances by giving them negative outputs, causing a drop in the consistency score.
We note that sometimes the consistency score keeps falling down even when attack
finishes. This is because the impact of some attacks persist in attributes of a few
following instances (up to 8 minutes). We can see that during intense attack periods
(Jun 2 and Jun 3), the consistency score of the one-class model of Samsung camera
drops to its lowest level, well highlighting a significant change of behavior in device
traffic.
On the other hand, it is seen in Fig. 5.14b that the multi-class model is insensitive
to attacks. The consistency score of the model remains high during the whole week,
and does not noticeably get affected by attack instances, as shown in Fig. 5.14b.
Even though the Random Forest model gives negative output to some attack in-
stances (34.6%), but each negative output is immediately followed by a sequence
of positive outputs keeping the real-time consistency score at a very high value –
incorrectly suggesting that the device behaves normally.
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We observe that the one-class clustering model has, by far, more ability to high-
light (detect) anomalies in device behavior compared to the multi-class decision-tree
model – detection rate of 92.6% compared to 34.6%. We also note that multi-class
model correctly classifies 98.0% of benign instances (TP) while this metric is slightly
lower (94.7%) for one-class model.
Although the performance of one-class classifier models is compared with a multi-
class classifier for a limited number of devices, we have found that one-class clas-
sification is more scalable compared to multi-class classification. Note that adding
more devices would exponentially increase the complexity of the multi-class model.
For one-class models, instead, our conflict resolution method ensures each classifier
works independently even for a large number of devices. We note that the cost of
one-class classification is expected to increase linearly with the number of devices.
Note that these two approaches are fundamentally different in their way of mod-
eling: one-class models are generative (learn distribution of each class) while multi-
class models are discriminative (learn decision boundary between various classes).
As a result, one-class models become sensitive to changes in any attribute while
multi-class models become sensitive to changes in only discriminative attributes.
5.5 Conclusion
Real-time traffic monitoring is of paramount importance for network operators who
manage a diverse set of IoT devices. In this chapter, we developed a modular clas-
sifier to identify IoT devices from their network behavior using a set of clustering
models. We further fine-tuned our classification models to not only identify IoT
devices but also detect the cyber-attacks from network traffic. We augmented our
machine learning-based system of classifiers with a conflict resolver and a model
consistency mechanism to track the behavioral changes of devices. Finally, we eval-
uated the efficacy of our system by applying it to traffic traces from 12 IoT devices,
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and demonstrate its ability to detect behavioral changes and cyber-attacks with an
overall accuracy of more than 94%. There are many interesting aspects of this work
that warrant further study. We outline some directions in the next chapter.
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6.1 Conclusions
The Internet of Things has become a natural extension to the physical world and its
influence is found in every aspect of our lives. Although they have endless potential
to offer immense experiences and benefits to the users, the rapid innovation and pro-
liferation make them vulnerable to security and privacy breaches. The recent attacks
on IoT networks clearly indicate the possible catastrophic consequences if we fail to
give adequate attention to IoT security. On the other hand, traditional IT security
mechanisms fail to protect the IoT networks due to the large-scale deployments and
heterogeneous behavior of the devices.
Smart environment operators still fail to recognize the IoT assets and detect
cyber-attacks or compromised behaviors in real-time due to the lack of tools to
enable visibility into the IoT network. This thesis is an attempt to develop novel
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IoT behavioral monitoring mechanisms using network analytics to automate the IoT
device identification and classification. It also deduces their operating context and
detects anomalous behavior indicative of IoT cyber-attacks.
This thesis opened by highlighting the ecosystem of IoT, especially in the per-
spective of security and privacy, by considering the market segments, security risks,
challenges in protection, role of the stakeholders and vulnerability assessment meth-
ods. We have also carried out a comprehensive survey on existing IoT security
solutions and behavioral monitoring methods. Following this, three key contribu-
tions to the field of IoT security have been presented by providing better visibility
into IoT network:
• We captured and synthesized the IoT network traffic traces from a testbed
which is equipped with 28 consumer IoT devices. These traces were used
to profile the behavioral characteristics of IoT devices based on the activity
and signalling patterns. We developed a machine learning based classification
framework using the attributes obtained from the traffic characteristics to
classify the IoT devices. The proposed classification architecture was trained
and tested with six months worth of data collected from an IoT testbed that
showed more than 99% accuracy in classifying the IoT device types.
• We reduced the cost of attribute extraction by proposing flow level programmable
telemetry at multiple timescales. We proposed a real-time IoT behavioral mon-
itoring solution that can recognize the IoT devices and their states of opera-
tions. Furthermore, we showed how an operator can further optimize the cost
of telemetry and how our inference engine can be used to identify behavioral
changes including cyber-attacks.
• We developed a modularized inference engine using an unsupervised machine
learning algorithm, which allows changes to be accommodated in the device
behaviors without system wide retraining. Additionally, we proved that unsu-
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pervised machine learning models are very sensitive with regards to detecting
the behavioral changes including low-rate cyber-attacks which showed 94%
detection rate.
6.2 Future Work
This work makes significant contribution towards IoT behavioral monitoring with
better visibility into the IoT network using network analytics. The novel mechanisms
for IoT behavioral monitoring outlined in this thesis can be improved and refined
based on real-world deployment scenarios. Some of the key refinements are outlined
below:
• The inference engine developed in this thesis has the ability to detect behav-
ioral changes by monitoring for anomalous network traffic patterns. Techniques
to identify the exact traffic flow that is causing the anomalous activity should
be further researched and developed in the future. Identifying and quaran-
tining the anomalous flows during the attack, and performing forensics on
compromised devices will be a sensible future requirement and can be a step
forward for this work [92].
• We proposed a classification framework to deduce the operating context by
identifying states of the devices. However, we have not investigated the proba-
bility of each state and transitional probabilities among them as a part of this
work. It will also be useful to detect the attacks that exploit the legitimate
network activities of devices, which will be a challenge to the current inference
engine. For example, if a device is configured to work dependent on a web ser-
vice, an attacker may compromise the web service to exploit the device using
its dependency [178]. During this attack the traffic between the web service
and the device may follow a legitimate pattern and then it is difficult to trace
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any anomalies. Monitoring the state transitioning pattern and frequency may
be a way forward to detect the attacks.
• The flow level telemetry is purely used in this thesis to monitor the IoT traffic
activities. Although it is difficult to spoof the flow patterns of a device, there
are possibilities an attacker could carefully mimic the flow patterns from a com-
promised device. This issue can be mitigated by including some packet level
attributes from sampled traffic which fingerprint the payloads (e.g., entropy
of packets) in addition to flow level telemetry.
We hope other researchers will explore the future directions identified above.
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